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Management scholars have established the importance of reputation for firm 
performance but the mechanisms through which reputation can be accumulated are still to 
be explored. While some researchers have proposed that reputation accumulates through 
causally ambiguous social processes and can be built through continuous investments 
over time, there is little evidence regarding the nature of firm activities that may serve as 
strategic investments in reputation building. Prior research has focused primarily on 
studying reputation in large established firms that have both their prior performance, 
which can guide public perceptions and opinions, and substantial resources to make 
costly investments in product quality and advertising, which serve to increase their 
reputation. The tendency to study reputation among firms that already have accumulated 
some reputation does not allow for examining how this critical intangible asset comes 
into being and what factors account for the variance in the levels of reputation among 
young firms in an industry. This gap in the literature can be addressed by studying the 
process of reputation building in the context of new ventures (NVs), because such a 
 
context allows for examining the processes and different paths that may evolve from day 
one in the life of a firm. Specifically, my dissertation addresses these gaps in the current 
state of knowledge by examining the critical factors that determine the variations among 
NVs in their reputation building efforts, the factors that account for the relative efficiency 
of these efforts, and the performance implications of reputation building activities and 
reputational capital at different stages of the life of NVs.  
The dissertation is composed of three essays. The first essay describes the 
exploratory stage of this dissertation and provides initial insights regarding the activities 
that help NVs develop reputation early in their lives. The second essay provides a 
theoretical framework to understand the process of reputation building by NVs. I propose 
that NVs can build their initial reputations by investing in symbolic activities and critical 
resources that serve as signals of NVs’ underlying quality and potential. The patterns and 
efficiency of such investments are likely to vary systematically depending on the 
founders’ entrepreneurial experience and the technology and market uncertainty faced by 
NVs and their stakeholders. The third essay tests and provides empirical supports to the 
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The concept of reputation has received considerable attention from scholars in 
strategy and organization theory (Deephouse, 2000; Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Hall, 1992, 1993; Martins, 1998, 2005; Rindova, 
Williamson, Petkova & Sever, 2005).  Reputations are valuable assets because they 
influence stakeholders’ economic choices vis-à-vis organizations and lead to differences 
in organizational performance (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Deephouse, 2000; Dollinger, 
Golden & Saxton, 1997; Rindova et al., 2005). Numerous studies have documented a 
positive relationship between a firm’s reputation and its financial performance (Fombrun 
& Shanley, 1990; Herremans, Akathaporn, & McInnes, 1993; Landon & Smith, 1997; 
McGuire, Schneeweis, & Branch, 1990; Podolny, 1993; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). 
Firms compete for favorable reputation among their stakeholders, because reputation can 
bring them benefits in addition to those explained by their objective financial 
performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990) or product quality (Benjamin & Podolny, 
1999). Reputation not only brings financial benefits to the firm, but also can contribute to 
its sustained profitability. For example, in a study of Fortune 1000 firms, Roberts and 
Dowling (2002) found that firms with higher reputations are better able to sustain 
superior profitability over time. 
There is a general agreement among scholars that reputation is a valuable 
intangible resource, which contributes to a firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Hall, 1992). However, the ways this critical resource emerges or 
can be created by the firm are much less understood. Reputation literature in strategy has 
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focused extensively on the role of reputation for old and well-established corporations, 
primarily Fortune 500 firms (Fombrun, 1997; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Martins, 2005; 
Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Wartick, 2002). The tendency to study reputation among firms 
that already have accumulated certain level of reputation does not allow for examining 
how this critical intangible asset is developed and what factors account for the variance in 
the level of reputational capital among young firms in an industry. While acknowledging 
that it is important to know what factors predict the firms’ reputation and how reputation 
relates to their future performance, most studies by design overlook the fact that firms 
begin their life with no reputation and many of them never accumulate sufficient levels of 
this critical intangible asset.  
Extant research suggests that firm reputation is predicted by past financial 
performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), as well as by some deliberate investments in 
reputation signals, such as pricing and advertising (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Shapiro, 
1983). However, new ventures (NVs) not only lack performance history but also most of 
them start their life with limited resources and few or no products to offer, which makes 
traditional investments in reputation difficult to access and use. In the absence of reliable 
signals of product quality, such as advertising expenditures, brand-name and pricing, it is 
not clear what the cues used by stakeholders to construct reputations are, and how this 
fact ultimately impacts firm performance. One viable way to address these limitations of 
previous research is to study the emergence and accumulation of reputation in NVs, in 




Reputation of New Ventures 
Reputation reflects collective perceptions and evaluations regarding a firm’s 
ability to create value for various stakeholders (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Reputation has been identified as a valuable 
intangible asset (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989), because it can influence 
stakeholders’ economic choices vis-à-vis a firm and their willingness to exchange 
resources with it (Rao, 1994; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Rindova et al., 2005). 
Reputation is particularly valuable under conditions of high uncertainty (Shapiro, 1983; 
Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), such as the early days in a NV’s life. Favorable reputation 
can help stakeholders make resource allocation decisions that favor the NV by investing 
in it, by buying its products and recommending them to their friends, or by pursuing 
employment with the venture. NVs with higher reputations have easier access to capital, 
even when uncertainty about their quality is high (Stuard, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). 
Therefore, building reputation early on can increase a NV’s chances for survival and 
success by improving its ability to attract key stakeholders and to establish exchange 
relationships with them.  
The resource scarcity that characterizes most entrepreneurial settings makes NVs 
even more dependent on their stakeholders for various resources than established firms 
(Aldrich, 2000), which in turn increases the importance of reputation as a factor that can 
attract stakeholders to the NV. Even NVs that begin their lives sponsored by a parent firm 
or angel investors face the need to develop strong reputation rapidly because higher 
levels of resource commitments by initial stakeholders are accompanied by higher 
expectations for economic returns. The perceptions and beliefs that constitute a firm’s 
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reputation develop as stakeholders observe and evaluate the actions and performance of 
firms and form summary impressions about the underlying strategic characteristics of a 
firm (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988).  However, most NVs lack 
the history and performance records to guide stakeholders’ evaluations and opinions 
about them. Often the potential stakeholders are not even aware of the existence and 
activities of a NV, which makes it impossible for them to form impressions or opinions. 
Moreover, because NVs often create value in novel ways by bringing to the market 
previously unavailable products or services, they face the additional challenge to prove 
that their activities fit with the norms and rules of the industry (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Rao, 1994). Overall, the need to develop reputation rapidly in the absence of enough 
resources, consistent performance histories, and interaction patterns, presents NVs with a 
number of unique challenges not encountered by established firms in an industry 
(Aldrich, 2000). Thus, studying NVs’ reputations provides a unique opportunity to 
understand the early reputation building dynamics, which occur when fewer performance 
indicators are available. More specifically, with this dissertation I am addressing the 
following research questions: 
1. What factors explain differences in the intensity and mode of reputation 
accumulation by NVs?  
2. How do initial conditions shape investments in future reputation building by 
the NV? 
3. What is the impact of (a) investments in reputation building, and (b) actual 
change in reputation stock on NV performance? 
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I address these questions in three essays, using a two-phase design that blends 
qualitative and quantitative research methods (Lee, 1999). The first essay describes the 
exploratory stage of this dissertation and provides initial insights regarding the activities 
that help NVs develop reputation early in their lives. The second essay provides a 
theoretical framework to understand the process of reputation building by NVs. I propose 
that NVs can build their initial reputations by investing in symbolic activities and critical 
resources that serve as signals of NVs’ underlying quality and potential. The patterns and 
efficiency of such investments are likely to vary systematically depending on the 
founders’ entrepreneurial experience and the technology and market uncertainty faced by 
NVs and their stakeholders. The third essay tests and provides empirical support to the 
hypothesized model of reputation building in a sample of 415 information technology 
NVs.  
 
Contributions of the Dissertation  
 This dissertation makes several important contributions to management theory 
and practice by expanding the existing knowledge on one important, yet understudied 
issue – reputation building by NVs. Below, I outline the major contributions to research 
and practice and I elaborate more on each of them in the discussion sections of the three 
essays. 
Contributions to research. This dissertation contributes to several bodies of 
research, including reputation research in management and organization theory, the 
resource-based view in strategy, and entrepreneurship research. First, the dissertation 
contributes to reputation research by uncovering the process of reputation building from 
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its very beginning. It addresses an important gap in current research on organizational 
reputations, which has focused primarily on established firms and has overlooked the 
uniqueness of the process of reputation building by NVs. Specifically, I develop and test 
a novel theoretical framework, which explains the processes of reputation accumulation 
by NVs. The theory I propose addresses a major gap in current state of knowledge: while 
scholars from a variety of disciplines, such as management, economics, and sociology 
unanimously agree that reputation is critically important for all firms, the process through 
which firms can accumulate reputation has received limited attention by prior research.  
Second, I extend the resource-based view of the firm (a) by refining scholarly 
understanding of reputation as a valuable intangible asset and by examining the processes 
through which this asset can be developed; and (b) by demonstrating that early in a firm’s 
life the process of reputation-building is less causally ambiguous and more predictable 
than RBV implies. Third, my dissertation contributes to a growing body of research on 
NVs. My findings provide specific ideas how new ventures can build reputation early in 
their lives – an issue that is critically important for their ability to attract stakeholders and 
improve their chances for survival and success. More generally, this dissertation 
addresses the need for cross-disciplinary research in management, which has been 
repeatedly emphasized in the last few years. The theory I develop brings together two 
theoretical perspectives that have not been linked by prior research – signaling theory in 
economics and symbolic research in management – to explain the interplay between NV 
resources and symbolic activities. 
Contributions to practice. This dissertation also has important practical 
implications. First, it provides entrepreneurs with very specific steps they can take in 
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order to build reputation for their ventures and thus to improve their chances for survival 
and success. Second, the qualitative phase of this research provides practitioners with a 
summary of the ‘best practices’ in reputation building for NVs, which can be used to 
guide their reputation-building efforts. For example, the descriptions of specific symbolic 
activities undertaken by the experienced entrepreneurs I interviewed could be used by 
founders as examples to follow. Finally, the results of the large sample study show the 
relative magnitude of the effects of each type of reputation-building activity. This 
information can guide NV founders when they make decisions on how to invest in 
reputation strategically, by allocating the limited resources available to the NV in the 





HOW CAN NEW VENTURES BUILD REPUTATION?  
AN EXPLORATORY STUDY 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this essay I use a grounded theory-building approach to explore the processes 
and mechanisms of reputation-building by new ventures. Specifically, I focus on the 
factors that determine variations among NVs in their reputation-building efforts and 
outcomes. Based on exploratory interviews with nine experienced entrepreneurs, 
supplemented by secondary data on 25 of the NVs they founded, I identify several types 
of activities that play the role of investments in NV reputations. I identify two paths that 
lead to the accumulation of two different types of reputation – direct and generalized. 
Which path a NV would take appears to be strongly related to the type of products that 
the NV offers. High levels of reputation tend to be related to better performance. 
However, the relationship between reputation and performance appears to be less tightly 
coupled than previously believed, which suggests that prior research using financial 
performance as a proxy for reputation needs to be refined.  
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MOTIVATION FOR THIS STUDY 
 
There is a general agreement among scholars that reputation is a valuable 
intangible resource, which contributes to a firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; 
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Hall, 1992). Multiple studies have demonstrated that reputation 
is related to future financial performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Roberts & 
Dowling, 2002; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova & Sever, 2005), which makes reputation a 
desirable resource for any firm to have. However, the ways this critical resource emerges 
or can be created by the firm are much less understood. Reputation research has focused 
extensively on studying reputation of old and well-established organizations, primarily 
Fortune 500 firms, which have already accumulated certain level of reputation (Fombrun, 
1997; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Martins, 2005; Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Wartick, 
2002).  
Extant research suggests that firm reputation is predicted by past performance 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), as well as by costly investments in pricing and advertising 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Shapiro, 1983). This expectation to have performance track 
record and substantial resources available for reputation building investments make 
reputation appear a difficult target for many new ventures (NVs). NVs not only lack 
performance history but also most of them start their life with limited resources and few 
or no products to offer, which makes traditional predictors of reputation irrelevant for 
them. In the absence of reliable signals of product quality, such as advertising 
expenditures, brand-name and pricing, it is not clear what cues stakeholders use to 
construct reputations. One viable way to address these limitations of previous research is 
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to study the emergence and accumulation of reputation in NVs, in order to capture the 
reputation-building process from its beginning.  
There are several reasons why the reputation-building processes of NVs are likely 
to differ from those of established firms: (1) past financial performance is not available to 
guide stakeholder opinions about NVs; (2) advertising and branding are quite costly for a 
start-up with limited resources and other more urgent needs to meet; (3) pricing strategies 
have limited applicability at the beginning, especially if there are no ready products to 
sell or a technology is still under development. The few studies concerned with reputation 
of young firms have converged around the idea that NVs’ reputation is a function of the 
prestige of affiliations they have (Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Further, these studies 
assume that reputational mechanisms lead to the observed performance outcomes without 
measuring reputation directly (e.g., Sine, Shane, & DiGregorio, 2004; Stuart, 2000; Stuart 
et al, 1999).1 However, these studies suggest that reputation is of critical importance for 
NVs, because it determines their survival and success, which makes further exploration 
of reputation accumulation by NV an important research goal.  
To sum up, there are two major gaps in reputation research that need to be 
addressed: first, the process of reputation accumulation remains largely unexplored; and 
second, predictors of reputation established by extant research may have limited 
applicability to new ventures. The tendency to study reputation among firms that already 
have accumulated certain level of reputation does not allow for examining how this 
critical intangible asset comes into being and what factors account for the variance in the 
level of reputational capital among young firms in an industry. Whereas scholars 
                                                 
1 The notable exception that did measure NV reputation using a specially developed three-item scale 
(Shane & Cable, 2002) incorporate reputation as mediator of the relationship between social ties of VC to a 
NV and their decision to invest in it. 
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consistently acknowledge the importance of knowing what factors predict the firms’ 
reputation and how reputation relates to their future performance, most studies by design 
overlook the fact that many firms not only start with no reputation but also never 
accumulate sufficient levels of this critical asset. Both of these gaps can be addressed by 
studying the process of reputation accumulation in NV context, so that the processes can 
be traced from their beginning and relevant factors that impact a NV’s reputation can be 
identified.  
Given the limited insights by prior research into the strategies through which a 
NV can accumulate reputation early in its life, a grounded theory-building approach is 
most appropriate for exploring this phenomenon (Eisenhardt, 1989; Glasser & Strauss, 
1994). The research question I am going to address with this essay is: How do 
entrepreneurs build reputation for their ventures? To address this question, I interviewed 





 This study uses an inductive, multiple-case, embedded research design. Multiple 
cases typically result in a better-grounded and more general theory than single cases 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1994), because they allow for using replication logic 
to confirm or disconfirm inferred patterns of relationships across cases (Yin, 1994). The 
embedded design allows for developing a richer and more accurate theory by uncovering 
aspects of the phenomenon of interest that occur at different levels (Yin, 1994). This 
study is designed to incorporate analysis at three interrelated levels: entrepreneur, NV, 
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and reputation-building activities. Reputation-building activities are broadly defined as 
any type of activity that informants reported as either being relevant for the reputation of 
their ventures or not implementing the activity as being a strategic mistake that harmed 
the reputation of the venture.  
 
Data Collection 
 There are two major sources of data for the cases – exploratory interviews and 
archival sources (internal and external to the NVs). I conducted eleven interviews with 
nine entrepreneurs, each of whom has been involved as a founder in at least one venture 
and as a founder, a CEO, a founding team-member, or a first employee in at least one 
other venture. In selecting my informants, I tried to find entrepreneurs with both positive 
and negative startup experiences, from diverse nationality, age, and number of NVs 
started or being involved in. Table 1.1 presents the summary characteristics of the 
informants, their ventures, and the capacity in which they were involved.2 In addition, I 
used insights from three industry experts and one venture capitalist to better understand 
and interpret my observations. 
Following the University of Maryland policy and procedures for research 
involving human subjects, each informant and I signed an Informed Consent Form, which 
provides information on the purpose of this research and guarantee the informants full 
confidentiality of their own and their ventures’ identity. In order to keep the informants’ 
identity confidential I assigned a code to each informant (e.g., E1, E2, etc.) and to each 
venture (e.g., E1V1, E2V3, etc.), which I use whenever I refer to an informant or a 
particular venture.  
                                                 
2 The relatively large proportion of young entrepreneurs is representative of the population of serial 
entrepreneurs, who are found to often start their second NV before 30 years of age (Ronstadt, 1988). 
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Table 1.1 
Summary Characteristics of the Entrepreneurs and Ventures Described 
 
Informants / Venture 
Characteristics Total E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9 
Age   35 62 48 63 35 35 36 40 63
Number of NVs in which 
the Entrepreneurs were 
involved 
32 2 5 3 6 3 5 2 2 4
Of them as: 
    - a founder 25 1 5 3 6 2 1 2 2 3
    - a non-founder CEO, 
VP,  or the 1st employee 7 1       1 4     1
NVs described in detail 26* (25 NVs) 2 5 3 4 2 3 2 2 3
    of them:                     
    highly successful 8* (7 NVs)   2 1 1   2   1 1
    moderately successful 8 1 2   1 1   1 1 1
    under-performing 4   1 1 1         1
    failure 6 1   1 1 1 1 1     
Note: One highly successful venture was described by two informants independently, 
leaving 25 distinct venture cases for analysis. 
 
The interviews were semi-structured, allowing both for clarification questions and 
giving the informants the opportunity to discuss additional issues, which they considered 
relevant for the reputation of their ventures and for their interactions with critical 
stakeholders. Examples of interview questions are attached in Appendix 1.A. It should be 
noted that the first two informants were used to pretest the questions – they were asked 
more general questions and given the opportunity to discuss activities they considered 
relevant for NV reputation. After receiving feedback from them, I revised the 
questionnaire by making some questions more specific and adding additional ones as 
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suggested by the informants. The interview design provided two major benefits: First, 
interviewing allowed me to learn not only what informants and their teams did – 
information that can be also cross-validated from secondary sources – but also what they 
did not do or what they wish they had done, as well as why. Second, the semi-structured 
interviews allowed me to gain additional insights by obtaining information about facts or 
events which the informants considered relevant even though I would not explicitly ask 
about them. Each interview lasted between 40 minutes and 3 hours, for an average of 1 
hour and 20 minutes per interview.  
In addition to the interviews, I used both internal and external archives to obtain 
supplementary materials about the NVs discussed. First, during the interviews I requested 
from informants archival materials such as company and product-related brochures, 
articles and interviews with the founders published in local or national press, case-studies 
or other materials written about the NVs. Second, I collected the informants’ resumes and 
various types of secondary data about their ventures, such as press releases, media 
publications, case studies published on the Internet, and other documents available from 
independent sources, to validate the activities and outcomes the informants described 
during the interviews. 
Across all the informants, I was able to obtain information on 32 NVs, 25 of 
which were described in enough detail to allow for in-depth analysis. As Table 1.1 
shows, there was substantial variance in the success of different ventures (as assessed 
qualitatively by their founders) and all but one informant had both successful and 
unsuccessful experiences. Specifically, six informants described at least one highly 
successful venture; seven informants described at least one moderately successful 
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venture; four informants described one under-performing venture each; and six 
informants described one failed venture each. As a result, I have for further analysis 
seven highly successful NVs, eight moderately successful NVs, four under-performing, 
and six failed NVs. This variation in performance is important for being able to link 
different reputation-building activities to performance outcomes (Yin, 1994). The NVs 
also vary by industry, type of products, and time period when they were started, which 
allows for deriving more generalizable observations and conclusions. 
 
Analysis 
Following recommendations by prior research, I grouped the data into different 
arrays to extract relevant patterns. As the categories emerged, I went back and forth 
between data and theory looking for confirming or disconfirming evidence. After three 
iterations of coding and analyzing the interviews, I was able to extract some preliminary 
observations. I analyzed the data at three levels: activities, entrepreneurs, and NVs. 
Below, I describe each of these analyses and the outputs obtained from them. 
 
Analysis at the level of NV activities. Based on the exploratory interviews, I 
developed a coding scheme for identifying and categorizing the investments in reputation 
building by different NVs. Table 1.2 presents a list of reputation-building activities 
extracted from the interviews. A detailed table with quotes for each type of activity is 
provided in Appendix 1.B. Two groups of activities emerged: First, direct reputation-
building activities intended to increase public awareness of the NV, to legitimate the NV, 
or to induce positive evaluations of the NV, which I labeled as “symbolic activities”, and 
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second, investments in new product development, building human capital and developing 
relationships for the NV are considered resource investments that contribute to a NV’s 
reputation, because informants identified them as alternative ways to reputation 
accumulation.3 Consistent with the signaling approach to reputation, I concluded that the 
accumulation of such resources also serves as signals, because they can inform observers 
about the potential of the NV to produce high-quality outputs.  
Table 1.2 also lists some indicators of the NV reputation discussed by informants, 
such as industry awards, coverage by specialized and general business press, featuring in 
books and case studies (see also Appendix 1.B). I use these specific suggestions to 
operationalize the concept of reputation in the third essay of this dissertation. 
 
Analysis at the level of the entrepreneur. The second type of analysis was 
performed at the level of the entrepreneur, in order to compare different ventures started 
by the same founder. This analysis allows to control for idiosyncratic founder effects and 
to trace what aspects of the reputation-building process (if any) tend to improve as the 
founders become more experienced. This analysis also allowed me to examine if there is 









                                                 
3 Some informants acknowledged that they performed these activities not only to build positive impressions 





Activities Indicators suggested by the informants 
Symbolic activities that increase  Make people notice the NV by high level of activity 
public awareness of the NV Attending trade-shows, conventions, etc. 
 Presented/ gave speeches at professional conferences 
 Hired VP of public relations 
 Published tech papers, books, industry newsletters 
Symbolic activities that legitimate 
the NV 
Act as a “real” company:  
• hired professional PR-agency  
• hired professional Ad-agency 
 Efforts to educate customers about the new tech – express 
authoritative opinions, provide explanations about the new 
technology 
Symbolic activities that induce 
positive evaluations of the NV 
and its activities 
Communicating clear vision to external parties – how the NV 
creates unique value for customers  
 Brochures and handouts that illustrate the NV team’s skills and 
capabilities 
Investments in NV team size  Building a TMT (adding team members) early in the life of a NV 
Investments in NV team quality Recruit a TMT member or other experts from a prominent 
organizations  
 Recruit an expert with a degree from a top university 
 Recruit a TMT member or other expert with proven track record  
 Recruit a TMT member with prior start-up experience  
Investments in NV team diversity 
 
Recruiting TMT to fill-in missing skills 
Building relationships with 
critical stakeholders  
Investment in building SC as a substitute for investment in 
traditional branding & advertising 
 Building a customer network 
 Secure a few big customers and use them for credential purposes 
 Building strategic alliances/ partnerships 
 Partnerships with prominent industry players (e.g., Microsoft, IBM, 
SAP) 
 Relationships with VCs 
 Relationships with prominent VCs 
Technology Development Quality of the NV’s potential products/ services/ technology 
 Have a pipeline (2nd product/ upgrade of technology)   
 Mergers with existing firms 
  Acquisition of technology 
Reputation • Media coverage in general, business, and industry press  
• Covered in TV news or other reports 
 • Industry/ market awards for innovation, pioneering, etc. 
Performance Criteria • Successfully sold the NV to a big firm 
• Market valuation when sold the NV 
• Growing number of employees 
 
Analysis at the level of the NV. I grouped NVs in different arrays: NVs started by 
each informant, NVs by 1st time entrepreneurs, 2nd time entrepreneurs, etc., and NVs that 
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have different types of products – more vs. less ‘observable’. For example, based on their 
founders’ experience, I divided the ventures in 1st time NVs, 2nd time NVs, etc. I then 
assessed NVs’ reputations based on the verbal descriptions and the secondary materials 
provided by their founders, such as media coverage, industry awards, repeated customers, 
and people who contacted the founders because they heard about the NV from third 
parties. After careful consideration I grouped them in high-reputation, medium reputation 
and low reputation ones for the NVs that aimed at reputation with large number of 
relatively distant stakeholders and good reputation vs. no reputation for the NVs that tried 
to develop positive reputation through a limited number of direct interactions with 
stakeholders.  
Of the eight 1st time NVs, one had no reputation, two – good reputation with local 
customers, three – moderate level of reputation with a broader range of stakeholders, two 
– high reputation at industry level. Of the nine 2nd time NVs, one had low reputation, 
three had good reputation with local customers, one – moderate level of reputation with 
broader range of stakeholders, two – high industry-wide reputation, one NV did not need 
to build reputation, because it was started to serve only one big customer. Of the rest of 
the NVs (five – 3rd time, two – 4th time, and one – 5th time), one had low reputation, two 
– good reputation with local customers, one – moderate level of reputation with broader 
range of stakeholders, three – high industry-wide reputation, one NV did not need to 
build reputation, because it was started to serve only one big customer. The two NVs that 
did not have to build reputation and thus made no efforts to do so were removed from 
subsequent analysis. It should be noted that the proportion of NVs that were able to 
accumulate high reputation among the ones I studied might be greater than the average 
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for the population of NVs. This over-representation of successful NVs could be explained 
with my sapling approach, which involved experienced founders, because my goal was to 
learn what reputation activities are most effective for NVs. Arguably, less experienced 
founders may have lower reputation NVs, as well as lower performing ones. However, 
my goal is to study the processes through which NVs accumulate reputation and, 
therefore, the more NVs in my study have accumulated reputation, the higher the number 
of observation and the more reliable conclusions I can draw about the relationships 
between relevant predictors and NV reputation. 
Because I did not find any systematic difference among NV reputation based on 
the number of prior start-ups by their founders, for most other analysis I pooled the NVs 
together to compare them. For example, I mapped each venture on each of the activities 
identified at the first level of analysis, to investigate potential relationships between 
different activities and levels of reputation. In order to draw conclusions about the 
relationships between different activities and the reputation accumulation by NVs, similar 
activities have to be related to similar outcomes and different activities – to different 
outcomes (Yin, 1994). For this purpose, I compiled several tables, which compared NVs 
along various activity dimensions, as well as along their ultimate outcome. I introduce 
these tables below, when discussing the key observations from the data. Also, I looked at 
pairs of NVs that were similar in type of outputs but accumulated different levels of 
reputation, and searched for similarities and differences in their activities. These analyses 









Observation 1: Limited Applicability of Branding and Advertising for New 
Ventures 
The exploratory interviews suggest that the traditional brand building and 
advertising strategies used by established firms to build or increase their reputation are 
seldom used by NVs. As the two quotes below illustrate, entrepreneurs consistently 
pointed to the fact that they consider launching an advertising campaign beyond the 
options a NV has.  
“… we were so far behind in terms of branding, that it was useless to try to brand 
in this region” (E5: 10) 
 
“It’s a small company, no way a company like that can actually really purchase 
enough promotion and advertising to become famous.” (E4: 7) 
 
Further, none of the informants mentioned any attempt to use traditional marketing and 
advertising strategies for their venture early on, which indicated that reputation 
accumulation by NVs might be driven by different factors than the ones identified by 
prior research as relevant for established firms (Kihlstrom & Riordan, 1984; Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1986).  
 
Observation 2: Reputation-Building Activities Relevant for New Ventures 
More detailed analysis and coding of the interviews suggested that entrepreneurs 
pursued two complementary approaches for attracting stakeholders’ attention and 
creating positive opinions about their NVs in order to build the NVs’ initial reputations. 
First, informants explained in great detail a large variety of activities, which were directly 
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intended to attract stakeholders’ attention, to legitimate the NV, or to explain the purpose 
of the NV. These activities did not involve substantive changes in the NV assets or 
practices but instead were intended to influence stakeholders’ perceptions of the NV and 
to creating desirable interpretations of its more substantive activities. Thus, consistent 
with prior sociology and management research, I call these activities “symbolic” 
activities (Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998). Second, informants identified 
different types of investments in developing their NVs, which they believed had an 
impact on the NVs’ reputation. As Table 1.2 shows, these activities can be grouped into 
three categories – investments in product development, investments in human capital 
(HC), and investments in social capital (SC). 
 
Symbolic Activities. Several informants emphasized the role of various types of 
communications and other activities, which were targeted to impress desired images and 
opinions about the NV. Such activities include: attending trade shows and conventions; 
presenting papers and giving speeches at professional conferences; publishing papers, 
books, and industry newsletters; hiring VP of public relations or a professional PR-
agency very early in the life of the NV; efforts to educate customers about the new 
technology by expressing authoritative opinions and providing explanations about the 
new technology; communicating clear vision to external parties about how the NV 
creates unique value for customers; distributing brochures and handouts that illustrate the 
NV team’s skills and capabilities (see Appendix 1.B for details). For example, one 
informant highlighted the importance of communications for attracting public attention 
and conveying the NV’s vision to critical stakeholders: 
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“You need to set a vision of where you’re going to be and that vision just can’t be 
painted in words by the senior executive.  It has to be embodied in sort of like the 
literature of and the images of the place, and the vision itself of where you’re 
going to be helps people get there.  This is as important for the internal people as 
for external people.  It is one of the transforming vehicles.” (E4: 27) 
 
A total of nine NVs used one or more types of symbolic activities to build 
reputation. Further, symbolic activities were used to draw stakeholders’ attention to the 
less observable resources a NV has, such as human capital and relationships. As one 
informant observed, “You have to be very active in this, you know … if you’re great and 
nobody knows that, you’re not great” Another informant explained how he and his team 
used symbolic activities to broadcast their knowledge and capabilities, i.e. the human 
capital of their NV:  
“What we did was, for example, we built what we called ‘a capabilities brochure’ 
and we took the resumes of all of the individuals who were associated with us and 
we were academics ok, so we had written many, many papers and some of those 
papers had very interesting titles and so we built a brochure that was by subject 
matter, Design and Computer Communications Network, for example, and we 
took the papers and we wrote down the names of the papers that we’d written on 
that, so we built this brochure out of capabilities including us as individuals, our 
resumes, a description of the business, challenges, up front big world of 
networking, then the backword applications.“ (E4: 4) 
 
Finally, informants believed that symbolic activities were most effective when 
they were backed up by underlying ‘true’ quality. Specifically, informants pointed to the 
fact that symbolic activities are pretty useful in attracting stakeholders’ attention to the 
NV and making them interested in it. However, once people sign up for engaging in 
closer interactions with the NV, they usually want to find out more about the product that 
the NV is going to offer and expect to see some proof that the NV can perform the 
intended activities. For example, one informant noted:  
“You have to make it known.  You need public relations.  In other words, you 
need all that other stuff, right?  They won’t come if they don’t know so, but if you 
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don’t have those then it doesn’t really matter because you see, the thing is, public 
relations is good to get a quick start.  It’s essential to deliver an impression of 
what you have but it can’t requite, the best quality of public relations with a lousy 
quality product is sort of like the advertising that goes on for a movie before the 
movie comes out.  But when the movie comes out, all of a sudden people know if 
it’s any good or not.  You can get people into the movie the first weekend based 
on public relations but you can’t get them to come back and you can’t get the next 
weekend so you have to have the quality.  If you don’t have the quality, then the 
public relations is sort of a sham and people figure it out.  People aren’t dumb.” 
(E4: 33) 
 
As the above example illustrates, in the presence of substantive NV resources, such as 
human capital, symbolic activities can be used to make those resources more visible to 
stakeholders and to focus stakeholders’ attention on them.  
Overall, it appears that symbolic activities play two critical functions: first, 
symbolic activities attract attention to the NV and increase stakeholders’ interest in it; 
second, symbolic activities help stakeholders better appreciate the critical resources that 
the NV possesses. These various functions of symbolic activities that I identified are 
generally consistent with prior research proposing that NVs can use symbolic actions and 
communications to establish their position in the organizational field (Aldrich & Fiol, 
1994). For example, Howell and Higgins (1990) concluded that clearly stated and 
compelling vision of an innovation’s potential is one of the fundamental components of a 
champion’s capacity to introduce innovations successfully. Also, activities such as 
membership in professional organizations and lobbying have been proposed to increase 
young firms’ legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  
 
Investments in Human Capital. Informants reported on various steps they took to 
increase the quality of their human capital. The most typical examples include adding 
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more members to the NV team, adding team members with complementary skills and 
competences, and hiring a team member from an established corporation that is well 
known to the target customers. One of the informants was rather explicit about the 
motivations that drove his decision to recruit two of the TMT members for his NV team 
soon after the founding: 
“I felt confident in my own consulting abilities, but I didn't have a blue chip 
management consulting resume.  You know, having worked for Diamond 
Technology Partners, or Cambridge …  So the two places I hired in, it wasn't so 
much I felt weak in the consulting, as I knew how I needed the right reputation.” 
(E5: 7-8) 
 
Overall, for 13 NVs informants described explicit investments in human capital, such as 
building a TMT from the very early days in the life of the NV, as well as recruiting an 
expert with specific skills (e.g., managerial, technological), with proven track-record 
(e.g., top-managerial experience), with prior start-up experience (e.g., having started 
previous ventures), from a prominent firm in the same industry, or having a degree from 
a top university (see Appendix 1.B for examples of each type).  
 
 Investments in Social Capital. All informants stressed the critical importance of 
relationships for their NVs, especially when the NVs were technology-based. This is not 
surprising, given the recent empirical findings that strategic alliances and partnerships are 
ubiquitous in high technology sectors (Kotha, Rindova & Rothaermel, 2001; Stuart, 
2000). As one informant says: 
“This business is all about relationships.  It’s beyond the price, beyond 
everything.  You know, because next time someone will come and try to bid, and 
if their bid is going to be close to us, the only reason the customer will stay with 
us is the relationship.  So in a sense, we need to get over the relationship they 
have right now with their own suppliers.  So we’re banking on the fact that, you 
know, for some of the customers, the relationship is not that good.  And for some 
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of them, it’s just a pure economics.  We can do it for less money, and we seem to 
be doing things right, and it’s not a headache to talk to us, so they will work with 
us.” (E1: 7-8) 
 
Several entrepreneurs perceived building social relationships as a much more efficient 
reputation building strategy than advertising. For example, one informant said: 
“So instead we went on the path of having a better network.  So my whole 
management team spent a lot of time networking, spent a lot of time out, going to 
conferences, meeting people, really developing a personal connection to different 
people.  And that helped develop the reputation more than any branding or 
marketing ever did.” (E5: 10) 
 
Further, some informants emphasized the effect of having a relationship with a prominent 
industry player (either partner or customer) for attracting other stakeholders. For 
example, one informant concluded:  
“It is not important, you know, how many of them [customers] sign up.  What’s 
important is what is the number of customers that you can use to go out and get 
ten more. Right?  Because what you are trying to do is to build an influence 
channel.” (E8: 9) 
 
Table 1.2 lists the three groups of relationships that were most consistently identified by 
the informants – relationships with venture capitalists, alliances and partnerships, and 
relationships with key customers (see also Appendix 1.B for quotes regarding each type). 
In total, 17 of the NVs were described as having strong relationships of one or more of 
these types. Two more NVs tried but were not successful in establishing the intended 
relationship. Relationships with partners and VCs appear to be important for high-
technology NVs but not for those operating in more traditional industries. Relationships 
with customers were mentioned by all founders regardless of the industry or type of 
product their NVs offered. Below I provide some examples of founders’ opinions of why 
these relationships are important. 
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Relationships with venture capitalists. Young entrepreneurial firms often have 
problems financing their innovation or idea. Regarding the importance of NVs’ 
relationships with venture capital firms, Gompers and Lerner (2001: 1) point to the fact 
that “Innovations fail to create value when they cannot attract the resources required to 
develop them”. In addition to financial backing, venture capitalists provide the NV with 
contacts, reputation, and advice. They screen entrepreneurial projects, structure financial 
deals, and monitor NVs’ performance – activities without which many NVs would never 
attract the resources they need to turn their ideas into commercial success (Gompers & 
Lerner, 2001). Most high-technology NVs have a number of fundamental problems that 
make them difficult to finance – such as uncertainty about the future, information gaps, 
the ‘soft’ nature of their assets, and the market conditions (Gompers & Lerner, 2001). 
Therefore, building relationships with VCs, and especially with prominent VCs might 
provide the NV with numerous benefits in addition to access to capital, such as 
legitimation and endorsement by the VCs (Hsu, 2004). As one of the informants said: 
“… and the real learning was that the VC’s are significantly more than just cash.  
They are a network of relationships that allow you to succeed in the marketplace, 
much more than just the money that they provide.  And sure, it would have been 
great to have a hundred million dollars in cash in the bank from which to run the 
business, but the real issue was because we didn’t have those relationships, we 
couldn’t move forward.” (E6: 12) 
 
It should be noted, however, that some informants also pointed to the downside of 
VC relationships, especially loss of decision making power and control over the strategy 
of the NV. For example, one informant explained that he deliberately avoided 
dependence on VCs, because he did not want to share the ownership of his NVs. Another 
 27
informant pointed to the problems stemming from dilution of ownership and conflicts of 
interests when too many VCs invest in a NV. 
Strategic alliances and partnerships. Past research has devoted significant 
attention to the role of alliances and partnerships for NVs and has attributed NV 
reputation and performance to a large degree to its alliance partners. The number of 
strategic alliances has been found to influence NVs’ strategy and performance (Kotha et 
al., 2001; Stuart, 2000). Stuart (2000) further found that quality of alliance networks (or 
what he calls network prestige) influence NVs’ performance beyond the effect of network 
size. He speculates that this performance is due to a reputational effect, assuming that 
high performance also indicates higher reputation, even though he does not measure 
reputation directly. As one of the entrepreneurs observed:  
“There's usually an eco system for large software companies that exists with or 
without their knowing.  There are a large number of companies that are offshoots 
of Oracle or SAP, a very large technology company.  Doesn't matter which one it 
is.  So we picked Microsoft.  We knew that as they came up with products, 
enterprise space, there was going to be a tremendous opportunity to help ride that 
wave.  And that's what we did.” (E8: 2) 
 
 Strategic alliances can serve both as a pathway to various resources and as signals 
that convey social status and recognition of the NV by third parties (Stuart, 2000). In the 
cases discussed with the informants, the signaling function appears to be the major 
reasons for NVs to enter various partnerships. Further, some informants mentioned that 
their technology-based alliance partners provided direct recommendations to customers 
regarding the prospects of the technology that the NVs were developing. Informants 
emphasized the fact that such recommendations contributed substantially to the 
reputation building of their NVs. 
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Relationships with Key Customers. For 12 NVs, informants pointed to the 
development of strong relationships with one or a few key customers. Informants saw 
these relationships as particularly helpful for developing their NVs’ reputation and they 
deliberately spent time building such relationships:  
“My whole management team spent a lot of time networking, spent a lot of time 
out, going to conferences, meeting people, really developing a personal 
connection with different people.  And that helped develop the reputation more 
than any branding or marketing ever did.” (E5: 10) 
 
“The relationship with the customer is what keeps the venture going, because all 
the greatest ideas in the world just die on the vine if somebody didn’t buy them.” 
(E7: 14) 
 
In most cases, these relationships were used as evidence presented to subsequent 
customers to convince them of the NV’s reliability and credibility. Examples of key 
customers include Government agencies, Microsoft, and Compaq. The informants used 
the early relationships with a key customer to attract their second/ next customers and 
more generally, to build public awareness of their NVs. In two cases the NV was 
originally started to serve one major customer and did not search for other customers.  
 
New Product Development. Consistent with economics view of reputation, which 
suggests that good reputation is built by providing high quality goods and services, 
informants highlighted the importance of product/technology quality for external 
evaluators. For example, several informants emphasized the quality requirements that 
stakeholders pose to a NV: “you have to have the quality” (E4: 33), “you have to have 
some meat” (E8: 15). Another entrepreneur, who later on had become an investor 
himself, said: 
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“Yes, I would [look at the NV’s product or technology].  Because the most 
powerful determiner of profitability is the product itself, and where it fits in the 
value chain, and how protectable its competitive advantages are and so on.  It is 
the most important parts.” (E2: 12)  
 
Overall, for nine of the NVs their founders explicitly discussed various new product 
development activities, such as refining the quality of the technology under development, 
acquiring a technology from another NV, merger with another NV that already has 
developed a complementary piece of technology, and developing a second product or an 
upgrade to demonstrate a pipeline of products (see Appendix 1.B for examples of each 
type). 
 
Observation 3: Two Types of Reputation – Direct and Generalized 
Comparisons across the NVs described by informants show that not every venture 
finds it relevant or necessary to invest in building reputation the same way: Specifically, 
my analysis suggests that NVs built two types of reputations – direct and generalized. 
Some NVs developed reputation locally, by relying primarily on direct customer 
experiences with the NV’s products and services and word of mouth. For example, when 
I asked how exactly this happens, one informant said:  
“Oh, you knock on doors and give them free stuff.  Yeah, I need to explain to you 
that this was a small town that had no other laundry and dry cleaning business… 
And then, you know, word of mouth was primarily it.”   
 
Thus, direct reputation is based on the interactions between a stakeholder and the 
NV and the experiences that the stakeholder has with the NV.   
Many NVs tried to develop a more generalized reputation at the regional or 
industry level. These ventures had some general idea what stakeholder groups to target 
but they needed to attract stakeholders and to convince them to enter the first exchange 
 30
with them. For example, one informant described his approach to achieving such general 
reputation as follows: 
“And so it was the promotional campaigns that had to do with ‘share your 
knowledge with them’.  I was supposed to talk about the company, talk about the 
field that should give them interest, and give them insight to what’s going on. And 
every six or eight months I would develop a really significant strategic sort of 
speech that I would give at a major conference and that significant speech would 
really weigh out where the future was going and where another future in terms of 
networking and telecommunications and computing would be going. And I’d be 
interviewed 5 times a month by the trade newspapers and magazines and there 
would be profiles of me and there would be profiles of the company and so this is 
the way of building tremendous recognition and that built the business.”  
 
Later on, this general reputation with many anonymous stakeholders began to pay 
off by people contacting the NV and signing contracts for different projects with it, as the 
following quote illustrates: 
“So one day I would get a call by a vice president of a firm … It was the biggest 
contract we had ever done in the commercial world. They called us because we 
were famous.” 
 
Thus, in some cases the accumulation of generalized reputation begins before the 
first direct interactions with customers or other stakeholders and serves to attract them to 
the NV.  
The observed differences in the type of reputation that the NVs aspired to and 
achieved appear to be systematically related to the industry and the type of products that 
the NVs offered. Specifically, I observed that: First, when a NV provides relatively 
traditional products or services for which there is a common understanding about the 
quality standards, the products are easy to evaluate and available immediately after 
founding, the NV tends to focus primarily on providing the highest quality goods and 
services and to rely on word of mouth for attracting more customers. Usually such 
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ventures had no intention to achieve industry-wide publicity, so they did not engage in 
symbolic activities but rather tried to build good reputations with their local community.  
Second, when output quality is unobservable, the output is yet to be developed, 
and/or the NVs are not sure who their customers will be, they tend to focus much more 
on building as broad public awareness as possible by using symbolic activities and 
investing in building critical resources, especially HC an SC, instead of the strong 
emphasis on product quality that was typical for the first group of NVs. Overall, it 
appears that NVs that provide relatively observable and easy to evaluate products rely on 
direct reputation, much like established firms improve their reputations by establishing 
good relationships with key stakeholder audiences (Grunig, Grunig & Dozier, 2002; 
Yang, 2005), whereas NVs with no initial products to offer, as well as NVs offering new 
and/or difficult to evaluate products tend to invest in a more generalized reputation with 
indefinite stakeholders. 
 
Observation 4: Multiple Paths to Reputation Accumulation 
Related to Observation 3, I identified two distinct paths to reputation pursued 
by NVs, each of which involves different emphasis on investing in some activities vs. 
others. Table 1.3 lists NVs by type of reputation and provides detailed information 
regarding the type of product that the NV offered and the reputation building activities it 
used. First, for more traditional, observable, or otherwise relatively easy to evaluate 
products, entrepreneurs tend to invest in product quality and building strong relationships 
with customers, relying on word of mouth to develop ‘good’ local reputation for their 
NVs; no industry-wide recognition was intended or achieved. I also observed very similar 
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processes for moderately complex and technology-based services with well-defined 
performance criteria: entrepreneurs tend to focus on providing reliable service and invest 
in strong customer relationships (e.g., provide follow-up support, take responsibility if a 
problem occurs), some of them also invested in HC. As a result, they built good direct 
reputation with a small set of long-term customers, but no industry-wide reputation was 
intended or achieved. As table 1.3 shows, seven NVs fall in this category.  
Second, for new technologies, unobservable, or otherwise difficult to evaluate 
products, entrepreneurs tend to use extensively symbolic activities, to invest in HC, and 
to build alliances and partnerships with established industry players, customers, and VCs. 
All these activities seem to produce a certain level of industry-wide visibility that 
materialized in a more generalized reputation with larger stakeholder audiences. These 
NVs are grouped in Table 1.3 above according to the degree to which they accumulated 
generalized reputation. I discuss these differences in greater detail in Observation 5.  
Overall, observations 3 and 4 suggest that reputation building efforts such as 
symbolic activities and investments in resource signals have higher pay-offs for less 
observable products. In contrast, for NVs producing more observable products it makes 
more sense to focus on product quality and direct interactions with customers and other 
stakeholders, and would be less efficient to invest in symbolic activities. Specifically, in 
my study this difference appears most consistently with regard to investments in 
symbolic activities. Both groups of NVs invested to some degree in human capital and 
social capital, although these resources might have had a stronger signaling value for 
NVs that produce difficult to evaluate products.   
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Table 1.3  
Product Characteristics, Investments, Types and Levels of Reputation 
 
   Initial Conditions Investments 









Direct E5V2 unobservable      
       
  E1V2 observable      
  E2V5 observable         
  E2V4 observable        
  E2V2 observable        
  E2V1 observable        
  E7V1 unobservable        
Generalized-Hi E4V2 unobservable     
  E6V3 unobservable       
  E6V1 unobservable      
  E3V3 unobservable        
  E8V2 unobservable     
  E8V1 unobservable       
  E4V3 unobservable     
Moderate E4V1 unobservable      
  E3V2 unobservable        
  E6V2 unobservable        
  E9V2 unobservable        
Low E1V1 unobservable      
  E9V3 unobservable        
  E3V1 unobservable        
No E5V1 observable         
  E2V3 unobservable       
No need E7V2 observable       
  E4V4 unobservable        
Notes: 1. The two dark boxes indicate that the failure to invest in the respective resources 
was acknowledged as a mistake that harmed the NV’s reputation.  
2. There is no distinction between levels of direct reputation because informants 
reported they had good reputation with their customers and other stakeholders, but 
there was no objective way to compare these beliefs. 





Observation 5: Relationship between NV Activities and Reputation 
After identifying the relevant activities that appear to predict NV reputation, I 
looked for systematic evidence that these activities indeed make a difference. Following 
Yin’s (1994) recommendations, I considered an action type related to reputation if the 
presence of this type of activity was associated with higher level of reputation and the 
absence of the same activity – with lower level of reputation. Table 1.4 summarized the 






















Yes      
 No      
Yes      Invested 
in HC 
No      
Yes      Invested 
in SC 
No      
Yes      Product 
completed 
No      
Note: Each star corresponds to one NV falling into a given category. The two NVs that 
did not need to build reputation due to only one customer (as explained above) were 
excluded from comparisons. 
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Symbolic activities. Nine NVs invested in at least one type of symbolic activities, 
two of which accumulated direct reputation with local stakeholders, five – high levels of 
generalized reputation, 1 – a moderate level of generalized reputation, and 1 – a low level 
of generalized reputation. The relationship between reputation and symbolic activities 
appears to be rather strong for the NVs that accumulated generalized reputations but not 
for the ones that accumulated direct reputations. This observation is not surprising, given 
that the NVs with direct reputations also produced more observable and easy to evaluate 
products (see observations 3 and 4 above). For such products, it might be less relevant to 
spend time and efforts in using symbols because the products ‘speak’ for themselves 
through their quality, which makes symbolic activities less critical for stakeholders to 
understand and evaluate the quality of such NVs and their products.   
 
Investments in human capital. As Table 1.4 shows, 12 NVs invested in 
increasing various aspects of their HC: they filled gaps in skills, diversified expertise, and 
recruited people for reputational reasons (e.g., a VP from IBM). As the tables show, three 
out of the seven NVs that accumulated direct reputation invested in HC. These 
proportions are six out of seven for NVs with high levels of generalized reputation and 
three out of nine for the NVs with lower levels of generalized reputation. This evidence 
suggests that investments in HC tend to be related to higher levels of generalized 
reputation. Further, investments in HC appear to be more important for NVs that build 
generalized reputations and less of a factor for NVs that try to build direct reputation with 
local customers. This conclusion is supported by the fact that all but one NV that 
managed to accumulate high level of generalized reputation reported deliberate 
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investments in HC. The only NV with high level of generalized reputation that did not 
invest in HC had strong relationship with Microsoft from the beginning and relied on a 
venture capitalist who knew the founder personally. In this case, high levels of SC might 
have substituted the need to invest in HC.  
 
Relationship-building. As Table 1.4 shows, 14 NVs were able to develop at least 
one type of relationship. Of them, 12 NVs made investments in building strong 
relationships with customers, 5 NVs built relationships with investors (bankers, VCs, 
angels), 5 NVs established partnerships with major industry players and one more tried 
but failed (see Table 1.3). Further, one NV failed to establish relationship with a 
prestigious VC but the informant recognized this as a mistake that eventually turned out 
to have negative consequences for the NV’s reputation and performance. The patterns of 
relationship between investments in SC and NV reputation look pretty similar to those for 
HC. Specifically, three out of the seven NVs that accumulated direct reputations invested 
in SC. Six out of seven NVs that accumulated high levels of generalized reputations 
invested in SC, whereas of the NV that accumulated lower reputation, five invested in SC 
and four did not. These observations suggest that investments in SC tend to be related to 
higher levels of generalized reputation but do not appear to make substantive difference 
for building direct reputation. Therefore, developing SC might be more important for 
NVs that aim to achieve generalized reputation but might be less important for NVs that 
try to build direct reputation with local customers who can interact with the NVs directly 
and evaluate the quality of their products.  
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Product development. Of all the NVs included in the analysis, only eight reported 
investments in new product development activities. The distribution of product 
development investments across NVs does not provide sufficient evidence to conclude 
that product development activities were critical for NVs’ reputation. For all levels of 
reputation, the NVs that explicitly mentioned investments in new product development 
are fewer than the once that did not discuss such investments. One possible explanation 
for this weak effect of investments in product development on NV reputation might be 
that informants did not see this type of investment as relevant for their NVs’ reputation or 
they assumed that this is a necessary investment that any NV would make and did not see 
it as distinctly contributing to the differentiation of their NV from the other NVs in the 
same industry.  
 
Observation 6: Relationship between Reputation and Performance 
I used qualitative statements by entrepreneurs and specific figures they reported, 
such as sales growth, growth in number of employees, and returns on investment, to infer 
the performance of each NV. I also explicitly asked each informant how each of the NVs 
described performed relative to their initial ambitions and expectations and what was the 
ultimate outcome of the NV (e.g., still active, sold at high profit, closed down, etc). For 
example, statements like “the business was growing like crazy”, “it was very profitable” 
and “I sold the business for twenty times more than what I invested in it” were interpreted 
as indicative of high-performance NVs. Statements like “and then we found that we had 
no business, no money and we’d spent it all and my partner quit” were interpreted as 
failure. Also, there were some NVs that did not fail but were dragging for a long period 
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of time and the founder exited in order to pursue more profitable opportunities – such 
NVs were coded as underperforming. Finally, NVs that were described as performing 
according to expectations but not better, or doing well but not great were coded as 
moderately successful. 
Table 1.5 below presents a summary of the number of NVs that accumulated 
high, moderate, low, and no reputation and their performance levels. As the table shows, 
high levels of generalized reputation are related to success in six out of seven ventures, 
whereas moderate levels of generalized reputation are related to moderate performance in 
one case and underperformance or failure in three cases. Consistent with this trend, 
low/no reputations are related to underperformance and failure in all five cases. Direct 
reputation is related to success in four NVs and moderate success in three NVs.  
 
Table 1.5 























     
No 
reputation 
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Two points deserve special attention with regard to the relationship between 
reputation and performance. First, NVs with better reputations tended to perform better 
than those with lower reputation at least for the first few years of their lives. Also, most 
of them were either sold very successfully or continue to operate, which could be 
interpreted as favorable long-term outcomes. This observation is consistent with the 
empirical evidence provided by prior research in established firm contexts about the 
positive effect of reputation on performance (Rindova et al., 2005; Roberts & Dowling, 
2002). Second, all informants distinguished between the reputation and performance or 
survival of their ventures. For example, one venture with very strong reputation 
ultimately failed because of an unexpected market crash. This observation suggests that 
prior studies that have assumed that NVs’ reputation is directly transferable to 
performance and have respectively measured change in reputation by change in 
performance (e.g., Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999), should be interpreted with caution.  
While it is a common approach to assume reputation rather than measure it, it would be 
more informative and correct to disentangle NVs’ reputation from their performance, as 
several studies in established firm contexts have done (see Rindova et al., 2005 for a 
recent example).  
 
Observation 7: Effects of Founders’ Prior Start-up Experience  
Effects of founders’ experience on investments in reputation-building. 
Consistent with psychology theories about learning from errors, informants explicitly 
mentioned lessons learned from previous ventures, especially from mistakes that 
prevented them from building reputation. For example, one informant recognized the 
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benefits of association with VCs only after he and his partners experienced the negative 
consequences of their failure to establish such relationships. Across all informants and 
their founding experiences over time, I observed consistent patterns of learning to invest 
in building reputation for their ventures earlier and through more diverse efforts. The 
more experienced the founders became – as they moved to their second, third, etc. 
ventures, the earlier they tended to start thinking about their ventures’ reputation, and the 
more deliberate and diverse investments in reputation building they made. In addition, 
comparisons among earlier and later NVs started by the same entrepreneur show patterns 
of increasing concern with building reputation for the NV and doing it earlier, by 
investing in reputation building efforts much before there was any output produced.  
 In terms of types of investments that founders made, I did not observe substantial 
relationships with experience. As Table 1.6 below shows, four out of nine first-time NVs 
had used some kind of symbolic activities, the same frequency as in the second-time 
NVs. Similarly, regardless of experience, founders tend to focus a lot on building HC and 
SC for their ventures, as evident from the large number of NVs that invested in these 
resources. 
Table 1.6 

















1st NVs 8    
 
  





3rd, 4th and 
5th  NVs 





Finally, there is no consistent evidence whether entrepreneurs invested more or 
paid stronger attention to improvements in the product or technology for their subsequent 
NVs. This might be explained with the fact that most founders of high-tech businesses 
have engineering background and they tend to over-emphasize the role of technology as 
the single most important activity they should perform and to overlook other important 
factors when they start a firm for the first time. Later on, they recognize the role of other 
factors, such as HC and SC and refocus their attention towards those assets, the 
investment in which simultaneously help their ventures become more viable and serve as 
signals of reputation. The moderate relationships between the founders’ experience and 
reputation building investments that I observed suggest that some other factors (such as 
individual differences and personality traits) may interfere with the founders’ experience 
in determining their decisions to invest in resource signals and symbols. 
 
Effects of founders’ experience on efficiency of investments in reputation 
building. Although experience did not appear to increase substantively the amount of 
efforts that founders devote to reputation building for their NVs, it did appear to make 
their efforts more productive and the reputation-building investments more efficient. For 
example, some of my informants explicitly pointed to the fact that they managed to keep 
some of the people that had worked with them in their earlier ventures. One informant 
reported that half of his best people moved from his first venture to the second one. 
Apparently, the fact that some of the best employees from a founder’s previous venture 
would join the new one makes it much easier to develop the HC for the NV.  
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Similarly, more experienced founders were able to use some of the contacts they 
had developed before for their subsequent ventures. For example, one informant pointed 
to the fact that when he searched for money for his second venture, he used his 
relationships with two of the venture capitalists he already knew from his previous NVs 
and could trust them. Another informant had a few key customers that he could approach 
and offer them the services of the NV. They readily agreed to support the NV, because 
they already knew and trusted the founder and his team based on the relationship they 
had from the previous venture. Last but not least, experience appears to increase 
founders’ credibility and therefore, to make their symbolic activities more efficient. For 
example, one informant who consistently invested heavily in symbolic activities noted 
that his efforts (such as participations in trade shows, fairs and industry events and 
presentations during major technology conferences) attracted much more media attention 
as well as potential customers and partners during the second and third venture than 
during the first one. Therefore, founders’ prior startup experience appears to influence 
positively the efficiency of all types of reputation-building investments.  
 
Effects of founders’ experience on NV reputation and performance.  Following 
management research on the role of experience for the performance of current tasks, I 
expected to observe increase in the level of reputation and performance of each 
subsequent venture started by the same entrepreneur. However, this is the case with only 
two entrepreneurs (E1 and E5) both of whom have started only two ventures. In both 
cases, the second NV accumulated higher reputation and so far has performed better than 
the first one. One entrepreneur (E7) had his first venture performing better than the 
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second one, one had both ventures successful and with high industry-level reputation, and 
the majority – five entrepreneurs (E2, E3, E4, E6, and E9) – had their second or third 
venture as the worst performing one, and for four of them it was also with the lowest 
reputation. These observations do not provide evidence to support the idea that over time 
entrepreneurs do a better job building reputation for their ventures, but suggest at best 
curvilinear (U-shape) relationship.  
Also, performance of each subsequent venture does not appear to be related to the 
success of the previous one, because successful and failed ventures, as well as low and 
high reputation ventures follow each other in no particular sequence. For example, 
successful ventures are followed by both failed and successful ones, and failed ventures 
are usually followed by successful ones, except for the case where the failed venture is 
the last one. The observation that failed NVs are followed by more successful ones but 
not the other way around led me to conclude that failure might be a stronger source of 
learning than success. This idea is consistent with recent theories of failure-driven 
learning in experimental psychology (Gully, Payne, Koles & Whiteman, 2002; Ohlsson, 
1996; Stiso & Payne, 2004).  
 
Observation 8: Effects of Previous Success on the Reputation of Subsequent New 
Ventures  
 I also compared each NV’s reputation to the performance and long-term outcome 
of the previous one started by the same founder to examine if there is a spill-over effect 
on the NVs’ reputation. For the NVs with high direct or generalized reputations, I found 
that eight were preceded by failed or underperforming ventures, while only four had a 
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successful predecessor. Further, four successful and moderately successful NVs were 
followed by low-reputation ones. These observations suggest that there is no simple and 
straightforward relationship between the NVs started by the same founder. It might be the 
case that founders transfer certain knowledge to their next venture but this knowledge 
depends on how much the founders have learned from their prior startup experiences. 
 
Conclusions from the Key Observations 
Together, the observations discussed above suggest two distinct reputation 
building processes that lead to two different types of reputation for NVs – direct vs. 
generalized. Direct reputation is built primarily by direct interactions with a limited set of 
stakeholders and relying on word of mouth among satisfied customers and other parties. 
Generalized reputation is built by using extensively symbolic activities, to invest in HC, 
and to build alliances and partnerships with established industry players, customers, and 
VCs. Further, which of these two types of reputation a NV would develop, appears to 
depend on the type of product that the NV offers and especially the ease of evaluation of 
the product quality by customers and other stakeholders. For more traditional, observable, 
or otherwise relatively easy to evaluate products, entrepreneurs tend to invest in product 
quality and building strong relationships with customers. For more difficult to evaluate 
products, such as new technologies or other unobservable products, entrepreneurs tend to 






 This study offers several important insights about the critical factors in the 
process of reputation building by NVs. First, I found that NVs differed systematically in 
the type of reputation they attempted to and were able to build. Specifically, NVs offering 
more observable and easy to evaluate products and services, the quality of which can be 
judged directly by customers, tended to focus on building direct reputation with a small 
set of customers through direct interactions with them. In contrast, NVs offering less 
observable or more novel products and services tended to focus on attracting large-scale 
public attention to the NV and its offerings and to build a more generalized reputation 
with distant stakeholders. The fact that some NVs focused on building direct reputations 
with customers while others immediately started investing in a generalized reputation 
appears somewhat surprising given that recent research have found both dimensions of 
reputation – perceived quality and prominence – to be present in established 
organizations (Rindova et al., 2005). This observation is theoretically interesting and 
important because it suggests that there might be differences between the content of 
reputations of young firms and established organizations.  
The observation that some NVs relied on direct customer experience while others 
focused primarily on more distant (signaling) efforts is somewhat consistent with the 
distinction that some scholars have made between primary (or experiential) reputation 
and secondary (or “reputational”) reputation (Bromley, 1993, 2000; Grunig & Hung, 
2002). According to Bromley (2000) individuals form first-order impressions with an 
organization through direct experiences with its product, services, premises, or personnel. 
Once these individual opinions begin to circulate as people interact with each other and 
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learn about others’ experiences, more homogenous perceptions form, and they represent 
the secondary reputation. The first-order perceptions may be more individualized and 
divergent, whereas the second-order perceptions are more homogenous and uniform 
across stakeholders because they form at the collective level (Bromley, 2000; Grunig & 
Hung, 2002).  
Interestingly, the NVs I studied focused primarily on influencing one of these two 
types of stakeholder perceptions, by either relying on direct experience of stakeholder 
with their products and services or on various activities that would influence broader 
stakeholder audiences that do not necessarily have direct access to the NV. Moreover, 
these important choices appear to be strongly influenced by the observability of the 
outputs the NV offers and the ease of evaluation of their quality. For relatively easy to 
evaluate outputs, NVs focused on building direct (or experiential) reputations, for more 
difficult to ‘see and touch’ outputs, especially new technologies, NVs focused on 
developing generalized (or “reputational”) reputation. This distinction between the two 
types of reputational experiences early on is important because it suggests that NVs 
competing in different product markets tend to focus on reducing different dimension of 
the uncertainty they and their stakeholders face. This observation also suggests that NV’s 
reputations follow different (potentially more sequential) dynamics than the reputations 
of large established corporations.  
Second, the variation in output observability also appears to impact how NVs 
approach the issue of reputation-building, and especially how much they invest in 
reputation-building activities early in their lives and what types of investment they make. 
For observable outputs, NVs relied extensively on the direct customer experience with 
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the product or service and focused on providing the best quality possible. For such NVs 
symbolic activities and investments in HC and SC did not appear to have a strong impact 
on the NV’s reputation. In contrast, NVs that offered less observable outputs tried to 
invest (more or less successfully) in at least one type of reputation-building activities – 
i.e., symbolic activities, HC, or SC. Moreover, the NVs that invested in all three types of 
reputation-building activities were able to achieve the highest level of generalized 
reputations. This observation is consistent with the economics view of reputation, 
according to which reputations are more valuable under higher uncertainty (Shapiro, 
1983). My observation that for less observable products the founders engaged much more 
in symbolic activities and investments in HC and SC, whereas for more observable 
products they relied primarily on the product quality is also consistent with signaling 
research which suggests that signals are used to infer unobservable quality or potential. If 
the product quality is directly observable, resources such as HC and SC would have a 
weaker effect on stakeholders’ perceptions, although they may still be necessary for the 
NV’s operational efficiency. It is notable, thought, that even founders with no prior 
entrepreneurial experience were able to recognize the critical importance of reputation 
building for their NVs and to use symbolic activities very early on. Further, the 
differences in the effect of reputation-building activities suggest that NVs can target 
strategically their investments in reputation depending on the types of outputs they intend 
to offer and the industry in which they started. 
Third, I found three types of investments to be used for reputation building 
purposes – using symbolic activities, investing in HC, and building SC. It appears logical 
that NVs used symbolic activities to influence public perceptions about themselves, but it 
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is interesting that they also thought of the signaling effect of recruiting key people or 
establishing relationships. While past research has identified these activities as critical 
inputs in the organizational processes of a NV, this study provides additional insights 
about the dual role of these resources. For example, a TMT member who has worked for 
Microsoft may contribute both useful skills and the prestige of affiliation to a new 
software development venture. Although it is possible that many NVs would invest in HC 
and SC as a part of their organizational strategy without considering the reputation effects 
of these resources, I observed that some founders invested in obtaining a resource they 
not only needed for operational purposes but also to increase their venture’s reputation. 
These founders focused on the ‘prestige’ components of HC and SC as well as on the 
substantive benefits of obtaining such resources. Therefore, my findings suggest that NVs 
can use their limited resources most wisely by investing in a resource that can serve both 
substantive and signaling purposes.  
 Fourth, the relationships between the three types of reputation building 
investments appear to be complex. On one hand, symbolic activities combined with HC 
and SC tend to be associated with the highest levels of generalized reputation. On the 
other hand, some NVs managed to successfully build reputation by investing in either HC 
or SC in addition to symbolic activities. Therefore, it might be the case that HC and SC 
are substitutable at least to some degree. While it is best to have them both, resource-
constrained NVs may be better off focusing on either of them while also spending efforts 
in symbolic activities rather than focusing on both and not using any symbolic activities. 
My conclusions that HC and SC may contribute to early reputation of NVs inform prior 
research on the role of intangible resources that has identified reputation, human capital, 
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and social capital as the most important resources for organizations (Hall, 1992; 
McMillan & Joshi, 1998). Specifically, my insights contribute to this body of research by 
articulating some potential interdependencies between different types of intangible 
resources, as well as their effect on each other. Future research should explore in greater 
detail these complex relationships. 
Finally, my observations suggest that the success of preceding ventures does not 
guarantee any reputational benefits for the subsequent ones. Rather, each NV needs to 
develop its own reputation through investments in symbolic activities and critical 
resources. Although founders appear to transfer some specialized knowledge to their next 
venture, this knowledge may depend on how much the founders have learned from their 
prior experience and not on the overall success or failure of the previous start-up. 
However, in the context of this study I have little evidence about some potentially 
relevant factors that may influence how much entrepreneurs learn from each NV, such as 
individual learning orientation, intellectual ability, and openness to experimentation. 
Therefore, one recommendation for future research is to explore in greater detail what 
factors determine how much founders learn from a given start-up experience and to what 
extent this knowledge helps to increase the reputation and performance of their 




RESOURCE SIGNALS, SYMBOLIC ACTIVITIES AND UNCERTAINTY 
REDUCTION IN THE CASE OF NEW VENTURES 
 
ABSTRACT 
This essay presents a theory of reputation building by new ventures. Drawing on 
signaling theory in economics and symbolic research in management, I develop a 
conceptual model that brings together NV resources and symbolic activities, which 
jointly impact its reputation. I propose that key resources, such as human capital and 
social capital, play the role of market signals, which indicate a NV’s potential to provide 
high-quality outputs. Investments in such resources can increase the reputation of the NV, 
because reputation reflects stakeholders’ perceptions of the NV’s potential to provide 
quality or otherwise meet their needs and expectations. Further, use of symbolic activities 
on part of the NV can increase its reputation in two ways: (1) directly – by drawing 
stakeholders’ attention to the NV and by providing ready-made interpretations about the 
NV and its activities, and (2) indirectly – by making more visible a NV’s resources and 
by explaining their meaning and providing interpretive frameworks for stakeholders to 
understand their purpose as strategic investments, thus enhancing their effect on 
reputation. I also explain the effect of founders’ prior experience on the extent of 
investment in key resources and symbolic activities. Finally, I explore the moderating 
effect of technology and market uncertainty on the patterns of investments in key 





Reputations are cognitive representations (or schemas) held collectively by 
stakeholders and reflecting their perceptions of organizations (Fombrun, 1996). Such 
perceptions are important for the organization, because they drive stakeholders’ 
expectations for future returns on investments in exchange relationships with them and 
encourage them to make reputation-consistent decisions regarding the organization 
(Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Wartick, 1992). Management scholars have established the 
importance of reputation for firm performance but the mechanisms through which 
reputation can be accumulated are still to be explored. While some researchers have 
proposed that reputation can be built through continuous investments over time, there is 
little evidence of the nature of firm activities that might serve as strategic investments in 
reputation building. Moreover, prior research has focused primarily on studying 
reputation in large established firms that have both their prior performance, which can 
guide public perceptions and opinions (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), and substantial 
resources to make costly investments in product quality and advertising, which serve to 
increase their reputation (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Shapiro, 1983). The tendency to 
study reputation among firms that already have accumulated some reputation does not 
allow for examining how this critical intangible asset comes into being and what factors 
account for the variance in the levels of reputation among young firms in an industry. 
This gap in the literature can be addressed by studying the process of reputation building 
in the context of new ventures (NVs), because such a context allows for examining the 
processes and different paths that may evolve from day one in the life of firms.  
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Under the high uncertainty surrounding the start-up process, a NV’s reputation 
can guide stakeholders who allocate their resources by buying and selling, investment 
and employment decisions (Rindova & Petkova, 2005). NVs with better reputation are 
likely to be able to leverage higher levels of resources and support from key stakeholders. 
For example, favorable reputation can help stakeholders make resource allocation 
decisions that favor the NV, such as investing in it (Shane & Cable, 2002), or pursuing 
employment with it (Baron, 2004; Lievens & Highhouse, 2003; Williamson, 2000; 
Williamson, Cable & Aldrich, 2002). Therefore, building reputation early on can increase 
a NV’s chances for survival and success by improving its ability to attract key 
stakeholders and to establish exchange relationships with them. 
However, NVs cannot benefit from reputations before stakeholders develop them. 
Past research suggests that reputations develop as stakeholders observe and evaluate the 
actions and performance of firms and form summary impressions about the underlying 
strategic characteristics of a firm (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Weigelt & Camerer, 
1988). Yet most NVs lack the history and performance records to guide stakeholders’ 
evaluations and opinions about them. Often the potential stakeholders are not even aware 
of the existence and activities of a NV, which makes it impossible for them to form 
impressions or opinions. Moreover, because NVs often create value in novel ways by 
bringing to the market previously unavailable products or services, they face the 
additional challenge to prove that their activities fit with the norms and rules of the 
industry (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1994). Overall, extant reputation research has 
overlooked some critical issues such as the factors that lead some NV to build reputation 
early in their lives and the ways to overcome resource constraints. The need to develop 
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reputation rapidly in the absence of specialized resources, consistent performance 
histories, and interaction patterns, presents a number of unique challenges not 
encountered by established firms in an industry (Aldrich, 2000), which makes NV 
reputations a special case that deserves foremost attention by both researchers and 
entrepreneurs.  
The purpose of this essay is to develop a theoretical framework for examining the 
process of reputation building by NVs. I address the following research questions: What 
factors explain differences in reputation accumulation by NVs? and How do initial 
conditions shape investments in future reputation building by the NV? To answer these 
questions, I bring together insights from the signaling theory in economics and symbolic 
research in management. Signaling theory has related costly investments by a focal firm 
to formation of impressions about it in the market under conditions of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry between the firm and other market participants. Since the start-up 
process is inherently uncertain and stakeholders often lack sufficient information that 
would allow them to evaluate a NV, they are likely to rely on observable characteristics 
(attributes and activities) of the NV to infer unobservable characteristics such as quality 
and potential. Key resources, such as human capital and social capital, play the role of 
market signals (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova & Sever, 2005), which indicate a NV’s 
potential to provide high-quality outputs. Investments in such resources can increase the 
reputation of the NV, because reputation reflects stakeholders’ perceptions of the NV’s 
potential to provide quality or otherwise meet their needs and expectations.  
Symbolic research in management has highlighted the role of symbols for firms’ 
ability to influence stakeholders’ perceptions and opinions about them. Several scholars 
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have theorized that the use of symbolic language and behavior might be particularly 
beneficial for legitimating young firms and new markets (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; 
Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Rindova, 1999; Rindova & Petkova, 2005). I extend this line 
of reasoning to propose that symbolic activities are a major tool for NVs to build their 
reputations, especially when they operate in highly uncertain or new markets. The use of 
symbolic activities on part of the NV can increase its reputation in two ways: (1) by 
increasing stakeholders’ awareness of the NV and making it more visible in the 
organizational field, and (2) by drawing stakeholders’ attention to the NV’s resources, 
explaining their meaning and providing interpretive frameworks for stakeholders to 
understand their purpose as strategic investments, thus enhancing their effect on 
reputation.  
 The core contribution of this essay is that it brings the signaling and symbolic 
perspectives together to help better understand the process of reputation accumulation by 
NVs. Specifically, I propose that resource signals and symbolic activities have a 
complementary role in the process of reputation accumulation by NVs and that they 
influence both independently and jointly this critical asset. I then explain the effect of 
founders’ prior experience on the extent of investment in key resources and symbolic 
activities. Finally, I explore the moderating effects of technology and market uncertainty 
on the patterns of investments in key resources and symbolic activities and on the effect 
of those investments on the NV’s reputation 
The essay proceeds as follows: I begin with providing a theoretical background 
and definitions of the key concepts. The next section explains the proposed relationships 
between symbolic activities, key resources, and the NV’s reputation, followed by a 
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section on the effect of founders’ experience on the resources and symbolic activities, and 
the role of uncertainty in the  reputation building process. I conclude with discussion and 
implications for future research. 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND CONSTRUCT DEFINITIONS 
 
Reputation 
The concept of reputation has attracted considerable attention by scholars in 
management, economics, sociology, and marketing. Researchers from different traditions 
consistently use the term reputation to refer to perceptions of the firm by various 
stakeholders (Fombrun, 1996; Grunig et al., 2002; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). For 
example, Fombrun and Rindova (1996) define reputation as “a collective representation 
of a firm’s past actions and results that describes the firm’s ability to deliver outcomes to 
multiple stakeholders. It gauges a firm’s relative standing both internally with employees 
and externally with its stakeholders, in both its competitive and institutional 
environments” (Fombrun & Rindova, 1996: 10).  
A more careful examination of past research shows that there are two schools of 
thought regarding the content of stakeholder perceptions, or what organizational 
reputation consists of, and how it is formed. Some scholars draw primarily on the game-
theory/ economics rationale to define reputation as more specific assessments of the firm 
based on certain relevant attributes, while others – taking primarily a socio-institutional 
perspective – tend to view reputation as a more general stakeholder perception that 
reflects the collective knowledge and esteem accumulated about the firm in its 
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organizational field (Rindova et al., 2005). Appendix 2.A provides a summary of the key 
studies of reputation in management, economics, sociology, and marketing and their 
belonging to one or the other perspective. 
Scholars taking a game-theory perspective define reputation as “a set of attributes 
ascribed to a firm inferred from the firm’s past actions” (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988: 443) 
or “an observer’s impressions of the actor’s disposition to behave in a certain manner” 
(Clark & Montgomery, 1998: 65). These impressions are based on consistent 
performance over time, such as producing high-quality products (Allen, 1984; Shapiro, 
1982, 1983) or following certain patterns of competitive actions (Kreps & Wilson, 1982; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1982). Overall, researchers from this school of thought focus on the 
evaluative component of reputation and assume a tight coupling between quality and 
reputation. 
Scholars taking more socio-cognitive and institutional perspectives view 
reputation as “the level of awareness that the firm has been able to develop for itself” 
(Shamsie, 2003: 199), “the evaluation of a firm by its stakeholders in terms of their 
affect, esteem, and knowledge” (Deephouse, 2000: 1093) and “publics’ cumulative 
judgment of firms over time” (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990: 235). According to this view, 
the relevant publics (or stakeholders) form more general type of impressions about the 
firm, such as awareness, fame, and esteem, which are an outcome of social interaction 
processes rather than specific evaluations on given performance dimensions. The socio-
institutional perspective on reputation allows for loose coupling between quality and 
reputation and focuses on more distant signals of quality, such as third-party affiliation 
and endorsement (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Stuart, 2000). Scholars from both 
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perspectives emphasize the comparative nature of reputation – reputation is an evaluation 
or global esteem of the firm relative to its rivals. For example, Fombrun (1996: 72) 
defines reputation as “a perceptual representation of a company’s past actions and future 
prospects that describe the firm’s overall appeal to all its key constituents when compared 
to rivals.”  
Recent research has integrated these two perspectives by suggesting that 
reputation comprises two distinct components – prominence and evaluations of quality 
(Rindova & Petkova, 2005; Rindova et al., 2005). “Prominence refers to the extent to 
which stakeholders are aware of the existence of the NV, or in cognitive terms, the 
degree to which a NV is available in their memory, so that they can readily recall 
information about it” (Rindova & Petkova, 2005: 108). Prominence is based on 
differences in relative ease of retrieval of knowledge about an organization. It depends on 
how frequently one activates the knowledge about the organization in one’s memory.  
Frequency of activation of stored information, in turn, depends on frequency of exposure 
to stimuli from the domain to which the knowledge pertains (Krippendorff, 1975). 
Organizations about which stakeholders encounter information more frequently are likely 
to be more focal in attention and recognized more readily as information about them is 
recalled more easily. Such organizations are more likely to be considered and selected as 
exchange partners, and therefore benefit from stakeholders’ awareness of them. 
Prominence is a key dimension of a NV’s reputation not only because it is impossible for 
stakeholders to exchange resources with the NV without being aware of its existence, but 
also because the likelihood of them considering a NV as a potential exchange partner 
increases with the prominence of the NV in their minds (Rindova & Petkova, 2005). 
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Evaluations of quality refer to the process of impression formation through which 
stakeholders estimate the quality of the entrepreneurial opportunity (vision) and the 
potential of the NV to meet their expectations (Rindova & Petkova, 2005). Positive 
evaluations of an organization can emerge as the organization begins to demonstrates 
high performance on relevant criteria, such as product quality (Shapiro, 1983), financial 
results (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), and reliability in relationships with key stakeholders 
(Grunig et al., 2002). The better a firm performs on these criteria, the more positive the 
evaluative component of its reputation is. Therefore, positive reputations of NVs are 
likely to be based on specific evaluations of their performance along the dimensions that 
stakeholders find relevant. Specifically, stakeholders are likely to evaluate the products 
and services of the NV relative to existing standards of performance in the industry 
(Rindova & Fombrun, 1999) or relative to the offerings of competing firms (Rao, 1994). 
Such evaluations result in judgments of the competitive standing of a NV relative to its 
peers and therefore contribute the unique content of reputation (Rindova & Petkova, 
2005). Overall, past research supports the idea that reputation incorporates both an 
evaluative component, based on past quality or performance, and a more general global 
impression of the firm, unrelated to specific attributes (Rindova et al., 2005).4  
The resource based view in management suggests that reputation accumulates 
through complex and causally ambiguous processes, which makes it a valuable intangible 
resource (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Hall, 1992). Empirical studies show that 
reputation of large established firms is related to their past performance (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990; Roberts & Dowling, 2002), strategic choices (Hansen & Haas, 2001), and 
                                                 
4 Roberts and Dowling (2002) found that this ‘left-over’ part, which they explain with firms’ efforts to 
improve their reputations, accounts for 85 percent of the variance in reputations of the Fortune 1000 firms. 
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affiliation (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Rindova et al., 2005). Finally, signaling theory 
argues that firm reputation is influenced by the costly investments in market signals, such 
as pricing and advertising (Kihlstrom & Riordan, 1984; Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; 
Shapiro, 1982, 1983; Wolinsky, 1983) and competitive behaviors (Heil & Robertson, 
1991; Milgrom & Roberts, 1982). Overall, prior studies converge on the role of signals – 
that is, firm characteristics and attributes that reduce the uncertainty faced by 
stakeholders – for reputation accumulation.  
 
Human Capital  
The concept of human capital was originally introduced by the economist 
Theodore W. Schultz (1961) to account for the investments intended to improve the 
quality of human effort and to enhance its productivity. He identifies five major 
categories of investments in human capital, including: “(1) health facilities and services, 
broadly conceived to include all expenditures that affect the life expectancy, strength and 
stamina, and the vigor and vitality of people; (2) on the job training, including old-style 
apprenticeship organized by firms; (3) formally organized education at the elementary, 
secondary, and higher level; (4) study programs for adults that are not organized by firms, 
including extension programs notably in agriculture; (5) migration of individuals and 
families to adjust to changing job opportunities” Schultz (1961: 8). More recent work in 
sociology provides very similar definition of human capital as “the value added to a 
laborer when the laborer acquires knowledge, skills, and other assets useful to the 
employer or firm in the production and exchange processes. … Typically, human capital 
is operationalized and measured by education, training, and experience” (Lin, 2001: 9).  
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Human capital has been a major focus of management and organizational scholars 
and has been consistently found to predict organizational strategy and performance 
outcomes (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; D’Aveni, 1990; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Wright, 
Smart & McMahan, 1995). Management scholars tend to conceptualize and study human 
capital at the organizational rather than individual level, defining it accordingly as “the 
individual capabilities, knowledge, skills, and experience of the company’s employees 
and managers” (Dess & Lumpkin, 2003: 118).5 Scholars taking a resource-based 
perspective suggest that management is a key rent-generating resource of the firm 
(Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Penrose, 1959). Managerial background and especially 
industry-related experience are studied as predictors of organizational outcomes such as 
strategic choices and firm performance (Castanias & Helfat, 1991; Gupta & 
Govindarajan, 1984; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).   
Researchers have further elaborated on the specific content of human capital and 
have found that the fit between a firm’s strategy and the capabilities of its human 
resources increase performance (Wright et al., 1995). In addition to the amount (or level) 
of human capital possessed by an organization, another important dimension of human 
capital is its quality, usually operationalized as managerial prestige. Managerial prestige 
has been found to help top management teams leverage institutional support for their 
organizations (D’Aveni, 1990). Finally, diversity of human capital has also been found to 
predict organizational performance (Kilduff, Angelmar & Mehra, 2000). Based on this 
research, the major characteristics of human capital can be summarized along three 
dimensions: amount (asset mass or quantity), prestige (asset quality), and diversity. 
                                                 
5 An exception of this trend are the studies of CEO or management succession, in which individual skills 
are the focus of analysis (see Bailey & Helfat, 2003; Harris & Helfat, 1997) 
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Recent research has devoted special attention to the role of human capital for 
small and new businesses (Rao & Drazin, 2002; Williamson, Cable & Aldrich, 2002). 
Researchers suggest that in order to recruit qualified personnel young and small firms 
have to overcome numerous challenges, stemming from the resource constraints and lack 
of legitimacy and awareness about them, which undermine their credibility with potential 
employees as compared to large and older competitors (Aldrich, 2000; Rao & Drazin, 
2002; Williamson et al., 2002). The more small firms succeed in their efforts to appear 
legitimate, the more attractive and desirable recruiters they become and the better their 
chances in developing high-quality human capital (Williamson, 2000; Williamson et al, 
2002). Further, resource-poor young firms can overcome resource constraints by 
recruiting from older and more established competitors. For example, Rao and Drazin 
(2002) found that young companies can increase their product innovation by recruiting 
highly qualified personnel form older and high-performance competitors. 
 
Social Capital 
Sociology scholars have defined social capital as “the resources embedded in 
social networks accessed and used by actors for actions” (Lin, 2001: 25) and more 
specifically “the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual 
acquaintance or recognition” (Bourdieu, 1985: 248). Management scholars provide a 
more specific definition of social capital as “the sum of the actual and potential resources 
embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of relationships 
possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 243).  
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Social capital can enhance the outcomes of purposful actions by facilitating the 
flow of information, exerting influence on critical actors/ decision makers, serving as 
social credentials, and reinforcing identity and recognition (Lin, 2001). It can provide 
access to economic resources, expert individuals, or affiliations with institutions that 
confer valued credentials (Bourdieu, 1985, Portes, 1998). Further, Dyer and Singh (1998) 
argue that from a relational perspective idiosyncratic interfirm linkages may be a source 
of relational rents and competitive advantage. They suggest that: “…the (dis)advantages 
of an individual firm are often linked to the (dis)advantages of the network of 
relationships in which the firm is embedded” (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 660). Social capital 
facilitates timely access to information, increases influence and power, and reduces the 
need for monitoring and control by fostering high level of trust (Adler & Kwon, 2002). 
Firms benefit from the fine-grained information sharing, joint problem solving and lower 
exchange costs within their social networks (Larson, 1992; Uzzi, 1996, 1997). Further, 
social capital facilitates the creation of new intellectual capital and thus increases 
innovation outputs of organizations (Nahaphiet & Ghoshal, 1998). SC is of highest value 
under conditions of high uncertainty and ambiguity, e.g. when there is no frame of 
reference and the activities of the individual or firm are of low legitimacy (Burt, 1997). In 
his study of benefits from bridging structural holes, Burt (1997) found that SC is 
especially valuable to managers with few peers, because they do not have the guiding 
frame of reference for behavior provided by numerous competitors, and the work they do 
does not have the legitimacy provided by numerous people doing the same kind of work.  
Network characteristics that emerge as major dimensions of social capital are 
network size, prestige, and diversity. According to Burt (1999), network size is an 
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indicator of the volume of information benefits of social capital, while network diversity 
means that the quality of the information is higher. Similarly, Stuart (2000) distinguishes 
between the number of strategic alliance partners of a new firm (size of alliance network) 
and the quality (prestige) of the network, and finds effects of network quality after 
controlling for size. Sutton and Hargadon (1996) and Hargadon and Sutton (1997) 
provide an interesting illustration of the role of network diversity. The product design 
firm they describe, IDEO, relies extensively on the employees’ relationships with clients 
in diverse industries. They report that during the brainstorming sessions, technological 
solutions from one industry were taken to solve client issues in other industries where the 
solutions were rare or unknown (Hargadon & Sutton, 1997). Thus, firms can generate 
profits by bridging a large number of actors in diverse industries, or filling the so called 
‘structural holes’  (Burt, 1997).  
Network quality (or prestige) has also been examined as one of the major 
predictors of performance, especially in the high-technology industry (Powell, 1996; 
Stuart, 2000). NVs’ affiliations with prestigious actors have been consistently found to 
predict various outcomes, such as survival, growth, innovation and financial performance 
(Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Larson, 1992; Shane & Stuart, 2002). For example, IPO success 
has been consistently predicted by NVs’ relationships with prominent actors, such as 
strategic alliance partners (Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999) or 
venture capital firms and investment banks (Brav & Gompers, 1994; Gompers, 1996; 
Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Lerner, 1994). Powell (1996) found that biotechnology firms 
with more and higher quality partnerships receive higher market valuations from the 
analysts. Similarly, Podolny and Stuart (1995) found that the status of actors associated 
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with an innovation increases the likelihood of the innovation to be seen by others as 
important and thus rapidly developed, controlling for innovation quality. 
 
Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory has been introduced by the economist Mark Spence 30 years 
ago. According to Spence (1974: 1), “Market signals are activities or attributes of 
individuals in a market which, by design or accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey 
information to, other individuals in the market”. Further, signals are observable alterable 
characteristics, which are costly to acquire or change (Ippolito, 1990; Spence, 1973, 
1974).6 Although originally developed in relationship to human capital, signaling theory 
has found broad application to various organizational contexts. Prior research has 
established the usefulness of market signals in various uncertainty-related contexts, 
including hiring and promotion decisions (Spence, 1973, 1974), faculty pay (Gomez-
Mejia & Balkin, 1992), buyer-seller exchange relationships (Klein & Leffler, 1981; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1986), new market entry (Milgrom & Roberts, 1982), insurance 
markets (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976), and initial public offering (Certo, Daily & Dalton, 
2001).   
People rely on signals as a source of information when evaluating unobservable 
product quality or other characteristics that cannot be judged a-priori (Nelson, 1974). 
Signaling is particularly effective in markets for relatively new products or services, as 
well as in contexts where the decision makers are relatively uninformed about the entity 
concerned (Kirmani & Rao, 2000; Riley, 2001). The more information asymmetry and 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that the individual or entity investing in costly signals need not necessarily think of 
itself as signaling (Spence, 1974). 
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uncertainty characterize the interaction between a firm and its stakeholders, the more 
likely the latter to search for information (Shrum & Withnow, 1988). For example, if a 
firm has developed a new product or service whose quality is difficult to evaluate by 
potential buyers, the firm can, through costly actions such as pricing, advertising, 
branding, or issuing warranties, signal to buyers that it is selling a high-quality product 
(Riley, 2001).  
Management research has been concerned with signaling in studying firm 
reputation with stakeholders (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Rindova et al., 2005) and 
competitors (Clark & Montgomery, 1998; Heil & Robertson, 1991; Weigelt & Camerer, 
1988). In their seminal study of reputation of large established firm, Fombrun and 
Shanley (1990) found firms’ accounting indices of performance, advertising 
expenditures, institutional ownership, risk, and firm size to predict their Fortune 500 
rank. They reasoned that these characteristics signal to stakeholders firm strategy, 
performance and conformity to industry norms, thus reducing the information asymmetry 
and uncertainty regarding the firms. In a more recent study, Rindova et al. (2005) found 
that process-related signals, such as inputs and productive assets influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions regarding output quality, whereas more general signals, such as institutional 
affiliation and third-part certification influence more general perceptions about the 
organizational standing in its filed.7   
Overall, both signaling research in economics and its applications in management 
trying to explain the reputation of large established organizations suggest that signaling 
                                                 
7 While some management scholars have defined signals as competitive actions and/or pre-announcements 
of actions (Heil & Robertson, 1991; Porter, 1980), I consider the traditional economics approach more 
suitable given that I am looking at a broader set of NV stakeholders not only competitors. Thus, quality 
related signals studied by economics research appear more appropriate and are consistent with the RBV in 
strategy. 
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might be a valuable mechanism for reputation accumulation by NVs, given that 
information asymmetries between NVs and their stakeholders are even more significant 
than those between established firms and their stakeholders.  
 
Organizational Symbols and Symbolic Communications 
Corporate communications, defined as “explicit verbal or visual statements 
created with the purpose to discuss, represent, and otherwise explain various aspects of a 
firm” (Rindova, 1999: 85), have emerged as one of the major tools used by organizations 
in their interactions with stakeholders and especially in their efforts to influence the 
process of impression formations (Brown, 1994; Jones, 1996; Pfeffer, 1981). Most 
management and organization scholars have related the use of symbolic activities on part 
of the organizations or their members to stakeholders’ perceptions of organizational 
legitimacy (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Brown, 1994; Elsbach, 1994; Pfeffer, 1981).8  
Management scholars also tend to distinguish between symbols and substance in 
organizational actions and communications (Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998; Zajac & 
Westphal, 1995), which is consistent with the institutional idea of decoupling (Meyer & 
Rowen, 1977). Consistent with this idea, impression management research has found that 
firms use causal attributions in their verbal accounts to manage stakeholders’ impressions 
of the organizations (Elsbach, 1994; Salancik & Meindl, 1984). For example, Salancik 
and Meindl (1984: 242) observe that managers take responsibility even for bad outcomes 
                                                 
8 For example, Elsbach (1994) examined how spokespersons use verbal accounts to manage perceptions of 
their organizations following controversial events and found that references to institutional reasons were 
more effective than technological arguments, especially when the audiences lacked the competence to 
evaluate the validity of technological explanations. Similarly, Westphal and Zajac (1998) found that 
symbolic communications not only explain the content of certain organizational actions but also have 
significant positive effect on stock-market valuations regardless of whether the firms actually implemented 
the announced organizational changes.  
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in order to induce in stakeholders illusions that they exert control over the environment: 
“Managements lacking real control, to remain viable, need to foster beliefs that they 
know what they are doing and can fulfill the organization’s promises. We can expect 
their attributions to reflect images of control”. This evidence suggests that the symbolic 
aspect of organizational activities plays a substantial role in shaping stakeholders’ 
perceptions and opinions about organizations and in manipulating their understanding of 
complex and ambiguous organizational events (Brown, 1994). 
Rindova and Fombrun (1999: 697) use the term “strategic projections” defined as 
“controlled images projected in social interaction through communication to secure 
favorable evaluations by others” to explain the role of symbols in firm interactions with 
stakeholders. They appear in a wide range of forms, including advertising, logo 
development, financial reports, and press releases (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Salancik 
& Meindl, 1984; van Riel, 1995). The goal of symbolic activities is to contribute to the 
formation of firm-related schemas, such as reputation (Fombrun, 1996; Grunig et al., 
2002; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). According to Rindova & Fombrun (1999: 697), 
“through strategic projections firms: (1) provide more information which constituents 
may use in making their decisions; (2) offer to constituents ready-made interpretations of 
their investments; and (3) impress desirable symbols in constituents’ minds.”  
Management scholars have also theorized that symbolic activities are useful 
legitimation tools for new organizations, with which stakeholders are not familiar 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). For 
example, Aldrich and Fiol (1994) propose that a NV can develop a knowledge base via 
symbolic language and behaviors, and it can build trust with stakeholders by maintaining 
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internally consistent stories. Similarly, Lounsbury & Glynn (2000) propose that 
entrepreneurial stories, which reflect a NV’s resource stocks and institutional capital, can 
shape and legitimate a NV by emphasizing its distinctiveness and unique characteristics, 
and by stressing its normativeness and symbolic congruence with similar organizational 
forms. In general, new organizations acquire standing within the organizational field by 
using environmentally preferred symbols and actions conforming to institutionalized 
rules (Rao, 1994). 
Communications research provides further insights into the different types of 
symbolic activities that firms use to influence their reputations with various stakeholder 
audiences. Symbolic activities differ along three dimensions: they can be (1) symmetrical 
or asymmetrical, depending on the extent to which organizations rely on advocacy and 
collaboration with stakeholders, (2) one-way or two-way, depending on whether the 
communications with stakeholders take the form of broadcasting of information vs. a 
dialogue, and (3) mediated or direct (interpersonal), depending on the use of a 
communication intermediary (Grunig, 1984; Grunig & Grunig, 1992; Grunig et al., 
2002). Communications scholars have advocated the use of two-way symmetrical 
communications as most effective for established organizations (Grunig & Grunig, 1992). 
Two-way interactions with stakeholders have been found to be particularly useful in 
highly uncertain and turbulent environments, because such environments force 
organizations to seek information from relevant stakeholders (Grunig, 1984; Grunig & 
Repper, 1992; Grunig et al., 2002). These ideas might be particularly relevant for NVs, 
because they often start in new industry and have to build their initial reputation with 
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stakeholders under conditions of high uncertainty and environmental turbulence (Aldrich, 
2000).  
 
Comparison between Symbols and Signals 
Symbols are similar to signals in several ways. First, both attract stakeholders’ 
attention to the firm in general (Nelson, 1974; Rindova & Petkova, 2005) or to specific 
firm characteristics and attributes (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Rindova et al., 2005; 
Shapiro, 1983). Second, both signals and symbols convey information to stakeholders 
and thus can affect their perceptions and opinions about the firm (Heil & Robertson, 
1991). Signals may influence perceptions by design or accident, because people seek to 
reduce uncertainty about the NV and therefore use and interpret the available cues to 
infer the NV’s true characteristics. Symbolic activities are explicitly intended to influence 
perceptions, and their information content can be controlled deliberately by the NV in 
order to project the desired images (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994).  
However, organizational symbols differ from signals in several ways. First, 
signals involve costly commitments and investments that are difficult to reverse (Ippolito, 
1990; Shapiro, 1983; Spence, 1974), whereas symbols do not necessarily involve costs. 
Second, signals are directly related to a firm’s characteristics and attributes – they are by 
definition observable attributes that indicate unobservable qualities, whereas symbols 
could be loosely related to specific firm attributes (Pfeffer, 1981; Westphal & Zajac, 
1994; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). Third, they use different mechanisms for influencing 
perceptions: signals rely on inference on part of the receivers – they convey some 
information but leave it to the receivers to interpret it. Thus, the experience and 
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background of the receivers play a certain role in the interpretations they will form based 
on a given signal (Heil & Robertson, 1991). Also, signaling research implicitly assumes 
that receivers already have developed some schemas according to which to interpret the 
signals.  
On the other hand, symbols are intended to shape meaning – they do not rely on 
stakeholders’ knowledge but instead provide ready-made interpretations and/or 
interpretive frameworks to guide formation of schemas (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; 
White & Dozier, 1992). By providing interpretive frameworks, symbols reduce the 
information over-load and allow stakeholders to focus their attention on specific 
capabilities. Unlike signals, symbols do not rely on inferences but directly communicate 
information to stakeholders to the desired extent and in the desired form. Therefore, they 
give the firm the greatest flexibility in terms of content and degree of disclosure of the 
information they provide to stakeholders and, therefore, allow for impressing the desired 
images and perceptions of the organizational attributes. Consequently, regardless of the 
receivers’ experience, symbols induce interpretations of unobservable characteristics or 
observable actions that might otherwise be interpreted in different ways (Lounsbury & 
Glynn, 2001). Finally, signaling may involve altering of observable attributes, which by 
design or by accident provide information about the underlying ‘true’ characteristics 
(Sanders & Boivie, 2004; Spence, 1974), while symbols frame the meaning of the 
observable characteristics and activities (without changing them) or provide information 
about unobservable characteristics, thus manipulating stakeholders’ opinions (Pfeffer, 
1981; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). In sum, symbols and signals present two distinct ways 
to convey information through different mechanisms and with different consequences.  
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REPUTATION ACCUMULATION BY NEW VENTURES 
 
How New Ventures Accumulate Reputation? 
Building reputation early in a NV’s life can help attract the support of various 
stakeholders and thus improve its chances of survival and success. At the same time, 
reputation building is a complex process, which requires significant resource investments 
over time. These conditions pose several additional challenges to NVs that are not 
encountered by established firms. First, it is particularly difficult for NVs to develop 
reputation, because at the beginning they lack the past history and consistent performance 
records necessary to guide stakeholders’ in comparing them to rival firms and forming 
opinions about them. Moreover, firms develop better reputations when they allocate 
resources to listening to and communicating with their stakeholders (Fombrun & 
Rindova, 1998; Grunig, 1984; Grunig et al., 2002; Grunig & Repper, 1992). Yet NVs 
tend to have rather limited resources which by necessity get allocated to critical activities 
related to developing and producing their new products and services (Block & 
MacMillan, 1985). Second, NVs are expected to create value in novel ways by bringing 
to the market previously unavailable products and services (Aldrich, 2000; Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994). However, the novelty of the products and services reduces the legitimacy of 
a NV and makes it difficult for potential stakeholders to see how it fits with the industry 
norms and beliefs (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1994), which in turn reduces stakeholders’ 
ability to compare the NV to other firms and to form positive impressions about it. Third, 
in order for stakeholders to form impressions of a NV, they have to be aware of its 
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existence and activities. This is a major challenge for most NVs, given their small size 
and limited resources that might be prohibitive for large-scale public relations or brand-
building campaigns. Further, at the beginning entrepreneurs may not even be aware of 
who the potential stakeholders of the NV are, which makes it even more challenging to 
attract their attention by selective allocation of resource investments.  
Extant research suggests that firms acquire reputation through complex social 
interaction processes and institutionalization mechanisms, aiming to engage relevant 
stakeholder groups and shape their opinions and evaluations about the firm (Ager & 
Piskorski, 2005; Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Grunig et al., 2002; Rindova & Fombrun, 
1999). As firms and stakeholders interact, they construct interpretive frameworks and 
interpretations that allow for stakeholders to evaluate firms relative to industry standards 
and to their rivals, thus giving content to firms’ reputations (Grunig & Hung, 2002; 
Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Institutional theorists consider the organizational field, 
defined as those organizations that in the aggregate constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life, a major arena where an organization’s interactions with key constituents 
unfold (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). They also explicitly acknowledge that one of the key 
characteristics of an organizational field is the presence of intense interactions among 
various actors and institutions (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). 
Interpretations about an organization develop as a result of its actions in various material 
and symbolic domains, which attract stakeholders’ attention and trigger various 
interpretations and impressions (Pfeffer, 1981; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Following 
this logic, it could be inferred that the process of building reputation for a NV involves 
ongoing social interactions that shape stakeholders’ reputational cognition: entrepreneurs 
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take actions on part of their venture, these actions are perceived and interpreted by 
observers, and the observers in turn develop cognitive representations of the NV. Thus, 
entrepreneurs must be very proactive and start investing in the reputations of their NVs 
early on, because the failure to do so may delay the access to some resources that are vital 
for the NVs’ survival and success. With the evolving activities of the NV, its reputation 
begins to accumulate incrementally, through the flows of strategic actions of the 
entrepreneurs on behalf of their ventures (Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Rindova, Petkova & 
Kotha, 2005). 
Drawing on symbolic research in management and signaling theory in economics, 
I propose that two groups of factors can influence a NV’s reputation: (1) symbolic 
activities that involve the communications and interactions of the NV with its potential 
stakeholders, and (2) key resources possessed by the NV, such as human capital and 
social capital, which signal the underlying quality of the NV’s organizational and 
operational processes and its access to resources. Below, I explain in greater detail the 
theoretical rationale for each of these factors and the mechanisms through which they 
influence a NV’s reputation. Figure 2.1 depicts the process model of reputation 
accumulation by NVs that I propose. 
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Symbolic Activities as Reputation Building Tools for New Ventures 
Stakeholders are interested in evaluating firms as exchange partners and are 
concerned with their reliability, credibility and trustworthiness (Fombrun, 1996). In order 
to assess these qualities, stakeholders have to be knowledgeable about and to understand 
firm technologies, identity and unique resources (Rindova, 1999). Therefore, they need 
not only information about the firm’s actions but also interpretive frameworks that 
explain the meanings of those actions (Weick, 1995; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). As 
Aldrich & Fiol (1994: 651) observe, “pioneering founders cannot base initial trust-
building strategies on objective external evidence. Instead, they must concentrate on 
framing the unknown in such a way that it becomes believable.”  
Symbolic activities include various communications and interactions of a firm 
with its current and potential stakeholders, such as use of symbolic language in naming, 
story-telling, advertising, promotions, and corporate social responsibility actions (Aldrich 
& Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2000; Rindova, 1999). Symbolic activities can both 
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draw stakeholders’ attention to the desired information and translate for them the 
meaning of ambiguous resources that the NV possesses, by relating symbols from the 
general culture to venture-specific characteristics (e.g., artifacts, concepts and frames). 
“By transferring its strategy into communication themes a firm ensures that observers 
understand critical and defining characteristics of its activities. In selecting symbols firms 
seek to convey attractive and unique meanings, so that the information discussed is 
remembered and evaluated positively” (Rindova, 1999: 22).  
Anecdotal examples and case studies also suggest that the use of symbolic 
activities might be among the major forces that helped some firms transfer quickly from a 
startup to a nationally recognized name. For example, Starbucks started extensive 
symbolic activities early in its life by developing communication materials that educated 
about coffee but also differentiated the firm and made it more memorable. As a result, 
Starbucks developed a national reputation within 5-6 years of founding (Rindova, 1999). 
Similarly, the use of symbolic activities was what differentiated Amazon.com from its 
nearest competitors – Barnesandnoble.com and CDNow – and helped it build a reputation 
for being a pioneer and the creator of the on-line book retail (Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 
2005). Based on these examples and the recently growing body of research on 
organizational symbolism, I propose that symbolic activities can be utilized strategically 
by NVs to build and increase their reputations. Below, I elaborate on the mechanisms 
through which the use of symbols can contribute to a NV’s reputation by shaping 
stakeholder opinions and impressions of the NV. I draw on communications research to 
articulate the role of different types of symbolic activities for reputation accumulation. I 
use the term “symbolic activities” to denote all symbolic communications and actions 
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that a NV can take that are not related to substantive investments or changes in its 
resource base. In this sense, symbolic activities are more inclusive than pure 
communications. 
The role of symbolic activities is to explain to stakeholders the purpose of the NV 
(e.g., how it can serve their needs, what products or services it is going to provide), to 
interpret for them the NV resources and activities, and more generally to attract 
stakeholders’ attention to the NV and its activities. Thus, any symbolic activities on part 
of the NV that make stakeholders aware of its existence, demonstrate its fit with the 
industry norms, and induce positive evaluations of the value for stakeholders of potential 
relationships with the NV, can serve as investments in building the NV’s reputation. 
Research drawing on the institutional perspective has also focused on the use of 
symbols by new organizations in an effort to change existing patterns of meaning 
(Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). New 
organizations acquire standing within the organizational field by using environmentally 
preferred symbols and actions conforming to institutionalized rules (Rao, 1994). Within 
the organizational field, there may exist many standards for comparison (Rindova, 1997). 
Stakeholders compare to their own expectations and beliefs, to other new ventures in the 
industry, and to the established firms (representing the industry status-quo). Therefore, 
the purpose of symbolic activities is to direct stakeholders’ attention toward the desired 
comparison categories. For example, symbolic activities can be used to convey the 
entrepreneurial vision to the potential stakeholders and general publics (Aldrich, 2000). 
In his investigation of the founding of a private school, Pettigrew (1979) concludes that 
the use of metaphors and analogies help link the old and new terminology and, thus, to 
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create a new meaning. Overall, this body of research strongly supports the notion that 
symbolic activities are critical for NVs’ interactions with their stakeholders as meaning 
making and impression formation stimuli. 
The first step toward developing a reputation through symbolic activities is to 
attract their stakeholders’ attention – that is, to build public awareness of the NV 
(Rindova & Petkova, 2005; van Leuven & Slater, 1991). Because of their limited span of 
attention, stakeholders are likely to notice only the most salient (or visible) firms in an 
industry. Visibility in turn depends on how much and how frequently stakeholders are 
exposed to information about a given firm. Thus, the more active a NV is in 
communicating with stakeholders and the more information it provides, the more likely it 
is to attract the stakeholders’ attention. A particularly effective way of attracting the 
stakeholders’ attention might be to focus on the media as a key info-intermediary which 
disseminates information about organizations to a broad range of relevant stakeholders 
(Grunig & Repper, 1992; van Leuven & Slater, 1991).  
Symbolic activities can also contribute to the reputation of a NV by propagating 
new meanings, through which the actions of the NV can be understood and appreciated. 
Past research suggests that symbolic activities are particularly beneficial for organizations 
with diverse audiences as well as under conditions of high uncertainty regarding the 
purpose and consequences of organizational actions (Brown, 1994; Grunig & Repper, 
1992; Westphal & Zajac, 1998). Specifically, prior research suggests that symbolic 
activities involving two-way interactions with stakeholders (as opposed to only providing 
information about the organization), are particularly useful in highly uncertain and 
turbulent environments (Grunig & Repper, 1992; Grunig et al., 2002). Therefore, NVs 
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may benefit from engaging in more interactive symbolic activities, such as participation 
in conferences, trade-shows and industry events, which allow for more immediate 
feedback on the new products, technologies, or other ideas that the NV seeks to develop 
and implement.  
In addition to creating interpretive frameworks for stakeholders to understand the 
NV, symbolic activities can also directly induce favorable interpretations and positive 
evaluations of the NV’s ability to create value for them. To the extent that stakeholders 
know about the existence of the NV and consider it legitimate, their decision to allocate 
and exchange resources with it will be influenced by the perceived potential of the 
enterprise to fulfill certain stakeholder needs and expectations (Rindova & Fombrun, 
1999). Unlike established firms, for which stakeholders can rely on a proven track-record 
for consistent product quality or on their past financial performance (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990), NVs have nothing tangible to offer to stakeholders as evidence of their 
ability, because often times they start only with an idea or an entrepreneurial vision, 
which is still to materialize (Aldrich, 2000; Bronson, 1999). However, the idea or 
intention is difficult to be conveyed and even more difficult to be used as a credible 
signal for reliable future performance. If so, the NV can use symbolic activities to define 
for stakeholders its purpose and explain to them its wealth creation potential in order to 
induce favorable interpretations (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Therefore, symbolic 
activities are critical in convincing stakeholders that the NV has the potential to create 
value for them. Based on this logic, I propose that symbolic activities are one of the most 
critical factors in reputation building by NVs: 
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Proposition 1: The higher the levels of symbolic activities on part of a NV, the 
greater its visibility in the organizational field and the higher its reputation. 
 
New Venture Resources as Reputational Signals  
Signaling theory posits that firm attributes convey information that reduces 
stakeholder uncertainty about a firm’s intrinsic quality. Following this logic, reputation 
research in management has established that observable organizational attributes that 
signal an organization’s potential to produce high quality shape stakeholders’ perceptions 
about the organization (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Rindova et al., 2005). Because the 
underlying quality of NVs cannot be observed directly, stakeholders must evaluate the 
NV based on observable attributes that are believed to indicate the underlying 
unobservable quality of the NV. Faced with the high degree of uncertainty often 
surrounding a NV, stakeholders may rely on various signals about the NV’s potential and 
capabilities, either in addition to or in the absence of direct communications on part of the 
NV.  
Entrepreneurship research has devoted substantial attention to observable 
characteristics of NVs that can be used to predict their chances of survival and success, 
speculating similar uncertainty reduction mechanisms to pertain. For NVs, attributes that 
have been proposed to reduce uncertainty include status of alliance partners (Stuart, 
2000; Stuart et al., 1999), underwriter bank prestige (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Higgins & 
Gulati, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999), status of VCs investing in the NV (Lee, Lee & 
Pennings, 2001; Shane & Stuart, 2002), and corporate governance mechanisms (Sanders 
& Boivie, 2004). Although these studies have not been directly measuring NV reputation, 
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they have assumed that reputation drives the observed relationships and have used 
signaling logic to explain these relationships. 
In this section, I explain how investments in critical resources on part of a NV can 
play the role of signals to potential stakeholders and thus contribute to the accumulation 
of reputation by the NV. A careful examination of the NV attributes studied by prior 
research shows extensive focus on two types of resources that serve as indicators of the 
NV’s unobservable quality – human capital and social capital (Burton, Sorensen & 
Beckman, 2002; Davidson & Honig, 2003; Honig, 1998; Pennings, Lee & Witteloostuijn, 
1998). From a stakeholders’ perspective, it is not only the availability of such resources 
but also their quality that matters and, therefore, is likely to influence stakeholders’ 
perceptions of the NV. For example, the quality of the NV’s human capital may be 
evident from the size, diversity, and experience of its team; and the quality of the NV’ 
social capital may be evident from the number and diversity of its relationships with 
various actors in the organizational field, as well as the status of those actors. Below, I 
discuss how each of these factors can play the role of a signal, and thus can impact 
stakeholders’ perceptions of the NV. 
 
Human capital as a signal. Entrepreneurial human capital can be broadly defined 
as “the set of knowledge and skills that individuals can bring to bear to create and exploit 
market opportunities” (Coff, 2005: 82). The human capital of a NV, and especially its 
most salient aspects (such as key experts), can signal to stakeholders the quality of the 
NV and its outputs. For example, Rindova and Kotha (2001: 1269) report that Excite 
attempted to signal the quality of its Web site content by introducing “personality-driven 
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reviews” offered by a team of journalists who were nationally renowned experts in their 
areas. Similarly, Audretsch and Stephan (1996) identify that a key function of top-notch 
scientists in biotechnology firms is to signal to stakeholders the quality of a firm’s 
research capability. These signaling effects of human capital are particularly likely to 
occur in young firms, where the founders and the TMT often embody the entire human 
capital of the NV. 
Different entrepreneurs possess different prior knowledge and experience, which 
could be more or less useful for the NV (Shane, 2000; Venkataraman, 1997). 
Entrepreneurial human capital refers to these individual variations in skills, experience, 
and competences, acquired through formal education, informal training, work experience, 
general management experience, and especially previous start-up experience (Davidsson 
& Honig, 2003; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper & Woo, 1997; Mosakowski, 1998). A summary 
of the major studies on entrepreneurial HC is provided in Appendix 2.B.  
A NV’s HC can influence its reputation by signaling to stakeholders that the 
processes utilized by the NV are of substantially high quality. Stakeholders may use 
different observable indicators of entrepreneurial human capital, such as size and 
diversity of founding teams (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Porter, 2004), as well as 
individual founders’ prestige (Shane & Cable, 2002).9 The size of a NV’s team is likely 
to attract more attention – other things being equal, larger teams would be more visible 
and thus more likely to be noticed by potential stakeholders than smaller teams or single 
founders. Also, a greater number of people are more likely to cope with the complex 
decision making tasks and the high degree of uncertainty involved in the founding 
                                                 
9 According to Lin (2001: 158), “prestige has been appropriated and is understood in the literature to grade 
positions in the hierarchical structure (e.g., occupational prestige).” 
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process (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990). Therefore, NVs started by larger teams are 
likely to be viewed by stakeholders as more viable and capable of producing desirable 
outputs. Further, team size has been found to be positively related to strategic alliance 
formation (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996), which suggests that a large number of 
founders increases the access of the NV to key relationships and resources.  
Diversity of the NV team is also a signal of higher quality of human capital, 
because a more diverse team is more likely to possess more of the needed expertise for 
the NV to perform its functions. Prior research has documented a positive effect of a 
NV’s founding team’s diversity on the NV growth and its attractiveness for various 
stakeholder groups (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Porter, 2004). For example, Porter 
(2004) found that larger and more diverse founding teams make a bio-technology start-up 
a more attractive acquisition target.  
Finally, individual team members’ prestige may also serve as a signal of the 
quality of a NV’s human capital. For example, having a degree from a prestigious 
university (Porter, 2004; Shane & Khurana, 2003) or having worked for a prestigious 
firm (Burton et al., 2002) indicates unique skills and capabilities and thus higher levels of 
human capital of the NV. To sum up, stakeholders are likely to use characteristics of a 
NV’s TMT to infer the level and quality of the NV’s human capital, and thus the 
potential of the NV to perform effectively. Therefore, other things being equal, NVs with 
higher levels and better quality human capital will have higher reputations than their 
competitors. This logic leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 2: The higher the level of human capital of a NV, as signaled by the 
team size, prestige, and diversity, the better the NV’s reputation. 
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Social capital as a signal. Social capital refers to “the sum of the actual and 
potential resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 243). 
According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) social capital is comprised of a relational 
dimension, which reflects the strength and quality of relationships, and a structural 
dimension, which reflects the number of relationships and the overall structure of an 
actor’s network. It should be noted that from the actor’s perspective the relational 
dimension might be more important, because high-quality relationships may bring more 
and better resources to it. However, in this section I argue that because the quality of 
relationships is unobservable, especially to publics not involved in a relationship with a 
focal NV, the relational dimension has little signaling value. At the same time, the 
structural dimension may have less direct benefits for a focal actor, but it is more 
observable and therefore, contains greater signaling value. 
Management scholars have recognized the importance of high quality 
relationships for building organizational reputation. For example, Fombrun (1996: 57) 
argues that “to acquire reputation that is positive, enduring, and resilient requires 
managers to invest heavily in building and maintaining good relationships with their 
company’s constituents”. Communications scholars also have become increasingly 
concerned with the development of high-quality relationships with relevant stakeholder 
groups (Grunig et al., 2002; Yang, 2005). Such relationships allow organizations not only 
to better understand and serve their stakeholders but also to provide relevant information 
to stakeholders and thus to familiarize them with the organization’s goals and activities. 
The relationships of an organization with its stakeholders increase the stakeholders’ 
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familiarity which in turn makes them perceive the organization as more desirable and 
form more positive opinions about it (Fombrun & Van Reil, 2003; Grunig et al., 2002; 
Yang, 2005). Further, entrepreneurs tend to rely extensively on their personal networks, 
including family, friends, and professional contacts, for all kinds of material, financial, 
moral, and emotional support (Aldrich, 2000). Therefore, a NV’s reputation can benefit 
from developing high-quality relationships with key stakeholders such as potential 
investors or customers. 
Further, past research suggests that relationships may play a signaling role 
(Rindova et al., 2005), thus influencing the perceptions of stakeholders who have no 
direct relationships to the focal NV. A NV’s social relationships can legitimate the NV 
and influence public impressions about it by providing information and institutional 
endorsement of the NV. People who know the founders personally are able to provide 
first-hand information and opinions regarding their personal and professional qualities 
and the viability of their venture. Lack of trusting relationships has been identified as one 
of the major reasons for the low success rates among NVs. For example, Aldrich & Fiol 
(1994: 664) explain that “many promising new activities never realize their potential 
because founders fail to develop trusting relations with stakeholders, are unable to cope 
with opposing industries, and never win institutional support”. 
The choices of third parties vis-à-vis a NV, and especially their decisions to enter 
an exchange relationship with it, have been identified by past research as an important 
signal of the NV’s quality and potential, and have been found to influence NV 
performance and survival chances. Relationships with influential third parties serve as an 
endorsement or certification of the NV’s quality, because such actors are believed to be 
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more knowledgeable and capable of evaluating the NV (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Higgins 
& Gulati, 2003; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Social capital can be viewed as a 
higher-order signal than new product development and human capital, because it comes 
from external validation and carries more credibility as a signal, especially if the third 
parties are established industry players (Podolny & Stuart, 1995; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et 
al., 1999). Sociology scholars have focused primarily on organizational status as a 
function of the relationships a NV has. Status has been conceptualized as a relative 
structural position in a network of exchange relationships – the more connected an 
organization to other well-connected actors, the higher its own status (Piskorski, 2004; 
Podolny, 1993; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Moreover, researchers have found that 
social relationships play the role of organizational endorsements and certifications of 
quality, and thus lead to perceptions of higher organizational quality compared to less 
connected rivals (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993).  
From public perspective, there are three sources of information about a NV: the 
entrepreneurs themselves, the media, and other monitors (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990). 
Before entrepreneurs have proved their credibility, potential stakeholders are more likely 
to rely on the evaluative signals from key intermediaries such as market analysts, 
professional investors and reporters (Fombrun, 1997). Consequently, entrepreneurs need 
to be able to signal their credibility by having the right social connections to key 
customers, partners, and investors that shape resource formation for new firms. 
Therefore, they should seek to attract the attention of these experts and to convince them 
in the quality of the opportunity they have identified and the viability of their 
entrepreneurial vision (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). For instance, Rao (1994) found that 
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‘certification contests’ in the early years of the automobile industry played an important 
role in legitimating the new industry and firms within it and helped build their reputations 
– the winners of the contests were perceived as better and more reliable performers. 
Following similar logic, Podolny and Stuart (1995) found that the status of actors 
associated with an innovation increases the likelihood of the innovation to be seen by 
others as important and thus rapidly developed, controlling for innovation quality. 
Further, Stuart (2000) shows that the size and innovativeness of a focal firm’s alliance 
partners predict its innovation rate and growth. This effect is stronger for new and small 
firms, which suggests that NVs benefit most from the signaling effect of partners on their 
reputation (Sanders & Boivie, 2004; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). 
Further, outside observers can infer certain characteristics of the NV by the 
quality of its social ties, because people tend to associate with others who have similar 
values and interests (Aldrich, 2000). Aldrich (2000: 87) points to the fact that “high status 
people – with more social resources, power, or prestige than others – play important roles 
in linking nascent entrepreneurs to resources and opportunities”. NVs that have 
relationships with high-status strategic partners are found to perform better because their 
social ties provide them with certification for quality when stakeholders are uncertain 
about their actual quality (Stuart et al., 1999). Affiliations of a NV with prestigious 
financial bankers, seasoned industry veterans, and large and established customers not 
only validate the potential of the venture signaled through its business concept and focal 
opportunity, but also provide legitimacy to the NV. This legitimacy is derived from the 
relative status of the affiliations of the NV, as high-status actors exert disproportionate 
amount of influence on the choices of others (Rao, Davis & Ward, 2000).  
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NVs’ affiliations are consistently found to predict various outcomes, such as 
survival, growth, innovation and financial performance (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Larson, 
1992; Shane & Stuart, 2002). For example, IPO success has been consistently predicted 
by NVs’ relationships with prominent actors, such as strategic alliance partners (Higgins 
& Gulati, 2003; Stuart et al., 1999) or venture capital firms and investment banks (Brav 
& Gompers, 1997; Gompers, 1996; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Lerner, 1994). In an in-depth 
qualitative analysis of seven relationships of entrepreneurial firms Larson (1992) reports 
that entrepreneurial firms emphasize the importance of relationships for financial success, 
growth, adaptiveness, and innovation.  
To sum up, prior research suggests that NVs’ relationships with key stakeholders 
can play a dual role in building reputation for the NV, by both improving the NV’s 
reputation based on the quality of the relationships and by signaling to more distant 
stakeholders the NV’s worthiness, reliability and potential (Baum, Calabrese & 
Silverman, 2000; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Therefore, social capital of a NV is 
likely to be attended by stakeholders as a signal of the NV’s quality.  Drawing on this 
logic, I propose that a NV’s relationships can impact its reputation by signaling to 
potential stakeholders its performance prospects and ability to create value, thus helping 
them to form positive impressions of the NV.   
Proposition 3: The higher the level of social capital of a NV, as signaled by the 
number and prestige of its relationships, the better the NV’s reputation. 
 
Symbolic Activities and the Effect of Human Capital and Social Capital on New 
Venture Reputation 
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 Institutional and impression management scholars argue that symbolic activities 
and substantial organizational characteristics are decoupled (Meyer & Rowen, 1977; 
Pfeffer, 1981). Such decoupling is found to have positive effect on the performance of 
established corporations (Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). 
However, this may not be the case with the NVs, which are much more closely watched 
and evaluated because of the perceived high risks related to their activities (Aldrich, 
2000; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Instead, NVs may use symbolic activities to promote their 
substantive characteristics, by drawing stakeholders’ attention to those characteristics and 
by explaining how such characteristics will help the NV produce high quality outputs or 
otherwise meet stakeholders’ expectations (Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 2005). In the 
presence of relevant resources that are likely to be seen by stakeholders as indicators of 
the NV’s higher quality and potential, such as human capital and relationships, symbolic 
activities can be used to make those resources more visible to stakeholders and to focus 
stakeholders’ attention on them. Further, symbolic activities can be used strategically to 
improve the quality of relationships with key stakeholders, such as customers or partners 
(Grunig et al., 2002). If so, symbolic activities will reinforce the positive effect of human 
capital, relationships with customers and partners, and product completion on a NV’s 
reputation. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
Proposition 4: Symbolic activities will increase the positive effects of (a) human 
capital and (b) social capital on a NV’s reputation. 
 
Founders’ Experience and New Ventures’ Reputation Building  
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Extant research attributes a great deal of a NV’s performance to its founder(s)’ 
background characteristics. Founders’ characteristics have profound effect on the way a 
NV is organized and the initial strategy it would pursue (Boeker, 1988; Burton, 2001; 
Burton, Sorensen & Stuart, 2002; Rubenson & Gupta, 1992). According to Boeker (1988: 
37), “because organizations are primarily begun by individuals, these individuals (the 
founders) play a central role in guiding the organization’s creation process”. Past research 
has found that the functional background and past employment of a NV’s founders and 
founding team-members predict the likelihood for the NV to pursue innovation/ first 
mover strategy or to deviate from dominant strategy in its industry (Boeker, 1988; 
Burton, 2001; Burton et al., 2002). Since founders are the major and in many cases the 
only decision makers for the NV, their background is likely to guide the decisions they 
make regarding investments in various assets and activities. Specifically, founders’ 
experience is likely to influence their decisions and actions with regard to utilizing 
symbolic activities to influence stakeholders’ perceptions of their NVs’, building the 
human capital of their NVs, and developing relationships with key stakeholders or 
building the social capital of their NVs. More experienced founders are more likely to 
invest in using symbolic activities and enhancing the NV’s HC and SC not only because 
they know from prior experience the strategic importance of these investments but also 
because they might be in a better position for doing such investments in comparison to 
novice founders. 
First, experienced founders are more likely to utilize symbolic activities because 
they can utilize symbols better and can benefit more from them. The reason why 
experienced founders might be better able to utilize symbols is because their proven track 
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record and credibility allow them to use symbolic communications and activities more 
efficiently and with greater impact on stakeholder audiences (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). 
Research on IPO markets has established as a major reason for involvement of 
underwriters the fact that IPO firms cannot make credible commitments themselves, 
because they go IPO only once (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). Similar logic holds for novice 
founders, who do not risk anything if their statements turn out to be false. Also, the fact 
that an entrepreneur has already started previous NVs allows for coming up with more 
coherent and consistent entrepreneurial stories, by using facts and examples from 
previous experiences. Finally, experienced founders are more likely to realize the need 
for building reputation for the NV early on and to understand the critical role of symbolic 
activities in this process. Therefore, experienced founders are likely to have an advantage 
over novice ones in terms of their ability to use symbolic activities. 
Second, experienced founders are likely to be more successful in building the HC 
for their NVs, because they can rely on the networks of contacts built during their 
previous ventures. It is well-established that recruitment through networks provides a 
“convenient and inexpensive” way of acquiring talents (Leung, 2003: 305). Experienced 
founders are also more likely to be able to identify and attract qualified people – either 
from their prior NVs or by using their credibility as seasoned founders to convince key 
experts to join the NV. This is particularly true early in the life of a NV when the venture 
is resource-poor and cannot afford other selection and recruitment channels (Leung, 
2003).  
Third, more experienced founders have better capabilities to invest in SC for their 
NVs. Entrepreneurs often rely on their personal reputation when approaching potential 
 91
stakeholders, because their ventures’ reputations are not yet established (Larson, 1992). 
More experienced founders are more likely to have established relationships from before, 
or to know people who may help them develop useful relationships for their current 
venture. For example, founders’ prior experience has been found to influence strategic 
alliance formation among semiconductor firms (Schoonhoven & Eisenhardt, 1996). 
Further, experienced founders have better chances of knowing some venture capitalists or 
other investors, who would be more inclined to invest in a NV if they already know its 
founder (Shane & Cable, 2002; Shane & Stuart, 2002). Consistent with this idea, serial 
entrepreneurs are found to be able to recruit funding from more sources than novice ones 
(Westhead & Wright, 1998). Finally, experienced founders might be able to find more 
prestigious venture capitalists or other investors for their NVs, because they understand 
the VC industry better and can direct their efforts more appropriately than novice 
founders (Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Wright, Smart & McMahan, 1995).  
For novice entrepreneurs, external accreditation from recognized bodies, such as 
investment banks and venture capitalists, are much more critical than for experienced 
founders, because the value of external accreditation increases with the degree of 
evaluative uncertainty (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). 
Thus, less experienced founders may feel greater need for building SC for their NVs. 
Similarly, they may also need to invest more in HC in order to prove that their NV is 
capable of producing the envisioned outputs by utilizing appropriate and highly qualified 
personnel. However, building HC might be more difficult for novice founders than for 
their experienced peers. For example, in the face of high uncertainty and no business 
track record to refer to, potential employees who do not know the entrepreneurs are 
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unlikely to join them. Therefore, novice entrepreneurs are less likely to be successful in 
recruiting high-quality talent than their more experienced peers. Similarly, novice 
founders will have harder time convincing potential partners to join them, because they 
have no evidence of credibility or past success to offer. This makes them less likely to 
succeed in building SC for their NVs, too. 
Overall, the above arguments suggest that experienced founders are more likely to 
invest successfully in symbolic activities, HC and SC for their NVs than their novice 
peers. Therefore, I propose that: 
Proposition 5: Founders’ entrepreneurial experience will increase (a) the 
efficiency of their investments in using symbolic activities and building human 




THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY IN THE PROCESS OF REPUTATION-
BUILDING BY NEW VENTURES 
 
Uncertainty and the New Venture Reputation 
 Uncertainty refers to the difficulty that individuals and organizations experience 
in predicting the future or anticipating the outcomes of certain actions (Beckman, 
Haunschild & Phillips, 2004; Leblebici & Salancik, 1981; Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). 
Past research has distinguished between two types of uncertainty – (1) internal or 
technical uncertainty and (2) external or market uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004; Dixit 
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& Pindyck, 1994; McGrath, 1997). The various sources of uncertainty regarding NVs can 
be grouped similarly under two categories: (1) internal uncertainties, related to the quality 
of the NV organization and value creation processes, which determine its survival 
chances and likelihood to behave reliably in social and economic exchanges with 
prospective stakeholders, and (2) external uncertainties related to the target product 
markets for the NV’s outputs and the likelihood that the NV’s products will meet the 
quality and performance expectations of these markets. External uncertainty stems from 
the turbulences in the market or industry where a firm operates and is faced by all 
competitors, whereas internal uncertainty is firm-specific (Beckman et al., 2004). Two 
issues related to perceptions of uncertainty and reactions to it appear particularly relevant 
to the arguments developed in this essay.  
First, organization scholars have acknowledged that perceptions of uncertainty 
differ among individuals and organizations (Daft & Weick, 1984; Meyer, 1982; 
Starbucks & Milleken, 1988). According to Starbucks and Milleken (1988), faced with 
the same external environment, different people perceive and filter out different 
information; and even noticing the same stimuli may lead to different interpretations, 
because different individuals may use different frameworks to interpret the stimuli. 
Further, they suggest that in complex environments, effective filtering of information 
requires detailed knowledge of the task environment (Starbuck & Milliken, 1988). These 
variations are particularly relevant for understanding NV reputation building activities, 
because as I will argue in this section, founders who perceive the uncertainty as higher 
will invest more in alleviating stakeholders’ concerns and providing them with 
information about the NV, thus increasing the early reputation of their NVs.  
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Second, past research has consistently demonstrated that most people have low 
tolerance to uncertainty and, therefore, experience a fundamental need to reduce 
uncertainty (Bourgeois, 1985; Dewey, 1929; Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Hogg & Terry, 
2000). Most people tend to react to uncertainty by either ignoring it or searching for 
information in order to reduce its magnitude (Bazerman, 2001). Dewey (1929) argues 
that people have a pathological need to know in situations containing uncertainty. This 
need to reduce uncertainty leads people to take too much credit for success and too much 
blame for failures (Salancik & Meindl, 1984). For example, under conditions of high 
uncertainty managers are found to take responsibility even for bad outcomes in order to 
re-assure themselves and the stakeholders of their control over the situation (Salancik & 
Meindl, 1984).  
The need to reduce uncertainty increases the need for reputation accumulation, 
respectively, because reputation is a major uncertainty reduction tool in the interactions 
between organizations and their stakeholders (Rindova et al., 2005). In the case of NVs 
stakeholders may try to reduce uncertainty regarding the NVs and their quality by 
seeking cues that allow them to make inferences about the unobservable characteristics 
they like to evaluate. At the same time, NVs may also try to facilitate this process of 
uncertainty reduction by providing more cues to guide stakeholders’ perceptions and 
interpretations. For example, research in finance suggests that NVs going IPO seek to 
reduce uncertainty by including more items in their proxy statements, thus disclosing 
more information about themselves (Beatty & Ritter, 1986). Therefore, the higher the 
level of uncertainty, the more incentives a NV has to invest in reputation building 
activities. 
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The Role of External Uncertainty on Reputation Building by New Ventures 
The external or market uncertainty stems from various unknown factors, such as 
the customer demand for new products and services (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), the 
competitive actions of rival firms (Burgers, Hill & Kim, 1993), the costs of inputs 
coming from internal suppliers (McGrath, 1997), as well as the relative performance of 
new technologies, business models, or processes (Baum & Silverman, 2004; Courtney, 
2001; Tushman & Rosenkopf, 1996). Market uncertainty makes the quality of the firms 
in the market difficult to assess by both competitors and external stakeholders (Podolny, 
1994). This uncertainty gets stronger when the firms operate in emerging markets and/or 
the time required to evaluate the potential outcomes is extraordinary long (Courtney, 
2001). Thus, market uncertainty is an ubiquitous problem faced by NVs and their 
stakeholders, because NVs often attempt to provide products, services or technologies 
that are new to the world and thus of unknown quality (Aldrich, 2000).  
In this section, I propose that market uncertainty is likely to interact with 
founders’ experience in determining the reputation-building investments made by NVs. 
Specifically, prior experience is likely to influence founders’ perceptions of the 
uncertainty faced by their NVs and the need to reduce this uncertainty, thus determining 
the relative emphasis they would place on different activities. Different founders vary in 
the degree to which they are likely to (a) perceive the same need for uncertainty 
reduction, and (b) invest effectively in new product development, accumulate HC and 
SC, and use symbolic activities, depending on the perceived level of uncertainty. 
Past research suggests that people avoid decision making under uncertainty to a 
different degree, depending on their knowledge and expertise in the realm of the decision 
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to be made. Experimental psychology has found that tolerance to uncertainty and 
confidence in decision making under a given level of uncertainty changes with 
experience in the focal subject area (Fox & Tversky, 1995; Heath & Tversky, 1991). For 
example, Heath and Tversky (1991) observed that people prefer to bet on their vague 
beliefs (as opposed to known probabilities) in situations where they feel particularly 
competent and knowledgeable, which suggests that more experienced people may 
perceive the same situation as less uncertain than inexperienced ones. Further, Fox and 
Tversky (1995) found that people perceive higher uncertainty and avoid decision making 
when they feel relatively incompetent about an issue – either because they compare their 
inferior knowledge and familiarity with the subject area to another one in which they are 
more competent or because they compare themselves to more knowledgeable individuals 
in the same subject area.  
Applying similar logic to entrepreneurial experience, it is conceivable that when 
faced with the same external environment, experienced entrepreneurs will perceive less 
subjective uncertainty than their inexperienced peers. The limited empirical evidence on 
serial entrepreneurship suggest that while all founders perceive starting a NV as a highly 
uncertain attempt, experienced founders (or “serial entrepreneurs”) tend to do so to a 
lesser extent than their novice peers (Westhead & Wright, 1998). Moreover, Kolvereid 
and Bullval (1993) found that experienced founders tend to get involved into more 
complex environments than their novice peers, which suggests that they feel more 
comfortable navigating under high uncertainty. These findings lead me to propose that 
founders’ experience will influence the decisions they make under given level of 
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uncertainty, and more specifically the degree to which they will decide to invest in 
different assets and activities for their NVs. 
When people compare two events about which they have different levels of 
knowledge, the contrast makes the more familiar event more attractive (Fox & Tversky, 
1995). Since experienced entrepreneurs are likely to be more familiar with starting a new 
firm than, say, managing an established corporation, they would feel particularly 
confident in their capabilities to deal with the uncertainties of the startup situation. This 
confidence might be good in some ways but it may also lead to underestimation of the 
need to invest in certain reputation-building activities. For example, experienced founders 
may feel that they know quite well what expertise is needed for their ventures and invest 
early in recruiting the necessary personnel, thus building the HC for their NVs faster than 
their novice peers. Similarly, if experienced founders perceive the market as reasonably 
predictable, they are more likely to start investing early in developing the necessary 
relationships with customers, partners, venture capitalists, and other stakeholders, thus 
building the SC for their ventures.  
On the other hand, if experienced entrepreneurs feel relatively comfortable with a 
given level of uncertainty, they are likely to experience lower need for uncertainty 
reduction than their novice peers. This in turn may lead to under-investment in symbolic 
activities, and especially in communications intended to provide meaning and explain to 
stakeholders the purpose and activities of the NV. Thus, under a very high level of 
uncertainty, prior entrepreneurial experience may be hubris for founder and prevent them 
from investing enough in symbolic activities. At the same time, novice founders who 
experience greater uncertainty will also feel a stronger need to explain and justify the 
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existence and activities of their NVs. This in turn would lead them to invest more heavily 
in using symbolic activities. Therefore, I propose that:  
Proposition 6: Under conditions of high market uncertainty experienced founders 
will investment more in HC and SC and less in symbolic activities, as compared 
to novice founders.   
 
The Role of Internal Uncertainty on Reputation Building by New Ventures 
Internal or technical uncertainty is uncertainty about the likelihood of technical 
success and the costs associated with success (McGrath, 1997). Technology uncertainty 
is firm-specific to the extent that other firms have different resources and capabilities and, 
therefore, different chances of success (Beckman et al., 2004). In general, there is always 
some uncertainty regarding a NV due to its unproven quality and future prospects 
(Venkataraman, 1997), manifested in the high failure rates of new firms (Romanelli, 
1989). The embryonic period in the NV’s life is considered particularly uncertain, 
because it is not clear whether the NV is going to take off and when (Gompers, 1995). 
“Because the quality of a new venture is always a matter of some debate, the decision of 
external resource holders to invest their time, capital, or other resources in a new 
organization is one that must be made under considerable uncertainty about the 
embryonic enterprise’s life chances and its financial prospects” (Stuart et al., 1999: 315). 
Further, entrepreneurship scholars have found consistent evidence suggesting that 
younger and smaller NVs are perceived as more uncertain than older ones (Beatty & 
Ritter, 1986; Sanders & Boivie, 2004; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). 
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In a more narrow sense, the technical uncertainty regarding a NV is related to the 
specific activities inside the NV, such as the new product development and operation 
processes. For example, past research has identified accomplishments such as having a 
prototype or producing the first product as major milestones in the start-up process 
(Wasserman, 2003). Such accomplishments may signal stakeholders that the NV is “on 
the right track” and likely to produce the desired outputs and thus reduce the technical 
uncertainty about the NV. However, many NVs start with an idea rather than a finished 
product and it may take months or years before they deliver outputs to the market. 
Therefore, for products that take a long period of time to develop, such as new 
technologies or research-intensive products, stakeholders may use certain indicator of the 
NV’s ability to produce an output as signals of the potential output quality.  
The less advanced the product or technology the NV seeks to produce (i.e., still an 
idea or work in progress as opposed to a prototype or a ready output), the higher the 
internal uncertainty faced by the NV and respectively the more difficult for stakeholders 
to evaluate its quality and its chances of survival and success. As I argued above, this 
uncertainty regarding the quality of the NV’s outputs will lead stakeholders to seek some 
signals of the underlying quality and potential of the NV, such as its human and social 
capital. The higher the technological uncertainty, the more likely stakeholders to rely on 
resources as signals, because they would not be able to evaluate the NV outputs directly. 
The less advanced the prospective output, the more important these resources signals 
would be as information sources. Consequently, technological uncertainty increases the 
usefulness of HC and SC as signals and creates incentives for stakeholders to rely on 
these signals when forming perceptions about the NV. Therefore, HC and SC will have 
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the strongest effect on a NV’s reputation when the actual outputs are not yet available 
and a weaker effect after the NV begins to market its finished products, services, or 
technology.  
In addition to the product advancement, the type of product is also a source of 
technical uncertainty about a NV, because different outputs vary widely in the quality-
related uncertainty which they bring to potential evaluators. For example, ‘hard’ products 
might be easier to evaluate than new services or technologies, because they are relatively 
more observable and thus carry greater value as a source of information and a signal of 
quality. This unobservability of outputs adds even more uncertainty for the stakeholders 
who might be interested in exchanging resources with the NV. Further, for more 
innovative products the potential demand or other market reactions become difficult to 
predict. Therefore, the more innovative the NV’s outputs, the higher the uncertainty 
about their quality and potential value that the stakeholders are likely to experience. For 
example, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) found that higher levels of innovation being 
pursued by the NV were related to more intense interactions between the VC and the 
CEO of the NV, because such ventures were perceived as more risky by the VCs. Based 
on these arguments, I propose that: 
Proposition 7: The greater the technological uncertainty about a NV, the stronger 
the effects of its resources and use of symbolic activities on its reputation. 
 
NVs can reduce technological uncertainty by using symbolic activities to provide 
stakeholders with ready-made interpretations (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999) or by 
investing in new product development activities so that they can speed up the delivery of 
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the first outputs to market (Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt & Lyman, 1990). Recall that 
symbolic activities are designed to provide stakeholders with ready-made interpretations 
and to induce favorable impressions of the NV. Thus, the higher the technological 
uncertainty regarding a NV, the more stakeholders need such interpretations (Aldrich & 
Fiol, 1994).  
As I already discussed in the previous section, HC and SC can be used by 
stakeholders as signals of the underlying quality and potential of the NV, and 
particularly, of its ability to deliver the products it claims to be working on. Once the first 
products are available to market, the stakeholders have no need for relying on other 
signals, because the NV has already demonstrated that indeed it has the capability to 
produce the desired outputs. Therefore, the role of HC and SC as signals is likely to 
diminish as the NV matures and delivers products to the market. On the other hand, after 
the first product is available to the market, symbolic activities may still be needed to 
explain to stakeholders how the new product works and how it is going to satisfy their 
needs. Thus, unlike HC and SC, symbolic activities may still continue to contribute to a 
NV’s reputation even if the technical uncertainty regarding a NV diminishes. This is 
particularly likely to be the case for new technologies or other products whose quality is 
unobservable or whose benefits are difficult to evaluate immediately. Therefore, lower 
internal uncertainty is more likely to diminish the effect of human capital, social capital, 
or other resources than the effect of symbolic activities on a NV’s reputation. Therefore, I 
propose that: 
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Proposition 8: Technological uncertainty will have stronger effect on the 
relationship of human capital and social capital with a NV’s reputation than on 
the relationship between symbolic activities and a NV’s reputation.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The theory developed in this essay is relevant for reputation accumulation in NV 
contexts characterized by some degree of uncertainty faced by stakeholders. Specifically, 
the model is most likely to hold when products are not yet available or when product 
quality is difficult to evaluate. In such situations, both resources are likely to matter as 
signals and symbolic activities – to influence stakeholders perceptions, and thus to affect 
a NV’s reputation. The more fine-grained information about the product quality is 
available, the less signaling value a NV’s resources would have. For example, if a NV 
starts producing outputs from day one and the quality of these outputs can be easily 
evaluated, there would be a lower need of symbolic activities or signals because the 
stakeholders would be able to evaluate directly the NV and its outputs. On the other hand, 
the model is directly relevant for NVs that produce “experience goods”, the quality of 
which can be evaluated only after purchase and consumption (Nelson, 1974), or for NVs 
that develop a new technology which takes substantial time to market and thus the 
stakeholders have to form impressions of the NV in the absence of ready outputs to 
evaluate. Therefore, reputation building efforts are likely to have higher pay-offs for less 
observable products, whereas for more observable products it might makes more sense 
for NVs to focus on product quality, and would be less efficient to invest in reputation 
building activities. 
 103
 The factors that I proposed to influence reputations of NVs are also likely to 
contribute to the reputations of established organizations but to a lesser degree. First, at 
the beginning new ventures may not know who their stakeholders are and in what role 
(i.e., customers, investors, or partners). Thus, it might be more feasible for NVs to try to 
develop a broader and more generalized reputation with all potential stakeholders by 
increasing their visibility in the organizational field and attracting as much attention as 
possible. Established firms, on the other hand, are much more likely to know who their 
customers, suppliers, competitors, and other relevant stakeholders are, and to target them 
directly. In fact, prior research suggests that established organization may even try to 
build audience-specific reputations – that is, to develop different reputations with 
different stakeholder groups (Fombrun, 1996; Grunig, 1984; Grunig et al., 2002). 
Second, established organizations have stronger track record in the form of 
product quality, financial performance, and demonstrated reliable behavior in 
relationships with relevant stakeholders. Therefore, stakeholders can draw on this 
information to form reputational perceptions about them. The availability of information 
about product quality and past financial performance would make the resources that I 
argued to be critical for NVs’ reputations less relevant as signals, although they still 
might matter. Third, established organizations may have a stronger focus on establishing 
and managing their relationships with large stakeholder audiences because such 
relationships are more likely to be mutually acknowledged than in the case of NVs. 
Further, established organizations are also likely to be more visible in their organizational 
field, which makes the use of symbolic activities to attract stakeholders’ attention less 
important. Instead, such organizations may use symbolic activities for other purposes, 
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such as strengthening their relationships with stakeholders (Grunig et al., 2002) and 
explaining the meaning of novel actions or changes in their strategy (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991; Gioia & Thomas, 1996).  
Finally, the nature and quality of relationships with key stakeholders may differ 
between new ventures and established firms. Whereas established firms can build 
relationships with large stakeholder groups as many people have experience with their 
products (e.g., Microsoft), new ventures may struggle to develop one or a few 
relationships with key stakeholders (e.g., a major customer, an established industry 
player, or an investor). Therefore, NVs are much more likely to rely on the indirect (or 
signaling) effect of relationships on their reputation, by using the few relationships they 
have to influence the perceptions of other more distant stakeholders. Established firms, 
on the other hand, may experience no need for building reputation with distant 
anonymous publics if large enough stakeholder groups already have direct experience 
with them and their products. Instead they may focus on strengthening these relationships 
and improving their reputations with the actual (as opposed to potential) stakeholders 
(Grunig et al., 2002; Yang, 2005).  
 
Future Research Directions 
In my arguments I considered the distinct effects of market uncertainty and 
technological uncertainty on the reputation building of NVs. However, these two types of 
uncertainty may also have some complex joint effects and may influence each other. 
Specifically, according to the ‘real options’ logic, high market uncertainty reduces the 
feasibility of heavy investments upfront in developing a new product or technology and 
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makes more ‘rational’ making smaller investments and continuously re-evaluating the 
feasibility of the idea (Courtney, 2001; McGrath, 1997). For example, the level of 
technological innovation is found to increase the time it takes young semiconductor firms 
to market their first product (Schoonhoven et al., 1990), which suggests that the higher 
market uncertainty related to developing new technologies systematically reduces the 
speed of new product development (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Therefore, high 
market uncertainty may slow down the new product development activities of NVs and 
may, therefore, lead to a prolonged technological uncertainty. Future research should 
explore systematically how the potential relationships between market uncertainty and 
technological uncertainty may influence the reputation building processes. 
Second, founder experience can moderate the effect of uncertainty on new 
product development by making it stronger for novice founder but weaker for 
experienced founders. More experienced and educated founders tend to be more 
innovative (Boeker, 1988; Burton et al., 2002) and more likely to deviate from the 
dominant industry strategy (Burton, 2001), which suggests that experienced founders 
may feel more comfortable taking the risks related to the development of a new product 
under high uncertainty. Further, experienced founders tend to be more active and 
undertake gestation activities with higher frequency than their novice counterparts 
(Davidson & Honig, 2003), which makes them more likely to advance the product 
development faster than novice founders. Finally, experienced founders are also more 
likely to have access to larger pools of financial resources (Kolvereid & Bullvag, 1993), 
which will also speed up the new product development and reduce the time to 
commercialize the first products (Schoonhoven et al., 1990). Overall, these arguments 
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suggest that founder experience may systematically influence the technological 
uncertainty about a NV and provides another fruitful avenue for future research. 
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                                                                  ESSAY 3 
REPUTATION BUILDING BY NEW VENTURES: 




Reputation can help new ventures attract stakeholders and engage in interactions 
with them. Yet, prior research provides limited insights into the question how new 
ventures can build reputation early in their lives. Scholars have found that the reputation 
of established firms is a function of their past financial performance and costly 
investments in strategic signals, such as pricing and advertising. However, new ventures 
lack performance track records and usually possess limited resources, which makes it 
difficult for them to rely on the same sources of reputation as the established firms. 
Further, extant research suggests that because new ventures lack their own reputations, 
they borrow the reputation of their partners or investors. However, this research 
overlooks the possibility that new ventures can build their own reputation. Thus, research 
to date leaves open the questions: (1) how new ventures can build their own reputations, 
and (2) what are the consequences of building reputation for new ventures’ performance. 
Given the limited guidance provided by prior literature, I draw on the insights 
from the exploratory stage of this dissertation (described in Essay 1) to develop an 
empirically testable model of reputation building by new ventures. According to this 
model, two groups of factors can contribute to new venture reputations: (1) symbolic 
activities can be used to attract stakeholders’ attention, communicate the unobservable 
 108
qualities of the new venture, and induce positive opinions about it, and (2) a new 
venture’s resources, such as human capital, relationships with customers and partners, 
and product completion, can serve as signals of the new venture’s underlying quality and 
potential. Further, symbolic activities can be used to make the otherwise less observable 
resources more visible, thus increasing their effect on the new venture’s reputation. I test 
these ideas in a sample of 415 venture capital backed information technology new 
ventures founded between 1997 and 2001 in the U.S. My results support the idea that the 
symbolic activities used by new ventures and the key resources they possess jointly 
influence their early reputations, which in turn increase their performance. I also find that 
the initial reputation of most new ventures consists primarily of a visibility (or 
awareness) component, and very few ventures accumulate the evaluative component of 





Past research consistently demonstrates that reputation is a valuable intangible 
resource, which contributes to a firm’s competitive advantage (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & 
Cool, 1989; Hall, 1992). However, the mechanisms through which this critical resource 
emerges or can be created by the firms are much less understood. Organization and 
strategy scholars have focused extensively on the role of reputation for old and well-
established corporations, primarily Fortune 500 firms (Fombrun, 1997; Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990; Martins, 2005; Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Wartick, 2002). This approach 
does not allow for examining (a) how reputation comes into being and (b) what factors 
account for the variance in reputation among young firms in an industry.  
Past research suggests that the perceptions and beliefs that constitute a firm’s 
reputation develop as stakeholders observe and evaluate its actions and performance and 
form summary impressions about its underlying strategic characteristics (Fombrun & 
Shanley, 1990; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988).  Scholars have found that the reputation of 
established firms is a function of their past financial performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990), product quality (Shapiro, 1983), and costly investments in pricing and advertising 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). However, these predictors of reputation may have limited 
applicability to new ventures (NVs) for the following reasons: First, NVs lack the history 
and performance track records to guide stakeholders’ evaluations and opinions about 
them. Second, many NVs start with limited resources (Aldrich, 2000), which makes it 
difficult for them to invest in costly advertising or other activities. Third, some NVs – 
especially those in technology-based industries, such as information technology or 
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biotechnology – take significant time to develop their first product or technology, which 
makes pricing and product quality inapplicable at the early years of their lives. Fourth, 
potential stakeholders may not even be aware of the existence and activities of a NV, 
which would prevent them from forming impressions or opinions about it. Last but not 
least, because NVs often create value in novel ways by bringing to the market previously 
unavailable products or services, they may face the additional challenge of stakeholders 
not being able to understand how such products are going to create value for them 
(Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1994; Rindova & Petkova, 2006). Therefore, the lack of 
sufficient resources, consistent performance histories, and interaction patterns, present a 
number of unique challenges that make reputation building a particularly difficult task for 
a NV to accomplish (Pollock, Porac & Wade, 2004; Williamson, 2000).  
Given all these obstacles to reputation-building by NVs, prior research has 
assumed that NVs cannot build their own reputation and, therefore, borrow the 
reputations of other more powerful and better-established industry players by affiliating 
with them (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Stuart, 2000; Stuart, Hoang & Hybels, 1999). Indeed, 
reputation borrowing is a viable solution for NVs that lack reputation or resources to 
invest in reputation building. However, there are examples of NVs that manage to 
develop high reputations very early in their lives, such as Amazon.com, Yahoo! and 
Google. These examples suggest that some NVs manage to build reputation despite the 
challenges faced and call for a more careful examination of the process of reputation 
building by NVs and the causes of variations among NVs in both reputation building 
efforts and the resulting levels of reputation they accumulate.  
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The research questions this essay addresses are: (1) How can a NV build 
reputation early in its life, and (2) What is the impact of reputation building on NV 
performance? Because prior research provides limited insights regarding reputation 
building by NVs, I followed a two-stage research design approach. First, I conducted an 
exploratory study (as explained in Essay 1 of this dissertation), the insights from which I 
used to develop a model of reputation building by NVs and to draw a set of testable 
hypotheses. Second, I test these hypotheses in a sample of 415 venture capital backed 
information technology new ventures founded between 1997 and 2001 in the U.S. My 
results support the idea that the symbolic activities used by new ventures and the key 
resources they possess jointly influence their early reputations, which in turn increase 
their performance. I also find that the initial reputation of most NVs consists primarily of 
a visibility (or awareness) component, and very few NVs accumulate the evaluative 
component of their reputations.  
 
THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Reputation of New Ventures 
Reputation reflects collective perceptions and evaluations regarding a firm’s 
ability to create value for various stakeholders (Fombrun, 1996; Fombrun & Shanley, 
1990; Roberts & Dowling, 2002). Reputation has been identified as a valuable intangible 
asset (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989) because it can influence stakeholders’ 
economic choices vis-à-vis a firm and their willingness to exchange resources with it 
(Rao, 1994; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Rindova, Williamson, Petkova & Sever, 2005). 
Reputation is particularly valuable under conditions of high uncertainty about a focal firm 
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(Shapiro, 1983; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988), such as the early years of a firm’s life. 
Favorable reputation can help stakeholders make resource allocation decisions that favor 
a new firm by investing in it (Shane & Cable, 2002; Stuart et al., 1999), by buying its 
products and recommending them to their friends, or by pursuing employment with it 
(Williamson, 2000; Williamson, Cable & Aldrich, 2002). NVs with higher reputations 
have easier access to capital, even when uncertainty about their quality is high (Stuard et 
al., 1999). Therefore, building reputation early on can increase a NV’s chances for 
survival and success by improving its ability to attract key stakeholders and to establish 
exchange relationships with them.  
Recent research on reputation has found that the construct of reputation 
incorporates two dimensions – an asset- mass dimension, which reflects a firm’s visibility 
in its organizational field (or the degree of public awareness about the firm), and an 
evaluative dimension, which reflects how positive (or negative) a firm’s reputation is 
(Rindova et al., 2005). Specifically, Rindova and colleagues (2005) suggest that, in the 
context of large established organizations, the evaluative component of reputation refers 
to their past quality or performance, whereas the mass dimension of reputation reflects a 
more general global appraisal of the firm, unrelated to specific attributes (Rindova et al., 
2005). Similarly, Rindova, Petkova and Kotha (2005) found that the media reputation of 
new firms in an emerging market also has a mass dimension – visibility – which reflects 
the level of reputation, and an evaluative dimension – favorability – which reflects the 
positive and negative opinions about a new firm. 
Below, I discuss what factors contribute to a NV’s reputation and develop a 
model of reputation building by NVs. I bring together symbolic research in management 
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and organization theory and signaling research in economics to explain the mechanisms 
through which symbolic activities and resource signals jointly influence a NV’s 
reputation. I use the insights gained from the exploratory study (Essay 1) to develop 
arguments and draw specific hypothesis regarding the resources that can serve as signals 
of the NV’s underlying quality and potential. Figure 3.1 presents illustration of the 
theoretical model that I discuss below. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – A Model of Reputation Building by New Ventures 
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Symbolic Activities and New Venture Reputation 
Stakeholders are interested in evaluating firms as exchange partners and, 
therefore, are concerned with their reliability, credibility and trustworthiness (Fombrun, 
1996). In order to assess these qualities, stakeholders have to understand and be 
knowledgeable about the firm’s technologies, identity and unique resources (Rindova, 
1999). Therefore, they need not only information about the firm’s actions but also 
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interpretive frameworks that explain the meanings of those actions (Weick, 1995; 
Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Symbolic activities – or the communications and other non-
exchange interactions of a NV with its stakeholders – can both draw stakeholders’ 
attention to a NV and translate for them the meaning of ambiguous NV qualities, by 
relating symbols from the general culture to venture-specific characteristics, such as 
artifacts, concepts and frames (Rindova, 1999). Case studies suggest that the use of 
symbolic activities might be among the major factors that contributed to the quick 
transition of early startups like Starbucks in the specialty coffee (Rindova, 1999) and 
Amazon.com in the e-commerce (Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 2005) to nationally 
recognized names. Therefore, using symbolic activities might be an effective mechanism 
to increase a NV’s reputations.  
Symbolic activities have emerged as one of the major tools used by organizations 
in their interactions with stakeholders and especially in their efforts to influence 
stakeholders’ opinions and attitudes towards the organization (Brown, 1994; Grunig & 
Repper, 1992; Grunig et al., 2002; Pfeffer, 1981; Rindova, 1999). Past research suggests 
that symbolic activities are particularly beneficial for organizations with diverse 
audiences as well as under conditions of high uncertainty regarding the purpose and 
consequences of the organizational actions (Brown, 1994; Grunig, 1984; Westphal & 
Zajac, 1998). For example, Grunig (1984) suggests that higher environmental uncertainty 
increases an organization’s propensity to use two-way communications in order to 
receive immediate feedback from relevant stakeholders, whereas under lower uncertainty 
organizations tend to use primarily one-way communications. 
 115
Symbolic activities appear in a wide range of forms, including advertising, logo 
development, financial reports, and press releases (Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Salancik 
& Meindl, 1984; van Riel, 1995). The goal of symbolic activities is to contribute to the 
formation of firm-related schemas, such as reputation (Fombrun, 1996; Grunig et al., 
2002; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). According to Rindova & Fombrun (1999: 697), 
through symbolic activities firms: “(1) provide more information which constituents may 
use in making their decisions; (2) offer to constituents ready-made interpretations of their 
investments; and (3) impress desirable symbols in constituents’ minds.” Consistent with 
these ideas, Westphal and Zajac (1998) found that symbolic communications serve to 
explain the content of certain organizational actions to stakeholders and lead to positive 
stock-market reactions. Research drawing on the institutional perspective has also 
focused on the use of symbols by new organizations in efforts to change existing patterns 
of meaning (Elsbach & Sutton, 1992; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). 
Overall, new organizations can acquire higher standing within their organizational field 
by using symbolic actions to help stakeholders understand their activities and to induce 
desirable impressions about themselves (Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 2005). 
My interviews with experienced entrepreneurs suggest that symbolic activities 
influence a NV’s reputation in at least three ways: First, symbolic activities can be used 
to attract attention and increase public awareness of the NV by active and continuous 
interactions with potential stakeholders. As one entrepreneur said, “you’ve got to create a 
buzz around what you do.” Some informants explained that they deliberately targeted 
major industry events, such as trade shows, conventions, and conferences, to build 
awareness of their venture and the product or technology it was going to offer. Further, 
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they considered these activities a top priority and invested a lot of time in them, as the 
following quote illustrates: 
“I went and I gave speeches at every major meeting … I would give twenty, 
thirty, forty speeches a year and I may be talking to 25 people or 125 people or 
500 people and they were all these major conventions of major meetings, you 
know, major business meetings, major communications networks, symposiums 
and so in the audience you would see literally hundreds of people, internationals 
as well as domestic, who were interested in building these networks. So, within a 
period of 2 or 3 years, we were known world wide to the point where people 
would call us.”   
 
Second, symbolic activities can contribute to the reputation of a NV by 
propagating new meanings, through which the actions of the NV can be understood and 
appreciated (Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 2005). Helping stakeholders understand what 
the NV can offer and how its products can meet their needs is particularly important 
when the potential products are not available yet, it would take time to develop them, or 
even after they are finished it would be difficult for stakeholders to evaluate them, as is 
usually the case with new technologies (Rindova & Petkova, 2005). For example, one 
informant believed that the educational lectures he gave out were what built the initial 
reputation of his business in the 1970s, when networking and communications 
technologies were still new terms: 
“And so it was the promotional campaigns that had to do with sharing your 
knowledge with them … I was the keynoter of the major conferences and that 
significant speech would really weigh out where the future was going and where 
another future in terms of networking and telecommunications and computing 
would be going and I’d be interviewed by the trade newspapers and magazines 
and there would be profiles of me and there would be profiles of the company and 
so this is the way of building tremendous recognition and that built the business.”  
 
Another informant explained that “educating” potential stakeholders was a way 
for building the initial reputation of his venture: 
 117
“Well, it’s a very successful strategy because what happens is that what you have 
to be able to do is impart knowledge and wisdom about whatever it is that you’re 
doing and in the imparting of that knowledge and wisdom you build a reputation.  
You know, if you just say, ‘here’s the products that we offer.  Buy our products’ 
you lose credibility.  You talk about the actual field itself with how products are 
used and then how services are used and then you show what the available 
services are and you build credibility. … You sell education and by giving away 
good insights for free, because that’s what you are doing, they come back and 
they figure there must be more there, alright, and so they end up hanging for the 
rest of it.” 
 
Third, in addition to creating interpretive frameworks for stakeholders to 
understand the NV, symbolic activities can also directly induce favorable interpretations 
and positive evaluations of the NV’s ability to create value for them. Unlike established 
firms, for which stakeholders can rely on proven track-record for product quality or past 
financial performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990), NVs have nothing tangible to offer to 
stakeholders as evidence of their ability, because often times they start only with an idea 
or an entrepreneurial vision, which is still to materialize (Bronson, 1999). However, an 
idea or intention is difficult to convey and even more difficult to use as a credible signal 
for reliable future performance. Instead, a NV can use symbolic activities to define for 
stakeholders its purpose and to explain for them its value creation potential in order to 
induce favorable interpretations (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). For example, the 
entrepreneurs I interviewed emphasized the importance of conveying a clear vision about 
the direction of the NV or explaining what is unique about their business as ways to 
induce positive opinions about their NVs in the absence of ready outputs to demonstrate, 
as the following quotes illustrate: 
“You need to set a vision of where you’re going to be and that vision just can’t be 
painted in words by the senior executive.  It has to be embodied in sort of like the 
literature of and the images of the place and the vision itself of where you’re 
going to be helps people get there.  This is as important for the internal people as 
for external people.”  
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“Let’s see if we can do something new and unique.  And so what was unique for 
them was that they got to influence the design, because they would come to 
customer meetings, and we’d do joint application developments, JAD sessions 
together.” 
 
According to communications research symbolic activities differ along three 
dimensions: they can be (1) symmetrical or asymmetrical, depending on the extent to 
which organizations rely on advocacy or collaboration with stakeholders, (2) one-way or 
two-way, depending on whether the communications with stakeholders take the form of 
broadcasting of information vs. a dialogue, and (3) mediated or direct, depending on 
whether they are conducted through a communication intermediary (Grunig, 1984; 
Grunig & Grunig, 1992: Grunig et al., 2002). Communications scholars have advocated 
the use of two-way symmetrical communications as most effective for established 
organizations (Grunig & Grunig, 1992).10 Two-way interactions with stakeholders have 
been found to be particularly useful in highly uncertain and turbulent environments, 
because such environments force organizations to seek information from relevant 
stakeholders (Grunig, 1984; Grunig & Repper, 1992; Grunig et al., 2002). These ideas 
might be particularly relevant for NVs, because they often start in a new industry and 
have to build their initial reputation with stakeholders under conditions of high 
uncertainty and environmental turbulence (Aldrich, 2000).  
Another useful distinction to make is whether symbolic activities are targeted at 
influencing stakeholders by reaching out and informing them about important events 
regarding the NV or they are used mostly for identity defining purposes. For example, a 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that the above typology has been developed by communications scholars based on 
studies of large established organizations with significant amount of power over their stakeholder 
audiences. Given that NVs have very limited power and are highly dependent on their actual or potential 
stakeholders, the power/influence symmetry of communications might be a non-issue and thus less relevant 
than the other two dimensions. 
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NV’s web site with its logo, motto, statement of mission and other information  
represents the ‘face’ that a NV puts for its publics. This face, or external identity 
(Rindova & Schultz, 1998), is what stakeholders encounter when they visit the NV’s web 
site. Thus, identity-building symbolic activities are aimed at presenting the ‘self’ of a NV 
to stakeholders. On the other hand, externally-oriented activities might be focused on 
specific audiences. For example, press releases are explicitly focued at reaching the 
general media, whereas more interactive activities such as participation at conferences 
and industry events are focused more on reaching other relevant stakeholder groups, such 
as potential customers, partners, investors, or the industry press. Thus, I draw on the 
communications research to distinguish between two types of externally-oriented 
symbolic activities – one-way (broadcasting of information) and two-way (interactions 
with stakeholders). 
My exploratory study suggested that using a variety of symbolic activities might 
be a more effective reputation-building strategy than focusing on only one or a few types 
of symbolic activities. Informants provided two major rationales in favor of diverse 
symbolic activities: First, because of the high uncertainty about the market and the NV’s 
potential stakeholders, some entrepreneurs were not sure which symbols would work, so 
they tried to use a variety of symbolic activities in the hope that some of them would lead 
to the desired effects. Second, informants believed that different stakeholder groups 
attend different symbols, so by using diverse symbolic activities they wanted to “cover all 
bases”, by targeting each stakeholder group separately. 
Using diverse symbolic activities can contribute to a NV’s reputation in two 
ways: First, by allowing the NV to reach more stakeholders from different stakeholder 
 120
audiences, because different stakeholders may attend different sources of information 
(Grunig et al., 2002; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999). Second, different types of symbolic 
activities are likely to provide information on different aspects of the NV, its resources, 
and its activities. By receiving more diverse information, stakeholders can become more 
familiar with and develop a more complex image of a focal organization (Yang, 2005). 
Such familiarity in turn is likely to increase the positive evaluations of NVs by 
stakeholders, because people tend to evaluate more positively familiar objects and actors 
(Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Therefore, diversity of symbolic activities can increase both the 
awareness and the evaluative dimensions of a NV’s reputation. 
To sum up, symbolic activities appear to be critical in convincing stakeholders 
that the NV has the potential to create value for them and to otherwise meet their 
expectations. Specifically, symbolic activities influence a NV’s reputation (1) by building 
awareness of the NV, (2) by providing potential stakeholders with interpretive 
frameworks so that they can better understand the NV and its products, and (3) by 
inducing positive evaluations and opinions about the NV. Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1: The number and diversity of symbolic activities on part of a NV will 
have a positive effect on the NV’s reputation. 
 
 
New Ventures’ Resources as Signals 
Market signals are activities or attributes of actors in a market, which are costly to 
acquire or change and which, by design or accident, alter the beliefs of, or convey 
information to, other actors in the market (Ippolito, 1990; Spence, 1973, 1974). Although 
originally developed in relationship to human capital, signaling theory has found broad 
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applications to various organizational contexts characterized by some degree of 
uncertainty (see Riley, 2001 for a review). Reputation research, in particular, has been 
concerned with the effect of market signals on firm reputation with stakeholders 
(Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Rindova et al., 2005) and competitors (Clark & 
Montgomery, 1998; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). For example, Fombrun and Shanley 
(1990) found firms’ accounting indices of performance, advertising expenditures, 
institutional ownership, risk, and firm size to predict their Fortune 500 rank. They 
reasoned that these characteristics signal to stakeholders firm strategy, performance, and 
conformity to industry norms, thus reducing the information asymmetry and uncertainty 
regarding the firms. In a more recent study, Rindova et al. (2005) found that inputs and 
productive assets influence stakeholders’ perceptions regarding output quality, whereas 
more general signals, such as institutional affiliation and third-party certifications 
influence the more general perceptions about the organization’s standing in its field. 
Overall, past research suggests that signaling theory might be useful for understanding 
the mechanisms through which NVs can build reputation, because potential customers, 
investors and other stakeholders who possess limited or no information about the NVs are 
usually concerned with their unobservable quality and potential.  
NVs rarely have substantial tangible assets that the potential investors and other 
stakeholders can assess (Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Sahlman, Stevenson, Roberts & 
Bhide, 1999). The resource constraints also prevent NVs from investing in traditional 
branding and advertising campaigns as established firms do. The entrepreneurs I 
interviewed consistently pointed to the limited resources and small size of their firms as a 
major obstacle for launching an advertising campaign and a reason for relying on 
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alternative sources of reputation for their NVs. As one informant explained: “It’s a small 
company, no way a company like that can actually really purchase enough promotion and 
advertising to become famous.”  
Because NVs lack enough resources to invest in costly reputation signals, 
stakeholders may attend other NV attributes, such as some initially accumulated 
resources, which can serve as signals of a NV’s potential to provide value for them. My 
inductive study suggested that the most important signaling resource of a NV are (1) its 
human capital, embodied in its founder(s) and top management team members, (2) its 
relationships with key customers and partners, and (3) its progress toward completion of 
the first product(s) or technology.11 These ideas are consistent with past research, which 
has found that human capital and social capital are the major predictors of a NV’s 
performance and survival (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Gimeno, Folta, Cooper & 
Woo, 1997; Pennings, Lee & Witteloostuijn, 1998; Schoonhoven Eisenhardt & Lyman, 
1990).  
 
Human capital as a signal. A NV’s human capital can influence its reputation by 
signaling to stakeholders that the processes utilized by the NV are of substantially high 
quality. For example, Rindova and Kotha (2001: 1269) report that Excite attempted to 
signal the quality of its Web site content by introducing “personality-driven reviews” 
offered by a team of journalists, who were nationally renowned experts in their areas. 
Similarly, Audretsch and Stephan (1996) identify that a key function of top-notch 
scientists in biotechnology firms is to signal to stakeholders the quality of a firm’s 
                                                 
11 It should be noted that a NV’s resources can serve as signals regardless of whether they were intended as 
such (Spence, 1973). 
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research capability. These signaling effects of human capital are particularly likely to 
occur in NVs, where the founders and the management team often embody their entire 
human capital. As one entrepreneur explained,  
“When those management teams are assembled early, it alleviates a lot of 
pressure from the founders and allows them to do what the founders should be 
doing, which is looking to the future, being out as an advocate of their 
technology, their product to the marketplace. Not trying to deal with lots of other 
issues.” 
  
Stakeholders may use different observable indicators of a NV’s human capital, such as 
the education, diversity, and experience of its team (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; 
Porter, 2004; Shane & Cable, 2002).  
The top management team members’ education and relevant experience may 
serve as signals of the quality of a NV’s human capital. For example, having an advanced 
degree or a degree from a prestigious university (Porter, 2004; Shane & Khurana, 2003), 
as well as having worked for a major firm in the industry (Burton, Sorensen & Beckman, 
2002), indicate that a NV’s team members may posses some unique skills and capabilities 
and thus signal the overall better quality of the NV’s human capital. For example, one 
informant explicitly mentioned experience in a major firm as a reason for hiring two of 
his team members: 
“I felt confident in my own consulting abilities, but I didn’t have a blue chip 
management consulting resume.  You know, having worked for Diamond 
Technology Partners, or Cambridge …  So the two places I hired in, it wasn’t so 
much I felt weak in the consulting, as I knew how I needed the right reputation.” 
 
Another informant emphasized the credibility that past employment with a well-known 
industry player gives to the NV team: 
“And so he was able to reach out to people at Dell and Paychecks, and so forth, 
and say hey we’ve got this new product coming.   Don’t you remember me from 
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Microsoft?  We’d like to pitch the product to you.  And they would take those 
phone calls.” 
 
Diversity of the NV’s team can also indicate higher quality of its human capital, 
because a more diverse team is more likely to possess more of the needed expertise for 
the NV to perform its functions. One third-time founder acknowledged his own lack of 
knowledge in certain areas as a motivation to recruit team members with complementary 
skills: 
“Good engineers, you know, bright ideas, but no clue whatsoever when it’s 
coming to what do you need to do, to take a new product and market it 
successfully, and fund successfully, the creation of an operation line, and all that 
kind of stuff which was needed.” 
 
Consistent with the above ideas, prior research has documented positive relationships 
between founding team size and diversity and the attractiveness of a NV for certain 
stakeholder groups, such as investors or potential partners (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 
1990; Porter, 2004). Therefore, the diversity of a NV’s team is likely to signal higher 
quality human capital and greater potential to create value for stakeholders, thus 
increasing a NV’s reputation.  
To sum up, stakeholders are likely to use characteristics of a NV’s top 
management team to infer the level and quality of its human capital, and its potential to 
perform effectively. Thus, I hypothesize that the observable characteristics of a NV’s 
team, such as education, diversity, and experience, will influence the NV’s reputation: 
“… the management team becomes so important, because even if I could do ten 
start-ups in a row, I’m not going to learn everything about running a start-up”  
 
Another informant argued against the ‘all-engineers’ teams, which are clueless about 
dealing with marketing or management issues: 
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Hypothesis 2: The quality of a NV’s human capital, as indicated by the team 
members’ education, diversity, and experience, will have a positive effect on the 
NV’s reputation. 
 
The role of founders for public evaluations of a NV is much more pronounced 
than in established firms, because of the general belief that founders have 
disproportionately strong effect on organizational characteristics and performance 
(Boeker, 1989; Dobrev & Barnett, 2005). The recognized ability of the NV founders 
provides important clues about the NV’s future prospects, because publics tend to believe 
strongly in the importance of leadership for the success or failure of any organization 
(Meindl, Ehrlich & Dukerich, 1985; Meindl & Ehrlich, 1987). Founders’ prior start-up 
experience can reduce the uncertainty related to their expertise and abilities and thus 
alleviate concerns regarding the NV’s potential for successful performance (Sapienza & 
Gupta, 1994). Specifically, prior research has found that founders’ prior start-up 
experience reduces VCs’ uncertainty regarding the NV and the need for interaction 
between the NV’s CEO and the VCs (Sapienza & Gupta, 1994). Thus, more experienced 
founders might be perceived as more reliable, which in turn will lead to more favorable 
evaluations of their ventures’ future prospects. Further, founders with prior start-up 
experience are more likely to be perceived as suitable for carrying out the complex tasks 
at founding and the early life of a NV, because the fit between the CEO’s managerial 
experience and the firm’s strategy is found to have a positive effect on performance 
(Gupta & Govindarajan, 1984). Specifically, prior entrepreneurial experience provides 
evidence to stakeholders that the founders have already done this at least once, which is 
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likely to alleviate their concerns regarding the prospects of the NV. In other words, 
startup experience can serve as a source of validation of the founders’ entrepreneurial 
ability, not possessed by novice entrepreneurs (Aldrich, 2000). Therefore, I propose that 
founders’ experience accumulated prior to starting a focal NV is likely to have positive 
effect on the NV’s reputation: 
Hypothesis 3: Founders’ prior entrepreneurial experience will have a positive 
effect on the NV’s reputation. 
 
Relationships with customers and partners as signals. Past research suggests that 
a NV’s relationships also can play a signaling role, thus influencing the perceptions of 
more distant stakeholders who have no direct relationships to the NV. The choices of 
third parties vis-à-vis a NV, and especially their decisions to enter an exchange 
relationship with it, have been identified by past research as an important signal of the 
NV’s quality and potential, and have been found to influence a NV’s performance and 
survival chances. Past research has found that relationships with other actors in the 
industry play the role of organizational endorsements and certifications of quality, and 
thus lead to perceptions of higher organizational quality compared to less connected 
rivals (Benjamin & Podolny, 1999; Podolny, 1993). Relationships with influential third 
parties serve as an endorsement or certification of the NV’s quality, because such actors 
are believed to be more knowledgeable and capable of evaluating the NV (Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Following 
similar logic, Podolny and Stuart (1995) found that the status of actors associated with an 
innovation increases the likelihood of the innovation to be seen by others as important 
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and thus rapidly developed, regardless of the innovation’s quality. Further, Stuart (2000) 
shows that the size and innovativeness of a focal firm’s alliance partners predict its 
innovation rate and growth. This effect is stronger for new and small firms, which 
suggests that NVs benefit most from the signaling effect of partners on their reputation 
(Sanders & Boivie, 2004; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). 
My exploratory study suggested two types of relationships to be particularly 
valuable for a NV’s reputation – those with customers and with partners. First, 
informants consistently mentioned the importance of building strong relationships with 
one or more customers very early in the life of the NV. For example, one founder of a 
software development company said: 
“This business is all about relationships.  It’s beyond the price, beyond 
everything.  You know, because next time someone will come and try to bid, and 
if their bid is going to be close to us, the only reason the customer will stay with 
us is the relationship.” 
 
Specifically, some informants believed that it was important to develop strong 
relationships with multiple customers early on. For example, one founder strategically 
sought to develop relationships with key customers and invested substantive efforts in 
contacting people who potentially may become long-term customers of his NV.  
“My whole management team spent a lot of time networking, spent a lot of time 
out, going to conferences, meeting people, really developing a personal 
connection to different people.  And that helped develop the reputation more than 
any branding or marketing ever did.” 
 
Another informant concluded:  
“The relationship with the customer is what keeps the venture going, because all 
the greatest ideas in the world just die on the vine if somebody didn’t buy them.” 
 
In addition to their direct effect on a NV’s reputation with these particular 
stakeholders (Grunig et al., 2002), such relationships can serve as a signal of the NV’s 
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worthiness as a producer. Thus, the fact that somebody (supposedly knowledgeable) 
values the NV’s offerings may signal to more distant stakeholders that the NV provides 
high quality outputs and may have positive effect on its reputation. Therefore, the 
majority of stakeholders who have no direct experience with the NV but may potentially 
consider some type of relationship with it are likely to use the fact that some customers 
have already signed for the NV’s products as an indicator of the NV’s high quality and 
potential. Specifically, securing an early influential customer may help a NV build 
reputation with other potential customers and stakeholder groups, by using the first 
customer as a signal of the NV’s quality. The entrepreneurs I interviewed emphasized the 
role of the industry-wide prestige of their first customers, as the following quote 
illustrates: 
“So you leverage your wins to say … We would let the prospective customers 
know about the first thing that we did with Compaq, because we knew that the 
first time they went to Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch would ask Microsoft, and 
Compaq would typically be on the customer call with us, or we would hook them 
up there on.  …  So what we did was, we basically used that as a teaser.” 
 
The importance of securing an early influential customer for NVs’ reputations is 
also consistent with research findings that high-status actors exert disproportionate 
amount of influence on the choices of others (Rao, Davis & Ward, 2000). Therefore, I 
expect that NVs that are able to build relationships with customers early on, and 
especially with prestigious customers, would accumulate higher levels of reputation than 
other NVs.  
Hypothesis 4: The number and prestige of customers with which a NV has 
relationships will have a positive effect on the NV’s reputation. 
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Second, the choices of third parties vis-à-vis a NV, and especially their decisions 
to enter a partnership with it, have been identified by past research as important 
indicators of the NV’s quality and potential, and have been found to influence a NV’s 
performance and survival chances. Relationships with influential third parties serve as an 
endorsement or certification of the NV’s quality, because such actors are believed to be 
more knowledgeable and capable of evaluating the NV (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Higgins 
& Gulati, 2003; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Outside observers can infer certain 
characteristics of the NV by the quality of its partners, because people tend to associate 
with others who have similar values and interests (Aldrich, 2000). Aldrich (2000: 87) 
points to the fact that “high status people – with more social resources, power, or prestige 
than others – play important roles in linking nascent entrepreneurs to resources and 
opportunities”.  
Several informants believed that an early relationship with an influential industry 
player was what gave boost to their NVs’ initial reputation. For example, one informant 
explained how the early partnership with Microsoft helped his business take off: 
“The notion was that because Microsoft was entering the high-end enterprise 
networking market that they were going to go after the Novell and the Banyan 
customers.  Because that was, that was the hunting ground for them. And 
Microsoft was going to be the driver of our business. … And there’s usually an 
eco system for large software companies that exists with or without their 
knowing.  There is a large number of companies that are offshoots of Oracle or 
SAP, a very large technology company.  Doesn’t matter which one it is.  So we 
picked Microsoft.  We knew that as they come up with products, enterprise space, 
there was going to be a tremendous opportunity to help ride that wave, you know.  
And that’s what we did.” 
 
This is consistent with prior research on the role of alliances and partnership in 
NV contexts. NVs that have relationships with high-status strategic partners are found to 
perform better because such ties provide them with certification for quality when 
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stakeholders are uncertain about their actual quality (Stuart et al, 1999). In an in-depth 
qualitative analysis of seven relationships of entrepreneurial firms, Larson (1992) reports 
that entrepreneurial firms emphasized the importance of relationships for financial 
success, growth, adaptiveness, and innovation. Overall, my informants, as well as prior 
research consistently support the notion that a NV’s affiliates reduce public uncertainty 
regarding the NV’s prospects and reliability (Baum, Calabrese & Silverman, 2000; 
Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). Therefore, I hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 5: The number and prestige of partners with which a NV has 
relationships will have a positive effect on the NV’s reputation. 
 
Completion of New Product Development as a Signal 
Output quality is the best-established predictor of reputation in economic theory: 
firms develop ‘good’ reputation by providing consistently high quality outputs over time 
(Shapiro, 1983; Weigelt & Camerer, 1988).  However, product quality is often difficult to 
evaluate a-priori, which creates evaluative uncertainty for customers and other 
stakeholders. As Shapiro (1982: 20) explains, “uncertainty about quality is a wide-spread 
and important feature of markets for most firms’ goods and services”. Such evaluative 
uncertainty might be even greater in the context of NVs, because many NVs start with an 
idea rather than a finished product and it may take months or years before they deliver 
outputs to the market. Therefore, stakeholders may use certain indicator of the NV ability 
to produce an output as signals of the potential output quality. For example, for products 
that take a long period of time to develop, such as new technologies or research-intensive 
products, the stage of product development, or how advanced and how close to 
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completion the output is, can signal to stakeholders that the NV has the potential of 
producing valuable outputs. 
Past research has identified accomplishments such as having a prototype or 
producing the first product as major milestones in the start-up process (Wasserman, 
2003). Such accomplishments may signal to stakeholders that the NV is “on the right 
track” and likely to produce the desired outputs. On the other hand, if in a few years a NV 
still has nothing but a promising idea to offer, stakeholders may begin to question the 
feasibility and quality of the idea. In other words, progressing too slowly towards 
completing the first output may send negative signals to stakeholders and harm a NV’s 
reputation. Therefore, I hypothesize that NVs that manage to reach some level of 
completion of their first product or technology faster will have higher reputation than 
their peers: 
Hypothesis 6: Faster completion of new product development will have positive 
effect on a NV’s reputation. 
 
Interactions between Symbolic Activities and Signaling Resources 
 Institutional and impression management scholars argue that symbolic activities 
and substantial organizational characteristics are decoupled (Meyer & Rowen, 1977; 
Pfeffer, 1981). Such decoupling is found to have positive effect on the performance of 
established corporations (Westphal & Zajac, 1994, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1995). 
However, this may not be the case with the NVs, which are much more closely watched 
and evaluated because of the high perceived risks related to their activities (Aldrich, 
2000; Aldrich & Fiol, 1994). Instead, NVs may use symbolic activities to promote their 
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substantive characteristics, by drawing stakeholders’ attention to those characteristics and 
by explaining how such characteristics will help the NV produce high quality outputs or 
otherwise meet stakeholders’ expectations (Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 2005). As one 
informant observed, “You have to be very active in this, you know … if you’re great and 
nobody knows that, you’re not great” Another informant explained how he and his team 
used symbolic activities to broadcast their knowledge and capabilities (i.e. the human 
capital) of their NV:  
“What we did was, for example, we built what we called ‘a capabilities brochure’ 
and we took the resumes of all of the individuals who were associated with us and 
we were academics ok, so we had written many, many papers and some of those 
papers had very interesting titles and so we built a brochure that was by subject 
matter, Design and Computer Communications Network, for example, and we 
took the papers and we wrote down the names of the papers that we’d written on 
that, so we built this brochure out of capabilities including us as individuals, our 
resumes, a description of the business, challenges, up front big world of 
networking, then the backward applications.“ 
 
As the above example illustrates, in the presence of relevant resources that are likely to 
be seen by stakeholders as indicators of the NV’s higher quality and potential, such as 
human capital and relationships, symbolic activities can be used to make those resources 
more visible to stakeholders and to focus stakeholders’ attention on them. If so, symbolic 
activities will reinforce the positive effect of human capital, relationships with customers 
and partners, and product completion on a NV’s reputation. Therefore, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 7: Symbolic activities will increase the positive effects of (a) human 
capital, (b) relationships with customers and partners, and (c) product completion 




New Venture Reputation and Performance 
Stakeholders rely on an organization’s reputation to reduce uncertainty about the 
value of future exchanges with it. As a result, favorable reputations induce stakeholders 
to establish exchange relationships with the organization. For example, buyers are willing 
to pay premium prices for the products of an organization with high reputation because it 
increases their confidence in the value of the organization’s outputs (Klein & Leffler, 
1981; Shapiro, 1983) or because acquiring products from such an organization can 
enhance their own image (Podolny, 1994). Numerous studies have documented the 
positive effect of reputation on a firm’s financial performance (Roberts & Dowling, 
2002; Wartick, 2002). If reputation matters for NVs as well, we would expect to find 
similar effect of NVs’ reputation on their early performance. Indeed, research on the 
human capital of young firms has found that qualified employees are more likely to 
pursue employment relationship with high reputation NVs (Williamson, 2000, 
Williamson et al., 2002), which in turn may increase those ventures’ overall performance. 
Similarly, Shane and Cable (2002) found that VCs are more likely to invest in NVs that 
they perceive as having better reputation. More generally, reputation has been argued to 
be a major driver of NVs’ early performance (Stuart et al., 1999). Therefore, I expect that 
a NV’s reputation will be positively related to its performance. 
Hypothesis 8: The greater and the more positive a NV’s reputation is, the better 
its early performance. 
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Figure 3.2 presents a detailed model of the hypothesized relationships. According 
to this model, symbolic activities and signaling resources jointly influence a NV’s 
reputation, which in turn increases its early performance. 
 
Figure 3.2 – A Detailed Model and Hypotheses 
H1
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The sample for this study consists of 415 information technology NVs founded in 
1997, 1999 and 2001 in the U.S. that received at least one stage of venture capital (VC) 
funding. The purpose of selecting NVs started in three different years was to account for 
potential systematic differences in terms of public and investor interests and expectations 
regarding the IT sector before, during, and after the so called ‘Internet bubble’. Following 
prior research (Hsu, 2004, 2005), I confine the sample within the pool of VC-backed 
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NVs, to be able to compare their performance and to control for some unobservable 
differences that may depend on the source of funding.  
The NVs were randomly selected from the pool of companies listed on the 
VentureXpert database, which has been used extensively by prior research as a reliable 
source of data on venture capital (VC) firms and VC-backed NVs (Baum & Silverman, 
2004; Gompers & Lerner, 1999; Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Shane 
& Stuart, 2001). The observation period for each NV starts from its founding date and 
ends at the time the NV received its first round of VC funding. I collected data about each 
venture from multiple sources, including the NV’s archival websites (extracted from the 
Internet archive www.archive.org), VentureXpert database, Lexis-Nexis Academic 
database, and ABI/Inform.  
 
Table 3.1 – Summary of Variables, Measures, and Data Sources 
 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION DATA SOURCE 
Reputation Measures 
Media visibility (total) Total number of articles that mention the 
NV’s name 
Lexis-Nexis database 
Positive reputation The number of positive media articles that 
mention the NV’s name 
Lexis-Nexis database 
Media tenor The proportions of ‘positive’ to ‘negative’ 
media articles relative to the media total 
Lexis-Nexis database 
Performance Measures 
Amount of money raised 
at 1st round 
Total amount (in mil $) of investment at first 
round by VCs and other investors, divided by 
the total number of VC investments in the IT 
industry that year  
VentureXpert database 
Market valuation at 1st 
round 
Amount (in mil $) of the NV market valuation 
at first round, divided by the NASDAQ 
composite index for the date of each NV’s 
first round of VC funding 
VentureXpert database 
Symbolic Activities Measures 
Level of symbolic 
activity 
Total number of all symbolic activities used 
by the NV 
Venture archival web-sites, 




Number of activities of the following types: 
web-site updates, logo, motto, mission 
statement, and number of links/ topics on the 
NV’s web-site prior to 1st round 






Number of activities of the following types: 
press releases, speeches,  interviews on the 
radio/TV, books and white papers published 
by team members  





Number of activities of the following types: 
conferences, fairs, trade shows, and other 
special events initiated and/or attended by the 
NV 
Venture archival web-sites,  
Lexis-Nexis, ABI/Inform 
Diversity of symbolic 
activities 
Blau (1977) diversity index among the three 
types of symbolic activities 
Venture archival web-sites 
Human Capital Measures 
Average team education Average of highest degree for each member Venture archival web-sites 
Relevant experience on 
the team 
Number of team members who worked for at 
least one of the major firms in the industry 
(e.g., Microsoft, IBM, Cisco, Apple), divided 
by team size 
Venture archival web-sites 
Diversity of the top 
management team 
Blau (1977) diversity index for team 
members’ backgrounds 
Venture archival web-sites 
Founders’ prior start-up 
experience 
Average number of prior start-ups by the NV 
founder(s) 
Venture archival web-sites 
Relationships Measures 
Customer relationships Total number of customers Venture archival web-sites, 




Number of customers who are Fortune 500 
firms or the Government, divided by total 
number of customers 
Venture archival web-sites, 
PR Newswire in Lexis-
Nexis  
Partnerships Total number of partners Venture archival web-sites, 
PR Newswire in Lexis-
Nexis  
Prestigious partnerships Number of partners who are Fortune 500 
firms or the Government, divided by total 
number of partners 
Venture archival web-sites, 
PR Newswire in Lexis-
Nexis  
Controls 
NV age Days from founding to 1st round VentureXpert database 
Year of founding Year dummies for 1997, 1999, 2001 VenureXpert database 
Industry sector Dummies for each of the six IT sectors VenureXpert database 
Seed investment Amount of seed investment in million USD VenureXpert database 
Number of VC investors Number of VC investors at 1st round VenureXpert database 
VC financial prestige Size (in million $) of the largest VC investor VenureXpert database 
VC evaluative prestige Number of IPOs led by the largest VC in the 
year preceding 1st round 
VenureXpert database 
 
Table 3.1 summarizes the variables and measures used in this study, and the 
sources of data for each variable. All qualitative data, such as press releases, media 
articles, and texts from the NVs’ archival web-sites were content analyzed and coded by 
trained coders. The intercoder reliability for the tone of media articles was .93 for a 
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subsample of 50 articles, which suggested sufficiently high agreement to split the rest of 
the media coding among single coders.  
 
Dependent Variables 
 New venture reputation. Most prior studies of firm reputation have used Fortune 
500 rankings as a measure of reputation, an approach driven by convenience rather than a 
strong theoretical or empirical rationale (see Wartick, 2002 for a recent review and 
critique). However, this approach does not allow for making any conclusions about the 
emergence of reputation and is practically inapplicable to start-up firms, none of which 
appears in the Fortune rankings. An alternative approach particularly suited for studying 
the reputation of NVs focuses on capturing reputation in the media coverage of firms 
(Deephouse, 2000; Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 2005). Prior 
research has emphasized the role of the media in making large number of stakeholders 
aware of a focal organization (Hunt & Grunig, 1994; Van Leuven & Slater, 1991) and 
sharing the same perceptions about it (Bromley, 1993). 
My interviews with people involved in different capacity with the IT industry also 
suggested that media coverage of IT NVs is an appropriate measure of their initial 
reputations. An expert who has been following the development of the high technology 
start-ups in the Silicon Valley for the last 10 years explained the role of the media as a 
major uncertainty reduction agency in the following way:  
“… about any given startup, initially there is what I would call a generalized 
uncertainty, meaning uncertainty in multiple domains like technology, demand, 
management, investments. And there is an interdependence of opinions among 
multiple stakeholders: customers would like to buy a technology from a firm that 
is going to be around, but the firm is not going to be around unless it gets some 
venture capital; however, the venture capitalists would like to give money to the 
ventures that will succeed, and so on. So, each of the stakeholders is looking at 
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the others, but because all of them are uncertain, ultimately all of them need to 
rely on what is in the mass-media.”  
 
Because of the endemic, multifaceted nature of uncertainty regarding high 
technology NVs, perceptions of each stakeholder group are driven and depend on those 
of the other stakeholders, and all of them need a “broker” to inform these perceptions. 
The media can play the role of such a broker, as suggested by prior research in various 
contexts and settings (Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Rindova & Fombrun, 1999; Rindova et 
al., 2005). These ideas are also consistent with Zuckerman’s (1999) mediated market 
model, according to which in markets characterized with high uncertainty, actors look for 
authoritative opinions from information intermediaries, such as industry analysts or the 
media. Media can play an important intermediary role in building a NV’s reputation, 
because it can attract public attention to those issues that are covered and away from 
those that are not covered (Hoffman & Ocasio, 2001; Pollock & Rindova, 2003). By 
increasing the exposure of a NV to public interpretations, media can render it more 
comprehensible and familiar (Pollock & Rindova, 2003). Also, positive media coverage 
increases the perceptions of a NV’s value by framing public opinions regarding the NV 
(Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 2005). Therefore, the 
representations of NVs in the media can serve as a reasonable proxy for their reputation, 
which allows for comparison among NVs. This measure improves over past research, 
which has used NVs’ performance as an indicator of their reputations (Stuart, 2000), 
lumping together the reputation as an asset with its performance consequences. 
 Media reputation can be operationally defined as “the aggregated news reports 
relating to a specific company within a prescribed period” (Wartick, 1992: 34). I 
measured NVs’ media reputations for the period between each NV’s founding and first 
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round of VC funding.12 Following past research on media reputation (Deephouse, 2000; 
Pollock & Rindova, 2003; Rindova, Petkova & Kotha, 2005; Wartick, 1992), I 
operationalize NV media reputation in terms of visibility and favorability. Visibility (or 
volume of media coverage) is measured by the total number of media articles mentioning 
each NV, as listed in “Industry News”, “Business and Finance”, “Magazines and 
Journals” and “Major newspapers” sections of the Lexis-Nexis Academic database and/or 
in ABI/Inform database. This approach produced a total of 1318 articles, of which 694 
were published in specialized industry outlets and 624 in general press (the vast majority 
of which local newspapers and magazines). The fact that the NVs I studied received 
coverage primarily by specialized outlets – either by industry sector or geography – is 
consistent with the findings of prior research that media seeks to write about events of 
local relevance or provide information that contains some local angle and is, therefore, 
more relevant for their readers (Aronoff, 1978; Hunt & Grunig, 1994; Sallot & Johnson, 
2006). Readers, in turn, tend to pay attention to information that is most relevant for them 
(Grunig, 1980b; Hunt & Grunig, 1994). Arguably, an information technology NV is most 
likely to find potential customers or partners among people interested in information 
technology. In addition, the most relevant investors and prospective employees are those 
located closer to the NV. Therefore, the types of media publications I identified are 
indeed likely to reach the most relevant stakeholder groups and influence their 
perceptions of a given NV.  
                                                 
12 Although the data on both substantive and symbolic activities and media coverage was collected during 
the same time period for each NV, I have strong reasons to believe that media coverage follows (as 
opposed to preceding) any given action. Specifically, I have matched the dates on 200 substantive and 
symbolic actions and their media coverage and found that the first media coverage of an action always 
appeared after the action was taken, within a time period ranging from one day to two years after a given 
action (on average, two and a half months). 
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To measure media favorability, each article was coded as positive, negative, or 
neutral by trained coders, producing 172 (13%) positive, 9 (1%) negative, and 1137 
(86%) neutral articles. The intercoder reliability for the tone of media articles was .93 
based on a subsample of 50 articles, which suggested sufficiently high agreement to split 
the rest of the media coding among single coders. The high proportion of neutral articles 
is not surprising, given that journalists usually strive to provide unbiased reports of the 
reality, and only occasionally express evaluative opinions (Hunt & Grunig, 1994). 
Moreover, the high uncertainty surrounding a NV makes any evaluative statements even 
more risky for journalist. My observations are also consistent with recent research on IPO 
firms, which similarly finds that the majority of media coverage of an IPO is neutral 
(Pollock & Rindova, 2003).  
I operationalize favorability in two ways. First, I used the number of positive 
articles as an indicator of positive reputation. Second, I calculated for each NV an overall 
tenor score using Janis-Fader coefficient of imbalance (Janis & Fader, 1965), which has 
been adopted by past organization research (Deephouse, 2000; Pollock & Rindova, 
2003). The formula for calculating this measure is:  
Tenor = (P2 – PN)/V2 IF P>N; 0 IF P = N, AND (PN – N2)/V2 IF N > P, 
Where P is the number of positive articles about a NV, N is the number of negative 
articles about it, and V is the total number of articles about it, including articles that are 
neutral in tenor. The range of this variable is from -1 to 1, where -1 denotes all negative 
coverage and 1 denotes all positive coverage. 
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 New venture performance. NV performance was measured at the time of the first 
round of venture capital investment (“Series A” funding). Early stage VC funding plays 
the role of interim valuation of the NV that predicts later profitability, because VCs do 
market valuation based on expected profitability of the NV. The most important 
characteristics of this valuation are (1) the amount of money the NV is able to gather 
from VCs; and (2) the market valuation of the NV at the time of first VC funding. 
Amount of funding was measured as the total investment by all VCs participating in the 
first round of funding for each NV, as reported on VentureXpert database. To account for 
the fact that the amounts of investment vary due to the supply of VC money, which is not 
related to a particular NV’s quality or reputation, I adjusted this variable by dividing the 
amount of first-round investment for each NV by the total VC investments in the IT 
industry in the respective year, as reported by Price Waterhouse-Cooper Money Tree.  
Market valuation was measured as the actual market valuation of the NV on the date of 
the first round of VC funding, as reported on VentureXpert database. To account for 
stock market variations unrelated to the focal NVs’ quality and reputation, I adjusted this 
variable by dividing each NV’s valuation by the NASDAQ composite index for the date 
of the NV’s first round of VC funding. Only 229 NVs had disclosed their market 




Symbolic activities. Symbolic activities have been rarely studied empirically in 
the context of NVs, which makes the use of established measures difficult. Therefore, I 
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started by developing an exhaustive list of all symbolic activities described by the 11 
entrepreneurs I interviewed. Next, I categorized the diverse symbolic activities that NVs 
can use in three groups – identity-building, one-way externally oriented, and two-way 
externally oriented symbolic activities. Table 3.1 lists the activities that fall in each 
category. It should be noted that the vast majority of one-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities in my sample (92%) are press releases posted on public wire servers 
such as PR Newswire and Business Wire. The correlation between the number of press 
releases only and the number of all one-way externally oriented symbolic activities is 
.984, suggesting that the effects for this type of symbolic activities is driven primarily by 
the press releases. However, the other one-way externally oriented symbolic activities 
add value to the overall diversity of symbolic activities, so I decided to keep them in this 
category for the analysis. 
Symbolic activities can be operationalized along two dimensions – intensity (or 
level) and diversity. Intensity of symbolic activity was measured by the total number of 
all symbolic activities, as well as by the number of activities of each of the three types 
(identity-building, reaching out one-way, and reaching out two-ways). Diversity of 
symbolic activity was measured using Blau (1977) heterogeneity index, which captures 
the relative proportion of each type of symbolic activities in the total. 
Diversity of symbolic activities = 1 – Σpi2, 
where pi equals the percentage of symbolic activities that fall in the ith category out of 
three possible categories – identity-building, one-way externally oriented, and two-way 
externally oriented symbolic activities. The measure varies from 0 (no diversity) to 1 
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(high diversity). A NV gets a zero score for diversity if it has no symbolic activities or if 
all of its symbolic activities fall into one category (e.g., only press-releases). 
 
Human capital. In order to construct the human capital measures, I collected 
biographical data on a total of 2239 individuals, of which 705 founders and 1534 team 
members. All the data were collected from the NVs’ archival web-sites for the period 
between founding and first round of VC funding, including the last web-site updated 
before the date of the first round of VC funding. Therefore, each NV’s team includes 
both people who were there from the startup and those who joined the top management 
team between founding and first round of VC funding. For each team member I collected 
and coded data on their highest degree, past entrepreneurial experience and employment. 
 
Top management team quality. I hypothesized that the quality of a VN’s top 
management team is signaled through the team’s diversity, education and relevant 
experience. First, for each team member, I coded their highest degree as 0=high school, 
1=college, 2=Bachelor, 3=Master, 4=PhD. I then averaged the scores across all team 
members to come up with an average degree score for each NV.13 Second, I measured 
relevant experience (or prestige of prior experience) as the proportion of team members 
who have worked for at least one of the major firms in the industry (e.g., Microsoft, IBM, 
Cisco, and Apple). To identify these firms I used Fortune 500 list of largest corporations 
and selected those from the IT industry. Third, I used the heterogeneity index proposed 
by Blau (1977) and used by organizational research as an appropriate measure of team 
                                                 
13 I also calculated alternative measures of education, such as number of team members with a Ph.D., 
number of team members with a Master’s degree, and the highest degree on the team. None of these 
alternative alternative variables changed the results substantively. 
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diversity (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). The Blau index was calculated for each NV 
using the following formula:  
Team diversity = 1 – Σpi2, 
where pi equals the percentage of team members who have background in the ith area 
(out of nine possible background areas – engineering, computers/information technology, 
physics, general management, marketing/sales, finance/accounting, operations, law, and 
others). The measure varies from 0 (low diversity) to 1 (high diversity). A NV gets a zero 
score for diversity if all team members come from the same background (e.g., all 
engineers or all IT specialists). 
 
Founders’ entrepreneurial experience. Following prior research, I measure 
founders’ entrepreneurial experience as the number of prior start-ups by the founder(s), 
divided by the number of founders for NVs with more than one founder (Sapienza & 
Gupta, 1994; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt & Lyman, 1990). For robustness tests I also 
developed a scale-based measure of prior start-up experience where 0 = no 
entrepreneurial experience, 1 = worked for a NV in non-founder and non-TMT member 
capacity, 2 =  worked for a NV as TMT/CEO/ other capacity involving decision making, 
3 =  been a founder or co-founder of a NV before in an unrelated industry, 4 =  been a 
founder or co-founder of a NV in the same or a related industry, 5 =  started more than 1 




Relationships with customers and partners. Relationships with customers and 
partners were operationalized using information about the customers and partners of a 
NV that (1) was listed on the NV’s most recent web-site before the date of its first round 
of VC funding, and/or (2) announced in press-releases during the time period between 
founding and the first round of VC funding. Using the information from these sources I 
counted the total number of customers a NV listed or announced. To calculate the 
customer prestige measure, I checked for each customer whether its name appears in the 
Fortune 500 list of largest corporations. I also considered the Government as a 
prestigious customer. I than calculated the proportion of prestigious customers out of the 
total number of customers and used this measure in my analysis. Similarly, I also counted 
the number of relationships with partners for each NV. Partners’ prestige was 
operationalized as the proportion of Fortune 500 partners (the number of Fortune 500 
partners, divided by the total number of partners).  
 
Completion of product development. In order to measure how fast NVs 
completed their first outputs, I first coded the degree of completion as the stage at which 
the NV product was at the time of the first VC funding (Higgins & Gulati, 2003).14 I used 
the following scale which was developed after consulting two IT experts and asking them 
to differentiate between degrees of completion of the products for a sub-sample of 50 
NVs (based on the product descriptions on the NVs’ archival web-sites): 1 = idea stage 
(product description is provided but no evidence of ready output), 2 = a demo or test-runs 
available, 3 = ready for sale output available (can click and buy or contact somebody to 
                                                 
14 Higgins & Gulati (2003) categorize the stage of product development in their study of biotechnology 
industry firms as preclinical, clinical, or postclinical. 
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order installation), 4 = second generation or an upgrade of the first product/ technology is 
available, 5 = second type of product/ technology is available, 6 = more than two 
different outputs are available. The degree of completion of each NV’s product was 
measured at the last point in time before the first round of VC funding when product 
description was available. 
As a second step, I calculated the rate of product completion for each NV, 
assuming that (1) at the time of founding, all NVs started from the idea stage, and (2) the 
advancement of the new product development between founding and first round of VC 
funding of each NV followed an exponential function. I use the following formula to 
calculate the rate of advancement for each NV:  
Rate of new product completion = A1/n – 1,  
where A is the level of completion at the last time point before the first round of VC 
funding, n is the number of days from founding to the first round of VC funding.15 This 
measure is independent of time and allows for comparison across NVs in the relative 
speed with which they got to the level of completion observed at the time of the first VC 
funding. 
 
Control Variables  
Controls for predicting reputation. In predicting NV reputation, I control for the 
year of founding, industry sector, and NV age. Dummies for founding year were included 
as controls, because prior research suggests that high technology ventures started during 
                                                 
15 I started by reasoning that if each NV starts its product development from level of A0=1 (idea), and the 
product advancement by the end of the observation period depends on the time that elapsed from founding 
to first round and on the NV-specific rate of advancement, the product advancement at the end of the 
observation period can be expressed as An = (A0 + r)n. By solving this equation for r, I derived that r = A1/n 
– 1. 
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the Internet bubble period (1999-2000) received disproportionate amount of media 
attention (Prats, 2004). I also control for industry sector by including a dummy variable 
for each industry sector in my sample – communications, computer hardware, computer 
software, internet specific, computer others, and semiconductor/electronics. Finally, I 
control for the NV age (the time that elapsed between the founding of a NV and the time 
of first VC funding), because I reasoned that the more time a NV had, the more likely to 
obtain media coverage regardless of other factors. I measure the NV age in days from 
startup to the date of the first venture capital investment in the NV. 
Controls for predicting performance. I control for several factors suggested by 
prior research as contributing to the amount of money and the market valuation of a NV. 
These variables include seed investments at founding, year of founding, industry sector, 
NV age at the time to the first round of VC finding, number of VC investors, and prestige 
of VC investors. The founding year was included as a control to account for potential 
cohort effects on the NV performance. I use the same industry sector controls as in 
predicting reputation, to account for variations in funding among the IT industry sectors. 
NV age (in days from the startup date to the date of the first venture capital investment in 
the NV) was included, because older NVs are likely to present lower uncertainty for VCs, 
and might be able to attract more money and/or to receive a higher market valuation.  
The fact that a NV has already received a seed investment may help it attract more VC 
money on the first round. Therefore, I also control for the amount of seed investment 
received by NVs. Past research suggests that being evaluated by VCs, and especially by 
prestigious VCs, can influence a NV’s early performance relative to other NVs in the 
same industry (Gulati & Higgins, 2003; Higgins & Gulati, 2003; Hsu, 2004; 2005a). To 
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account for these effects, I collected data on the characteristics of the VC investors that 
participated at the time of the first round of VC funding (a total of 583 firms). I 
constructed two variables to control for both VC financial prestige and VC evaluative 
prestige. First, following the methodology used by prior research (Gulati & Higgins, 
2003; Hsu, 2004, 2005a), I measured VC financial prestige using the total funds under 
control of the largest VC investor, adjusted for the total VC investments in the year of 
funding. Second, as suggested by past research (Hsu, 2004, 2005a), to measure VC 
evaluative prestige, I used the number of IPOs led by the largest VC in the year 
preceding the first round of VC investment in a focal NV, adjusted for the total number 
of IPOs in that year.16 Finally, I control for the number of VCs, because more VCs are 
likely to provide more money to a NV, regardless of its reputation. The data for all 
control variables was collected from the VentureXpert database.  
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
 I performed two sets of analyses – two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions and 
measured variable path analysis – in order to better assess the empirical evidence in 
support of my hypotheses and the overall fit of the hypothesized model to the data. In this 
section I explain each of these analyses and the results from them.  
 
Regression Analysis and Results 
In the first set of analyses, I use two-stage least square (2SLS) regressions to test 
the hypothesized model. 2SLS is an instrumental variable analysis particularly 
                                                 
16 I also repeated the analysis using the number of IPOs in the last 3 years preceding the year of the first 
round VC funding but all the results remained essentially the same. 
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appropriate for models that contain mediating variables, because it accounts for the 
correlation between error terms across equations and produces coefficients that are 
consistent and unbiased (Kennedy, 2001; Shaver, 2005). In order to identify the system of 
equations, I first had to identify the explanatory variables that predict only reputation and 
those that predict only performance (Greene, 2003).  
According to my theory, stakeholder perceptions which comprise a NV’s 
reputation are influenced by symbolic activities and substantial resources that serve as 
signals to stakeholders (see Figure 3.2). Because stakeholders have to notice the NV and 
form impressions about it before making investment decisions (Fiske & Taylor, 1991), I 
reasoned that a NV’s symbolic activities and substantial resources can influence directly 
its reputation but not its financial performance. On the other hand, venture capitalist 
characteristics such as prestige and number of VCs, may impact the financial 
performance but are unlikely to influence a NV’s reputation, because in the context of my 
study they follow in time the media coverage of the NV. Therefore, on the first stage of 
the 2SLS I estimated the direct and interaction effects of symbolic activities, human 
capital, relationships with customers and partners, and product completion on NV 
reputation. To reduce nonessential collinearity, I centered the variables prior to creating 
the product terms for the interactions following the centering procedures suggested by 
Aiken and West (1991) and Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken (2003). At the second stage, 
I estimated NV financial performance as a function of its reputation, including VC 
characteristics as control variables to account for alternative explanations of performance.  
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Correlations and descriptive statistics. Table 3.2 shows the descriptive statistics 
for, and the correlations among, the study variables. The correlation between the total 
media coverage and the positive coverage is high (0.790), which is not surprising given 
that the positive coverage is a sub-sample of the total coverage. Similarly, the correlation 
between the amount of investment and the market valuation at the 1st round of VC 
funding is high (0.731), which suggests that both measures of a NV’s early financial 
performance capture the same construct. There are also very high correlations between 
the total number of symbolic activities and the number of identity-building symbolic 
activities (b=.891), as well as between the total number of symbolic activities and the 
number of one-way externally oriented symbolic activities (b=.903). These high 
correlations suggest that the total number of symbolic activities should not be included 
together with the three types of symbolic activities in the same analysis, in order to avoid 
multi-collinearity problems.  
It also should be noted that the three measures of team quality (team members’ 
industry experience, team diversity, and team average degree) are relatively weakly 
correlated (bivariate correlations range between .319 and .458), which suggests that they 
may capture different dimensions of the overall quality of the NV teams. Finally, the 
correlations between the number of customers and the proportion of Fortune 500 
customers and between the number of partners and the proportion of Fortune 500 partners 
are also relatively low (bivariate correlations of .126 and .220, respectively), suggesting 
that the prestige of customers and partners is largely independent of the size of a NV’s 
customer and partner networks. 
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Table 3.2 – Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
Min Max Median Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Total media coverage .000 86.000 .000 3.176 9.337
2. Positive media coverage .000 10.000 .000 .414 1.392 .790
3. Media tenor -.250 1.000 .000 .022 .111 .048 .268
4. Amount of 1st round .000 .042 .001 .002 .003 .149 .161 .075
5. Market valuation .000 1.758 .038 .138 .229 .158 .172 .065 .731
6. Rate of product development .000 .045 .000 .001 .004 .073 .070 .009 -.030 .039
7. Team members industry experience .000 2.000 .290 .340 .308 .037 .120 .003 .042 -.037 -.002
8. Team diversity .000 .840 .571 .480 .264 .079 .100 .081 .046 .009 -.023 .319
9. Team average degree .000 4.000 2.000 1.729 1.192 -.094 -.013 .120 -.015 -.026 -.010 .377
10. Founders' prior startup experience .000 3.000 .000 .367 .623 .131 .091 .023 -.044 -.001 -.084 -.007
11. Number of customers .000 58.000 .000 .627 4.036 .104 .107 .004 .018 .108 .111 .066
12. Proportion of Fortune 500 customers .000 1.000 .000 .013 .094 .177 .220 .031 .101 .078 .003 .026
13. Number of partners .000 40.000 .000 1.357 4.247 .314 .331 .053 .079 .131 .145 -.073
14. Proportion of Fortune 500 partners .000 1.000 .000 .013 .074 .079 .088 .064 .049 .123 -.006 -.037
15. Identity-building symbolic activities .000 67.000 1.000 5.605 7.981 .451 .383 .064 .073 .083 .226 -.014
16. Two-way externally oriented symbolic activities .000 29.000 .000 .390 1.977 .339 .266 -.014 .023 .004 .053 -.027
17. One-way externally oriented symbolic activities .000 79.000 .000 3.617 8.578 .556 .501 .048 .116 .334 .059 -.006
18. Total number of symbolic activities .000 118.000 2.000 9.600 15.800 .572 .499 .057 .103 .213 .152 -.014
19. Diversity of symbolic activities .000 .652 .000 .151 .212 .459 .408 .084 .105 .125 .215 -.010
20. Age at 1st round 7.000 2396.000 425.000 513.573 418.583 .227 .203 .069 .043 .031 -.138 -.136
21. Seed investment .000 21.600 .000 .584 2.407 .189 .121 .053 .053 .278 .059 -.012
22. Number of VCs .000 17.000 2.000 2.383 1.874 .072 .074 .068 .366 .275 .003 .049
23. VC financial prestige (biggest VC size) .000 .124 .005 .008 .011 -.055 -.022 .044 .225 .096 -.002 .065
24. VC evaluative prestige (biggest VC IPOs) .000 12.700 .350 1.392 2.206 -.073 -.077 -.010 .132 .108 -.006 .088
25. Founded in 1997 .000 1.000 .000 .352 -.036 -.038 -.010 -.067 .035 -.127 -.136
26. Founded in 1999 .000 1.000 .000 .366 -.058 -.007 .012 -.086 .000 -.004 -.006
27. Founded in 2001 .000 1.000 .000 .282 .100 .048 -.002 .162 .163 .139 .151
28. Industry - communications .000 1.000 .000 .219 .019 .043 -.017 .063 .051 -.001 .069
29. Industry - computer hardware .000 1.000 .000 .031 .083 .096 .003 .056 .084 .120 -.009
30. Industry - computer software .000 1.000 .000 .436 -.019 .007 .033 -.078 -.099 -.024 .054
31. Industry - internet specific .000 1.000 .000 .193 .020 -.071 -.103 -.041 .045 .032 -.114
32. Industry - computer others .000 1.000 .000 .012 .012 .046 -.002 -.035 -.046 -.024 .014
33. Industry - semiconductor/electronics .000 1.000 .000 .108 -.071 -.048 .099 .073 -.057 -.060 -.033  
 
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
1. Total media coverage
2. Positive media coverage
3. Media tenor
4. Amount of 1st round
5. Market valuation
6. Rate of product development
7. Team members industry experience
8. Team diversity
9. Team average degree .458
10. Founders' prior startup experience .193 .169
11. Number of customers .075 .025 -.009
12. Proportion of Fortune 500 customers .104 .014 .089 .126
13. Number of partners .086 -.065 .011 .306 .213
14. Proportion of Fortune 500 partners .017 -.064 -.066 .005 .045 .220
15. Identity-building symbolic activities .113 -.027 -.003 .261 .198 .437 .219
16. Two-way externally oriented symbolic activities .045 -.116 .009 .109 .037 .243 .095 .339
17. One-way externally oriented symbolic activities .086 -.061 .005 .429 .223 .450 .105 .633 .321
18. Total number of symbolic activities .109 -.062 .000 .378 .226 .496 .180 .891 .471 .903
19. Diversity of symbolic activities .047 -.117 -.083 .218 .147 .387 .198 .619 .383 .557 .663
20. Age at 1st round .012 -.087 -.044 .118 .173 .229 .237 .535 .196 .431 .529 .429
21. Seed investment .001 -.099 .006 .092 .055 .253 .040 .061 .064 .107 .097 .115 -.023
22. Number of VCs .032 .028 .068 -.024 -.053 .026 -.042 -.001 .012 .004 .004 -.007 -.029
23. VC financial prestige (biggest VC size) .020 .044 -.034 .025 .123 -.040 -.019 -.025 -.041 -.040 -.039 -.029 -.038
24. VC evaluative prestige (biggest VC IPOs) -.019 .083 -.029 -.019 -.045 -.053 .035 -.100 -.048 -.061 -.089 -.111 -.102
25. Founded in 1997 -.062 -.133 -.126 -.048 .005 -.092 .009 -.096 -.095 .011 -.054 -.055 .286
26. Founded in 1999 -.053 .047 .055 -.024 -.011 .025 -.043 -.019 .022 -.024 -.019 -.009 -.141
27. Founded in 2001 .122 .091 .075 .077 .007 .071 .037 .122 .077 .014 .078 .068 -.153
28. Industry - communications .033 .042 .042 -.064 .052 -.072 -.091 -.127 -.043 -.078 -.112 -.061 -.166
29. Industry - computer hardware -.027 -.043 -.025 -.014 -.025 .079 .335 .110 .020 .107 .116 .092 .139
30. Industry - computer software .175 .059 -.019 .109 -.017 .143 .045 .146 .104 .085 .132 .078 .197
31. Industry - internet specific -.156 -.184 -.029 -.023 -.002 -.048 -.056 -.042 -.050 .002 -.026 -.008 -.091
32. Industry - computer others .070 .022 .024 -.001 .064 -.035 -.019 -.008 -.022 -.029 -.022 -.007 .028
33. Industry - semiconductor/electronics -.136 .101 .017 -.052 -.048 -.102 -.060 -.068 -.049 -.084 -.086 -.081 -.065  
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21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32
1. Total media coverage
2. Positive media coverage
3. Media tenor
4. Amount of 1st round
5. Market valuation
6. Rate of product development
7. Team members industry experience
8. Team diversity
9. Team average degree
10. Founders' prior startup experience
11. Number of customers
12. Proportion of Fortune 500 customers
13. Number of partners
14. Proportion of Fortune 500 partners
15. Identity-building symbolic activities
16. Two-way externally oriented symbolic activities
17. One-way externally oriented symbolic activities
18. Total number of symbolic activities
19. Diversity of symbolic activities
20. Age at 1st round
21. Seed investment
22. Number of VCs .135
23. VC financial prestige (biggest VC size) .080 .332
24. VC evaluative prestige (biggest VC IPOs) .110 .348 .423
25. Founded in 1997 .012 -.048 .028 .048
26. Founded in 1999 -.084 .007 .006 .092 -.560
27. Founded in 2001 .077 .043 -.037 -.150 -.462 -.476
28. Industry - communications .036 .112 .138 .056 -.049 .093 -.047
29. Industry - computer hardware -.001 .008 .009 .020 .070 -.137 .072 -.095
30. Industry - computer software .030 -.154 -.096 -.105 .003 -.063 .064 -.466 -.158
31. Industry - internet specific -.050 -.009 -.040 -.036 .113 .072 -.198 -.259 -.088 -.430
32. Industry - computer others -.027 -.023 -.040 -.030 .057 .008 -.069 -.059 -.020 -.097 -.054
33. Industry - semiconductor/electronics -.023 .111 .030 .139 -.143 -.040 .195 -.185 -.063 -.307 -.170 -.039
Note: N=415, correlation coefficients higher than .100 and lower than -.100 are significant at p<.05  
  
Regression results for media visibility. Table 3.3 shows the regression results for 
predicting the media visibility of NVs and the effect of media visibility on the amount 
and market valuation at the 1st round VC funding. At the first stage of the 2SLS 
regressions I estimated the direct and interaction effects of symbolic activities, human 
capital, relationships with customers and partners, and product completion on media 
visibility. Model 1 is a baseline model consisting of control variables. Consistent with my 
expectations, older NVs received significantly more media coverage (b=.282). Also, 
being started in 1997 and 1999 has a negative effect (b=-.223 and b=-.154, respectively) 
on media visibility (started in 2001 is the omitted category). Finally, the communications 
and internet industry sectors have positive effect on media visibility (b=.161 and b=.168, 
respectively).  
Model 2 adds the direct effects of symbolic activities, human capital, relationships 
with customers and partners, and product completion on media visibility. As predicted by 
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hypothesis 1, both level and diversity of symbolic activity have strong positive effects on 
NVs’ media visibility (b=.566 and b=.169, respectively). The practical effect of symbolic 
activities is also pretty sizable – other things being equal, three additional symbolic 
activities on part of a NV increase its media coverage with one article. Of the team 
quality variables, only team members industry experience has a marginally significant 
(p<.10) positive effect on media visibility (b=.074). Looking at the nonstandardized beta 
coefficient for team members’ industry experience suggests that one unit increase in 
average experience on the team contributes two additional articles in media visibility. 
The effect of team average degree is marginally significant (p<.10) but negative (b=-
.091), and team diversity has no statistically significant effect on media visibility. 
Overall, these results provide limited support to hypothesis 2. Consistent with hypothesis 
3, founders’ prior entrepreneurial experience has a positive and significant effect on 
media visibility (b=.145). In more practical terms, for every additional startup per 
founder a NV’s media coverage increases with two articles. Contrary to hypothesis 4, the 
number of customers has negative and significant effect on media visibility (b=-.142) and 
customer prestige has no statistically significant effect. Coefficients for both number of 
partners and proportion of Fortune 500 partners are non-significant, thus hypothesis 5 is 
not supported. Finally, hypothesis 6 also fails to receive statistical support, because the 
coefficient for rate of product development is non-significant. 
The overall magnitude of the effects of symbolic activities and NV resources on 
media visibility is also indicated by the R-square statistics reported in table 3.3. 
According to these statistics, the main predictors in my model account for a total of 
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52.5% of the variance in media visibility (direct and interaction effects), which suggests 
that my model captures effectively the major predictors of media reputation. 
 
Table 3.3 – Two-Stage Least Square Coefficients for Media Visibility, Amount of 
First Round VC Funding, and Market Valuation at First Round of VC Funding 
 
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Controls
Age at 1st round  .282*** -.137** -.078  .090^  .090^  .139^  .015
Founded in 1997 -.223***  .002  .021 -.180** -.180** -.157^ -.036
Founded in 1999 -.154** -.079 -.051 -.178** -.178**  .106  .183*
Industry - communications  .161*  .065  .027  .018  .017  .226*  .157^
Industry - computer hardware  .082 .030  .085*  .024  .023  .138^  .076
Industry - computer software  .081 -.019 -.019 -.036 -.037  .062  .020
Industry - internet specific  .168*  .038  .003 -.002 -.002  .106  .006
Industry - computer others  .046  .030  .014 -.016 -.016 -.016 -.030
Seed investment -.010 -.014  .073 -.019
Number of VCs  .314***  .310***  .285***  .265***
VC financial prestige (biggest VC size)  .125*  .132**  .112  .077
VC evaluative prestige (biggest VC IPOs)  .000 -.003 -.058 -.013
Predictors
Total number of symbolic activities  .566***  .512***
Diversity of symbolic activities  .169**  .109*
Team members industry experience  .074^  .128***
Team diversity  .004 -.013
Team average degree -.091^ -.073^
Founders' prior startup experience  .145***  .186***
Number of customers -.142*** -.053
Proportion of Fortune 500 customers  .036  .043
Number of partners  .059 -.005
Proportion of Fortune 500 partners -.036 -.032
Rate of product development -.054 -.094*
Symbolic activities * Team members experience  .370***
Symbolic activities * Team diversity -.014
Symbolic activities * Team average degree -.160***
Symbolic activities * Founders' prior startup experience  .439***
Symbolic activities * Number of customers -.198**
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 customers -.162**
Symbolic activities * Number of partners  .134***
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 partners  .025
Symbolic activities * Rate of product development  .162***
Media visibility  .103*  .370**
R-square  .093  .414  .618  .180  .190  .206  .311
Adjusted R-square  .075  .385  .590  .155  .164  .157  .265
R-square change .093*** .320*** .205*** .180***  .011*  .206*** .105***
Note: The standardized beta coefficients are reported. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ^p<.10. N=415 for models 1 to 5, N=217 for models 6 and 7.
Stage 1                        
(DV Media visibility )
Stage 2              
(DV Amount of 1st 
round)
Stage 2              
(DV Valuation 1st 
round)
 
Model 3 adds the interaction effects of the resource signals with the number of 
symbolic activities. Consistent with hypothesis 7, symbolic activities have positive 
significant interactions with team members industry experience (b=.370), founders prior 
entrepreneurial experience (b=.439), number of partners (b=.134) and rate of product 
completion (b=.162). In addition, symbolic activities have negative significant 
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interactions with team average degree (b=-.160), number of customers (b=-.198) and 
customer prestige (b=-.162). Appendix 3.A shows the plots of all the significant 
interactions of symbolic activities with resource signals. As the first plot shows, increase 
in TMT industry experience has a positive effect on media visibility for high levels of 
symbolic activities but slightly negative effect for low levels of symbolic activities. 
Second, higher TMT degree has a strong negative effect on media visibility for high 
levels of symbolic activities but positive effect for low levels of symbolic activities. 
Third, increase in founders’ prior startup experience has a positive effect on media 
visibility for high levels of symbolic activities but slightly negative effect for low levels 
of symbolic activities, similar to the pattern observed in TMT experience. 
Fourth, a greater number of customers has a strong negative effect on media 
visibility for high levels of symbolic activities but positive effect for low levels of 
symbolic activities. Customer prestige does not appear to make any difference beyond the 
effects due to symbolic activities – for high levels of symbolic activities media visibility 
is high and for low levels of symbolic activities media visibility is low, regardless of the 
level of customer prestige. Fifth, an increase in number of partners has a strong positive 
effect on media visibility for high levels of symbolic activities but slightly negative effect 
for low levels of symbolic activities. These negative interactions of symbolic activities 
with relationships with customers and partners might be indicators of substitutive effects 
between the information value of symbolic communications and affiliation.  
To explore this possibility further I also plotted the effect of symbolic activities 
on media visibility under high vs. low number of customers and partners. These plots are 
presented in Appendix 3.B. As the plots show, symbolic activities are fully redundant 
 156
with the number of partners – for low number of partners symbolic activities have strong 
positive relationship with media visibility but for high number of partners, symbolic 
activities have no effect on media visibility. However, they have a positive effect for a 
high number of customers and a negative effect for a low number of customers, which 
suggests different patterns of interaction with customers vs. partners. Finally, the rate of 
product advancement does not appear to make a difference beyond the effects due to 
symbolic activities – for high levels of symbolic activities media visibility is high and for 
low levels of symbolic activities media visibility is low, regardless of the rate of product 
advancement. 
At the second stage, I estimated the effect of media visibility on the amount of the 
1st round VC funding (Models 4 and 5) and the market valuation (Models 6 and 7). 
Model 4 presents the effect of control variables on the amount of the 1st round VC 
funding. NV age is significantly positively predictive of the amount of the 1st round VC 
funding (b=.105). Being started in 1997 and 1999 has a negative effect (b=-.177 and b=-
.171, respectively) on the amount of 1st round VC funding (started in 2001 was the 
omitted category). There are no significant industry sector effects. From the VC 
characteristics, the number of VCs and the VC financial prestige (biggest VC size) have 
positive significant effects on the amount of the 1st round VC funding (b=.342 and 
b=.136, respectively). Model 5 adds the media visibility, which has a positive significant 
effect on the amount of the 1st round VC funding (b=.128), consistent with hypothesis 8. 
Model 6 presents the effect of control variables on the market valuation at the 
time of the 1st round VC funding. NV age is positively predictive of the amount of the 1st 
round VC funding (b=.139). Being started in 1997 has a negative effect (b=-.157). Of the 
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industry sectors, communications and computer hardware have positive significant effect 
on market valuation (b=.226 and b=.138, respectively). From the VC characteristics, the 
number of VCs has a positive significant effect on market valuation (b=.285). Model 7 
adds the effect of media visibility, which is positive and significant (b=.370). Overall, the 
positive and significant effects of media visibility on both the amount and the market 
valuation of the 1st round VC funding provide strong support to hypothesis 8.  
The effects of media visibility on the amount of the VC funding and the market 
valuation at the 1st round are small to medium (R-square change of 4.9% and 10.5%, 
respectively). However, my results have practical significance, because they suggest that 
each additional media article about a NV increases the amount of money it receives from 
VCs with 128,000 USD and its market valuation with 370,000 USD. My results are also 
important from a theoretical perspective, because venture capitalists represent the most 
conservative and well-informed stakeholder group, which is least likely to rely on media 
reputation when evaluating NVs. The fact that the decisions of this supposedly “rational” 
stakeholder group are influenced by the media visibility of NVs suggests that these 
effects might be even stronger with other more distant stakeholder.  
 
Regression results for positive media coverage. Table 3.4 shows the regression 
results for predicting the positive media coverage of NVs and the effect of positive media 
coverage on the amount of the 1st round VC funding (all other variables remain the same 
as in the previous analysis). At the first stage of the 2SLS regressions I estimated the 
direct and interaction effects of symbolic activities, human capital, relationships with 
customers and partners, and product completion on positive media coverage. Model 1 
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shows the baseline models with the control variables. As this model shows, older NVs 
and those started in the communications sector received significantly higher positive 
media coverage (b=236 and b=129, respectively). The NVs founded in 1997 received 
significantly less positive coverage. All other controls are non-significant. 
Model 2 adds the effects of symbolic activities, human capital, relationships with 
customers and partners, and product completion on positive media coverage. Consistent 
with hypothesis 1, both level and diversity of symbolic activity have a strong positive 
effect on NVs’ positive media coverage (b=.445 and b=.156, respectively). In more 
practical terms, for each additional symbolic activity, the positive articles about a NV 
increase with .04, going form no diversity to maximum diversity of symbolic activities 
increases the number of positive articles about a NV with one.  
As predicted by hypothesis 2, team members’ industry experience has a 
significant positive effect on positive media coverage (b=.146). Looking at the 
nonstandardized beta coefficients suggests that having team members who have worked 
for a major IT firm increases the positive media coverage of a NV with .7 articles. The 
effects of team diversity and average degree are not statistically significant. Consistent 
with hypothesis 3, founders’ prior entrepreneurial experience has a positive and 
significant effect on positive media coverage (b=.096). in practical terms, one additional 
startup per founder increases a NV’s positive media coverage with .22 of an article. 
Consistent with hypothesis 4, customer prestige has a positive and significant effect on 
positive media coverage (b=.094). Having only prestigious customers increases positive 
media coverage with more than one article. However, the number of customers has a 
negative and significant effect (b=-.124), contrary to my predictions.  
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Table 3.4 – Two-Stage Least Square Coefficients for Positive Media Coverage, 




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Controls
Age at 1st round  .236*** -.125* -.071  .090^  .091^  .139^  .033
Founded in 1997 -.144*  .073  .082 -.180** -.181** -.157^ -.071
Founded in 1999 -.054  .021  .054 -.178** -.179**  .106  .118
Industry - communications  .129^  .030 -.003  .018  .018  .226*  .1714^
Industry - computer hardware  .091  .040  .082^  .024  .023  .138^  .057
Industry - computer software  .055 -.049 -.051 -.036 -.036  .062  .027
Industry - internet specific  .039 -.073 -.083 -.002 -.001  .106  .085
Industry - computer others  .065 .045  .031 -.016 -.016 -.016 -.033
Seed investment -.010 -.009  .073 -.004
Number of VCs  .314***  .311***  .285***  .244***
VC financial prestige (biggest VC size)  .125*  .127*  .112  .068
VC evaluative prestige (biggest VC IPOs)  .000  .002 -.058  .000
Predictors
Total number of symbolic activities  .445***  .442***
Diversity of symbolic activities  .156**  .109*
Team members industry experience  .146**  .186***
Team diversity -.015 -.015
Team average degree -.037  .003
Founders' prior startup experience  .096*  .138***
Number of customers -.124** -.029
Proportion of Fortune 500 customers  .094*  .077
Number of partners  .127* -.075
Proportion of Fortune 500 partners -.026  .043
Rate of product development -.039 -.067
Symbolic activities * Team members experience  .482***
Symbolic activities * Team diversity -.048
Symbolic activities * Team average degree -.042
Symbolic activities * Founders' prior startup experience  .230***
Symbolic activities * Number of customers -.467***
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 customers -.111^
Symbolic activities * Number of partners  .448***
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 partners -.051
Symbolic activities * Rate of product development  .140***
Positive media coverage  .098*  .365***
R-square  .069  .339  .532  .180  .189  .206  .311
Adjusted R-square  .050  .307  .497  .155  .163  .157  .265
R-square change .069*** .271*** .193*** .180***  .010***  .206*** .105***
Note: The standardized beta coefficients are reported. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ^p<.10. N=415 for models 1 to 5, N=217 for models 6 and 7.
Stage 1                          
(DV Positive coverage )
Stage 2               
(DV Amount of 1st 
round)
Stage 2               
(DV Valuation 1st round)
 
 
Consistent with hypothesis 5, the number of partners has a positive and significant 
effect on positive media coverage (b=.127). More practically, for each additional partner 
a NV receives about .04 of a positive media article. The proportion of Fortune 500 
partners has no significant effect. Hypothesis 6 fails to receive statistical support. The 
overall magnitude of the effects of symbolic activities and NV resources on positive 
media coverage is also indicated by the R-square statistics reported in table 3.4. 
According to these statistics, the main predictors in my model account for a total of 
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46.3% of the variance in positive media coverage (direct and interaction effects), which 
suggests that my model captures effectively the major predictors of positive media 
coverage. 
Model 3 adds the interaction effects of the main predictors with the number of 
symbolic activities. Consistent with hypothesis 7, symbolic activities have positive 
significant interactions with team members industry experience (b=.482), founders prior 
entrepreneurial experience (b=.230), number of partners (b=.448) and rate of product 
completion (b=.140). In addition, symbolic activities have negative significant 
interactions effect with number of customers (b=-.467) and marginally significant 
interactions effect with customer prestige (b=-.111). Overall, it appears that symbolic 
activities increase the effects of the resource signals in a direction consistent with their 
main effects, except for prestigious customers.  
At the second stage, I estimated the effect of media visibility on the amount of 1st 
round VC funding (Models 4 and 5) and the market valuation (Models 6 and 7). Model 4 
presents the effect of control variables on the amount of the 1st round VC funding, which 
are identical to those estimated in the previous regression and their effects are the same 
(see above). Model 5 adds the effect of positive media coverage on the amount of 1st 
round VC funding, which is positive and statistically significant (b=.134), consistent with 
hypothesis 8. Model 6 presents the effect of control variables on the market valuation at 
the time of the 1st round VC funding, which are identical to those estimated in the 
previous regression and their effects are the same (see above). Model 7 adds the effect of 
media visibility on market valuation, which is positive and significant (b=.365). Overall, 
these results provide strong support to hypothesis 8. 
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The effects of positive media coverage on the amount of VC funding and the 
market valuation at the 1st round are small to medium (R-square change of 5.1% and 
10.5%, respectively). However, they suggest that each additional positive media article 
about a NV increases the amount of money it receives from VCs with 134,000 USD and 
its market valuation with 365,000 USD. 
 
Table 3.5 – Two-Stage Least Square Coefficients for Media Tenor, Amount of First 
Round VC Funding, and Market Valuation at First Round of VC Funding 
 
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7
Controls
Age at 1st round  .066  .021  .013  .090^  .091^  .139^  .053
Founded in 1997  .017  .056  .071 -.180** -.181** -.157^ -.188
Founded in 1999  .042  .053  .070 -.178** -.179**  .106  .038
Industry - communications -.135 -.147 -.148  .018  .018  .226*  .401***
Industry - computer hardware -.055 -.075 -.069  .024  .024  .138^  .200**
Industry - computer software -.140 -.158 -.154 -.036 -.036  .062  .230*
Industry - internet specific -.204** -.200** -.207** -.002 -.001  .106  .388***
Industry - computer others -.039 -.046 -.050 -.016 -.016 -.016  .024
Seed investment -.010 -.012  .073  .061
Number of VCs  .314***  .312***  .285***  .261***
VC financial prestige (biggest VC size)  .125*  .124*  .112  .085
VC evaluative prestige (biggest VC IPOs)  .000  .002 -.058 -.050
Predictors
Total number of symbolic activities -.022  .170
Diversity of symbolic activities  .092  .057
Team members industry experience -.041 -.029
Team diversity  .046  .039
Team average degree  .111  .115
Founders' prior startup experience  .008  .030
Number of customers -.018 -.009
Proportion of Fortune 500 customers  .014  .033
Number of partners  .023 -.069
Proportion of Fortune 500 partners  .053  .071
Rate of product development  .015 -.012
Symbolic activities * Team members experience  .112
Symbolic activities * Team diversity -.048
Symbolic activities * Team average degree  .024
Symbolic activities * Founders' prior startup experience  .045
Symbolic activities * Number of customers -.128
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 customers -.060
Symbolic activities * Number of partners  .195
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 partners -.010
Symbolic activities * Rate of product development  .041
Media tenor  .034  .336***
R-square  .023  .048  .063  .180  .181  .206  .271
Adjusted R-square  .004  .002 -.007  .155  .154  .157  .222
R-square change .024 .016 .180***  .001  .206*** .065***
Note: The standardized beta coefficients are reported. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ^p<.10. N=415 for models 1 to 5, N=217 for models 6 and 7.
Stage 1                            
(DV Media Tenor )
Stage 2                 
(DV Amount of 1st round)
Stage 2                 
(DV Valuation 1st round)
 
 
Regression results for media tenor. I also replicated the latter analysis using 
media tenor as a measure of the favorability of NVs’ reputations, because this measure 
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has been used extensively by past research. However, as models 1, 2 and 3 in Table 3.5 
show, none of the coefficients for the controls, main effects, and interactions, is 
statistically significant, except for the internet sector control (b=-.204). Moreover, media 
tenor has no significant effect on the amount of the 1st round VC funding (see Model 5 in 
Table 3. 5). Interestingly, it does have a positive significant effect on market valuation 
(b=.336), which provides some support to hypothesis 8. Overall, these results suggest that 
media tenor may be less appropriate for capturing the favorability component of 
reputations for really young firms than it has been proven to be the case in the context of 
older firms. 
 
Exploring the effects of symbolic activities by type. Because symbolic activities 
(a) consistently came out as the most significant predictor of both the visibility and 
favorability dimensions of NVs’ reputations, and (b) have received less attention by prior 
research as compared to the resource signals included in my model, I conducted 
additional analyses to explore in greater detail the effect of each type of symbolic 
activities on NVs’ reputations. For this purpose, I replicated only the first stages of the 
previous analyses but replaced the total number of symbolic activities with three separate 
variables – identity-building, one-way externally oriented, and two-way externally 
oriented symbolic activities. 
Table 3.6 shows the results of the OLS regressions estimating the effects of each 
type of symbolic activities, human capital, relationships with customers and partners, and 
product completion on media visibility. Model 1 is identical to the baseline model 
presented in Table 3.3 and discussed above. Model 2 tests the effects of the predictors on 
media visibility. As the model shows, identity-building symbolic activities have a 
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marginally significant effect on media visibility (b=.104), two-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities and one-way externally oriented symbolic activities have positive and 
highly significant effects on media visibility (b=.122 and b=.437, respectively). All other 
effects are similar to those presented in Table 3.3 above. 
 
Table 3.6 – OLS Regression Coefficients for the Effects of each Type of Symbolic 
Activities on Media Visibility 
 
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
Controls
Age at 1st round  .282*** -.090
Founded in 1997 -.223*** -.029
Founded in 1999 -.154** -.092^
Industry - communications  .161*  .062
Industry - computer hardware  .082  .020
Industry - computer software  .081 -.018
Industry - internet specific  .168*  .042
Industry - computer others  .046  .034
Predictors
Identity-building symbolic activities  .104^
Two-way externally oriented symbolic activities  .122***
One-way externally oriented symbolic activities  .437***
Diversity of symbolic activities  .165***
Team members industry experience  .073^
Team diversity  .007
Team average degree -.081^
Founders' prior startup experience  .142***
Number of customers -.167***
Proportion of Fortune 500 customers  .036
Number of partners  .055
Proportion of Fortune 500 partners -.020
Rate of product development -.016
R-square  .093  .430
Adjusted R-square  .075  .400
R-square change .093***  .337***





Table 3.7 – OLS Regression Coefficients for the Effects of each Type of Symbolic 
Activities on Positive Media Coverage 
 
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
Controls
Age at 1st round  .236*** -.077
Founded in 1997 -.144*  .037
Founded in 1999 -.054  .006
Industry - communications  .129^  .027
Industry - computer hardware  .091  .028
Industry - computer software  .055 -.046
Industry - internet specific  .039 -.071
Industry - computer others  .065  .050
Predictors
Identity-building symbolic activities  .031
Two-way externally oriented symbolic activities  .073^
One-way externally oriented symbolic activities  .399***
Diversity of symbolic activities  .157**
Team members industry experience  .145***
Team diversity -.011
Team average degree -.030
Founders' prior startup experience  .095*
Number of customers -.155***
Proportion of Fortune 500 customers  .091*
Number of partners  .124**
Proportion of Fortune 500 partners -.008
Rate of product development  .002
R-square  .069  .358
Adjusted R-square  .050  .323
R-square change .069***  .289***
Note: The standardized beta coefficients are reported.  N=415, *p<.05, 
**p<.01, ***p<.001, ^p<.10
V Positive Media Coverag
 
 
Table 3.7 shows the results of the OLS regressions estimating the effects of each 
type of symbolic activities, human capital, relationships with customers and partners, and 
product completion on positive media coverage. Model 1 is identical to the baseline 
model presented in Table 3.4 and discussed above. Model 2 tests the effects of the 
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predictors on positive media coverage. As the model shows, identity-building symbolic 
activities have no significant effect on positive media coverage, two-way externally 
oriented symbolic activities have a marginally significant effect (b=0.73) and one-way 
externally oriented symbolic activities have positive and highly significant effects 
(b=.399) on positive media coverage. All other effects are similar to those presented in 
Table 3.4 above. 
 
Table 3.8 – OLS Regression Coefficients for the Effects of each Type of Symbolic 
Activities on Media Tenor 
 
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
Controls
Age at 1st round  .066  .019
Founded in 1997  .017  .051
Founded in 1999  .042  .052
Industry - communications -.135^ -.147^
Industry - computer hardware -.055 -.078
Industry - computer software -.140^ -.156^
Industry - internet specific -.204** -.201**
Industry - computer others -.039 -.046
Predictors
Identity-building symbolic activities -.012
Two-way externally oriented symbolic activities -.052
One-way externally oriented symbolic activities  .013
Diversity of symbolic activities  .099
Team members industry experience -.042
Team diversity  .048
Team average degree  .106^
Founders' prior startup experience  .009
Number of customers -.025
Proportion of Fortune 500 customers  .010
Number of partners  .023
Proportion of Fortune 500 partners  .055
Rate of product development  .015
R-square  .023  .050
Adjusted R-square  .004  .001
R-square change .023  .027





Table 3.8 shows the results of the OLS regressions estimating the effects of each 
type of symbolic activities (one-way direct, two-way direct, and one-way mediated), 
human capital, relationships with customers and partners, and product completion on 
media tenor. Model 1 is identical to the baseline model presented in Table 5 and 
discussed above. Model 2 tests the effects of the predictors on media tenor. As the model 
shows, none of the predictors has a statistically significant effect on media tenor. 
 
Post-hoc Analysis for Differences Among Industry Sectors 
 Although all NVs in my sample are in the IT industry, the 2SLS results reported 
above show that some industry sectors have significant effect on NV reputation. 
Specifically, as Table 3.3 above shows, communications and Internet sectors have 
positive and significant effect of media visibility (b=161 and b=168, respectively). To 
explore these inter-industry sector differences further, I split the sample in two – 
communications and internet specific vs. the other four IT sectors and repeated the 
analysis for their effect of symbolic activities and resource signals on media visibility. 
The results from these analyses are presented in Table 3.9 below. 
The analyses show that the number of symbolic activities in the communications 
and Internet sectors is lower than the number of symbolic activities in the other four IT 
sectors (means of 7.43 vs. 11.12, respectively). The effects of all three types of symbolic 
activities on media visibility are stronger for the communications and Internet sectors 
than for the other IT sectors. Specifically, identity-building symbolic activities have a 
positive and significant effect on media visibility in the communications and internet 
sectors (b=.276) but no significant effect in the other IT sectors. Two-way externally 
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oriented symbolic activities have significant effect in both subsamples but their effect in 
the communications and internet sectors is stronger than in the other IT sectors (b=.373 
vs. b=119).The difference is smaller for one-way externally oriented symbolic activities 
(b=.436 in the communications and internet sectors vs. b=374 in the other IT sectors). 
The diversity of symbolic activities and the number of partners have significant positive 
effects on media visibility in the other IT sectors’ subsample but no significant effect in 
the communications and internet sectors. Finally, symbolic activities and signaling 
resources explain 56.8% of the variance in media visibility for the communications and 
internet sectors and substantially less (33.1%) of the variance in the other IT sectors.  
 
Table 3.9 – OLS Regression Coefficients - Comparison of the Predictors of Media 
Visibility for Communications and Internet Specific vs. the Other IT Sectors 
 
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2
Controls
Age at 1st round  .206** -.126*  .345*** -.019
Founded in 1997 -.390*** -.110 -.099  .067
Founded in 1999 -.301** -.160* -.074 -.024
Predictors
Identity-building symbolic activities  .276***  .058
Two-way externally oriented symbolic activities  .373***  .119*
One-way externally oriented symbolic activities  .436***  .374***
Diversity of symbolic activities -.007  .156*
Team members industry experience -.025  .093
Team diversity -.008  .003
Team average degree -.080 -.028
Founders' prior startup experience  .129**  .094^
Number of customers -.138** -.172**
Proportion of Fortune 500 customers  .029  .093
Number of partners -.056  .179**
Proportion of Fortune 500 partners -.012 -.004
Rate of product development -.128* -.004
R-square  .105  .673  .108  .439
Adjusted R-square  .089  .639  .097  .399
R-square change .105*** .568*** .108***  .331***
Note: The standardized beta coefficients are reported . *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001, ^p<.10. N=171 for 
communications & internet specific, N=244 for the other IT sectors. The average number of symbolic activities 
in the communications & internet specific sectors is 7.43, the average number of symbolic activities for the 
other sectors is 11.12.
Communications & 
Internet Specific The othe Four IT Sectors
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LISREL Analysis and Results  
To test simultaneously the proposed relationships in the hypothesized model I 
estimated a series of path models, using Measured Variable Path Analysis in LISREL 
8.53 (Jöreskog & Sörboom, 2001). The Measured Variable Path Analysis allows 
researchers to simultaneously examine a series of dependence relationships, while 
simultaneously analyzing multiple dependent variables (Shook, Ketchen, Hult & Kacmar, 
2004), such as the relationships hypothesized in my model. By estimating the maximum-
likelihood solutions of a system of equations, LISREL provides both an overall 
assessment of the fit of a hypothesized path model to the data, and tests of individual 
hypotheses.  
The hypothesized model depicted in Figure 3.3 consisted of 17 exogenous 
variables and 2 endogenous variables.17  Each variable was modeled as a single indicator 
and assumed to contain no measurement error. Further, I allowed the main predictor 
variables to co-vary, because as I inferred from the exploratory stage of this research 
(Essay 1), all resource investments and commitment to using symbolic activities may be 
driven to some degree by the founders’ vision, capabilities, or other underlying common 
factor, which makes these variables likely to be correlated. I estimated separate models 
for media visibility, positive media coverage, and media tenor as measures of NVs’ 
reputations.  
Below I report the results for each of these models by starting with the overall 
model fit to the data. I assessed the overall fit of each model to the data using the chi-
square statistic, the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), the normed fit index (NFI), the 
                                                 
17 I included only team members’ industry experience as a measure of the NVs’ team quality, because the 
other two measures did not appear to significantly improve the model and the purpose of LISREL is to find 
the most parsimonious (not all-inclusive) model that fits the data. 
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comparative fit index (CFI), and the incremental fit index (IFI). The chi-square statistic is 
well-known to be oversensitive to sample size and be significant (suggesting that a model 
does not adequately fit the data) even when the differences between observed and model-
implied co-variances are slight (Kline, 1998). To reduce the sensitivity of the chi-square 
statistic to sample size researchers recommend using the rule “χ2 /df lower than 3” to 
decide the acceptability of the chi-square value (Kline, 1998). GFI, NFI, CFI, and IFI 
scores at or above .90 indicate an acceptable fit (Medsker, Williams & Holahan, 1994). 
After evaluating the fit of each model to the data, I also present the maximum-likelihood 
parameter estimates for the main predictors, significance levels, and R-squares for the 
hypothesized model.  
To test the interactions between symbolic activities and signaling resources, I 
used the total number of symbolic activities. I calculated a product term for each 
interaction following Ping’s (1995, 1996) procedure, also recommended by Cortina, 
Chen & Dunlap (2001). To avoid non-essential collinearity, I centered each variable prior 
to calculating the interaction terms following the centering procedures recommended by 
Aiken and West (1991). I tested separate models with media visibility, positive media 
coverage, and media tenor as measures of reputation.  
 
Media visibility as a measure of reputation. The chi-square for the hypothesized 
model with media visibility as a measure of reputation was χ2 (16, N = 415) = 12.088, p > 
.05. Chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom was .756 suggesting an adequate fit of 
the model to the data. The GFI for this model was .997, the NFI was .997, the CFI was 
1.000, and the IFI was 1.000, supporting the conclusion that the hypothesized model 
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adequately fits the data. Figure 3.3 contains the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates 
for the main and interaction predictors, significance levels, and R-squares for the 
hypothesized model. As predicted by hypothesis 1, the number of symbolic activities is 
positively and significantly related to media visibility (γ = .597). Diversity of symbolic 
activities is also positively and significantly related to media visibility (γ = .114). Thus, 
hypothesis 1 is supported. The team members’ industry experience is positively and 
significantly related to media visibility (γ = .102). Thus hypothesis 2 is also supported. 
Consistent with hypothesis 3, the founders’ prior entrepreneurial experience has a 
positive significant relationship with media visibility (γ = .153). The number of 
customers has no significant relationship to media visibility and customer prestige has a 
positive and significant effect on media visibility (γ = .261). Thus, hypothesis 4 is 
partially supported. None of the partner variables has a significant relationship with 
media visibility. Thus, hypothesis 5 is not supported. The rate of product completion is 
not significantly related to media visibility, thus failing to support hypothesis 6. 
Consistent with hypothesis 7, symbolic activities have positive significant interactions 
with rate of product completion (γ = .177), the team members’ industry experience (γ = 
.194), the founders’ prior startup experience (γ = .388), and the number of partners (γ = 
.237). However, contrary to my predictions, the interactions of symbolic activities with 
the number of customers and customer prestige are negative and significant (γ = -.214 
and γ = -.266, respectively). It appears that symbolic activities increase the positive 
effects of internal to the NV resources but not of the relationships with customers and 
partners. Overall, these results provide mixed support to hypothesis 7. Finally, consistent 
with hypothesis 8, media visibility is positively and significantly related to the amount of 
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the 1st round VC funding (β = .147). As evident from the R-squares statistics, the 
exogenous variables together explain 55.7% of the variance in media visibility, which in 
turn explains 2.2% of the variance in the amount of the 1st round VC funding. Further, the 
following exogenous variables have significant indirect effects on the amount of the 1st 
round VC funding: the number of symbolic activities (.088), the team members’ industry 
experience (.015), the founders’ prior experience (.022), and the proportion of Fortune 
500 customers (.038). The other predictors have no significant indirect effects. 
 
Figure 3.3 – Path Coefficients for the Direct and Interaction Effects with Media 
Visibility as a Measure of Reputation 
 
Rate of product development -.095 Symbolic activities * Rate of product development
          .177*
Team members industry 
experience .102*
Symbolic activities * Team 
members experience
.194*
Founders' prior startup 
experience .153*





Total media coverage           R2 
= .557
.147* Amount of 1st round                   R2 
= .022
Proportion of Fortune 500 
customers .261*                        -.081        .010
Number of partners
-.101                    .023
Age at 1st round
Proportion of Fortune 500 
partners -.006
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 
partners
            .237*
Total number of symbolic 
activities .597*
Symbolic activities * Number of 
partners
               -.266*
Diversity of symbolic activities
.114*
Symbolic activities * Fortune 
500 customers
            -.214*




Positive media coverage as a measure of reputation. The chi-square for the 
hypothesized model with positive media coverage as a measure of reputation was χ2 (16, 
N = 415) = 10.384, p > .05. Chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom was .649 
suggesting an adequate fit of the model to the data. The GFI for this model was .997, the 
NFI was .997, the CFI was 1.000, and the IFI was 1.000, supporting the conclusion that 
the hypothesized model adequately fits the data. Figure 3.4 contains the maximum-
likelihood parameter estimates for the main and interaction predictors, significance 
levels, and R-squares for the hypothesized model.  
 
Figure 3.4 – Path Coefficients for the Direct and Interaction Effects with Positive 
Media Coverage as a Measure of Reputation 
 
Rate of product development -.068 Symbolic activities * Rate of product development
          .137*
Team members industry 
experience .170*
Symbolic activities * Team 
members experience
.367*
Founders' prior startup 
experience .117*





Positive media coverage      
R2 = .486
.159* Amount of 1st round             
R2 = .026
Proportion of Fortune 500 
customers .110*                        -.046        .011
Number of partners
-.131*                      -.039
Age at 1st round
Proportion of Fortune 500 
partners .050
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 
partners
            .524*
Total number of symbolic 
activities .478*
Symbolic activities * Number of 
partners
               -.071
Diversity of symbolic activities
.101*
Symbolic activities * Fortune 
500 customers
            -.530*




As predicted by hypothesis 1, both the number and diversity of symbolic activities 
have positive and significant effect on positive media coverage (γ = .478 and γ = .101, 
respectively). Consistent with hypothesis 2, the team members’ industry experience is 
positively and significantly related to positive media coverage (γ = .170). The founders’ 
prior entrepreneurial experience also has a positive significant relationship with positive 
media coverage (γ = .117), thus supporting hypothesis 3. Consistent with my predictions, 
customer prestige has a positive and significant effect on positive media coverage (γ 
=.110). However, the number of customers has no significant relationship to positive 
media coverage. Thus, hypothesis 4 is partially supported. The number of partners and 
partner prestige have no significant relationship with positive media coverage. Thus, 
hypothesis 5 is not supported. The rate of product completion is not significantly related 
to positive media coverage, failing to support hypothesis 6.  
Consistent with hypothesis 7, symbolic activities have positive significant 
interactions with rate of product completion (γ = .137), the team members’ industry 
experience (γ = .367), the founders’ prior startup experience (γ = .094), and the number of 
partners (γ = .524). However, contrary to my predictions, the interactions of symbolic 
activities with the number of customers is negative and significant (γ = -.530). The 
interactions with customer prestige and partner prestige are not significant. Overall, these 
results provide mixed support to hypothesis 7. Finally, consistent with hypothesis 8, 
positive media coverage is positively and significantly related to the amount of 1st round 
VC funding (β = .159). As evident from the R-squares statistics, the predictor variables 
together explain 48.6% of the variance in media visibility and media visibility in turn 
explains 2.6% of the variance in the amount of the 1st round VC funding. Further, the 
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following exogenous variables have significant indirect effects of the on the amount of 
the 1st round VC funding (which in this model are the same as the total effects): the 
number of symbolic activities (.076), the team members’ industry experience (.027), and 
the founders’ prior experience (.019). The other predictors have no significant indirect 
effects. 
 
Figure 3.5 – Path Coefficients for the Direct and interaction Effects with Media 
Tenor as a Measure of Reputation 
 
Rate of product development  .002 Symbolic activities * Rate of product development
           -0.013
Team members industry 
experience  .021
Symbolic activities * Team 
members experience
.084
Founders' prior startup 
experience  .041





Media tenor              
R2 = .019
.072 Amount of 1st round           
R2 = .007
Proportion of Fortune 500 
customers  .023                        .051        .038
Number of partners
-.034                      .005
Age at 1st round
Proportion of Fortune 500 
partners  .044
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 
partners
            .123
Total number of symbolic 
activities -.013
Symbolic activities * Number 
of partners
             -.039
Diversity of symbolic 
activities  .063
Symbolic activities * 
Fortune 500 customers
              -.102
Symbolic activities * 
Number of customers
 
Media tenor as a measure of reputation. The chi-square for the hypothesized 
model was χ2 (16, N = 415) = 16.092, p > .05. Chi-square divided by the degrees of 
freedom was 1.006 suggesting adequate fit of the model to the data. The GFI for this 
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model was .996, the NFI was .995, the CFI was 1.000, and the IFI was 1.000, supporting 
the conclusion that the hypothesized model adequately fits the data. Figure 3.5 contains 
the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the main predictors, significance levels, 
and R-squares for the hypothesized model with media visibility as a measure of 
reputation. As the figure shows, none of the path coefficients is statistically significant, 
suggesting that the predictor variables are not related to media tenor and media tenor in 
turn is not related to the amount of the 1st round VC funding. 
 Tests of separate effects of symbolic activities by type. As a next step, I tested the 
direct relationships in the hypothesized model including each type of symbolic activities 
as a separate variable in the models to estimate the different contributions to media 
reputation of different symbolic activities. I estimated only two models – those with 
media visibility and positive media coverage as measures of reputation, because media 
tenor is not related to any variables in the hypothesized model.  
I first tested these effects using media visibility as a measure of reputation. The 
chi-square for the hypothesized model was χ2 (11, N = 415) = 8.329, p > .05. Chi-square 
divided by the degrees of freedom was .757 suggesting an adequate fit of the model to the 
data. The GFI for this model was .997, the NFI was .996, the CFI was 1.000, and the IFI 
was 1.000, supporting the conclusion that the hypothesized model adequately fits the 
data. Figure 3.6 contains the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the main 
predictors, significance levels, and R-squares for the hypothesized model with media 
visibility as a measure of reputation. Of the three types of symbolic activities, identity-
building direct activities have no significant relationship to media visibility. The other 
two types – two-way externally oriented and one-way externally oriented symbolic 
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activities – are positively and significantly related to media visibility (γ = .124 and γ = 
.446, respectively). Diversity of symbolic activities is also positively and significantly 
related to media visibility (γ = .178). Further, both one-way and two-way externally 
oriented symbolic activities have significant indirect (or total) effects on the amount of 
the 1st round VC funding (.018 and .066, respectively). 
 
Figure 3.6 – Path Coefficients for Each Type of Symbolic Activities with Media 
Visibility as a Measure of Reputation  
 
Rate of product development -.009
Team members industry 
experience .046




Media visibility           
R2 = .412
.147* Amount of 1st round           
R2 = .022
Proportion of Fortune 500 
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Number of partners
 .046
Age at 1st round




Two-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities .124*
            .178*
One-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities .446*





Figure 3.7 – Path Coefficients for Each Type of Symbolic Activities with Positive 
Media Coverage as a Measure of Reputation 
 
Rate of product development  .006
Team members industry 
experience  .135*




Positive media coverage    
R2 = .345
.159* Amount of 1st round           
R2 = .026
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Number of partners
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Two-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities  .072
            .158*
One-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities  .404*




Second, I tested the same model using positive media coverage as a measure of 
reputation. The chi-square for the hypothesized model was χ2 (11, N = 415) = 7.107, p > 
.05. Chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom was .646 suggesting adequate fit of the 
model to the data. The GFI for this model was .998, the NFI was .996, the CFI was 1.000, 
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and the IFI was 1.000, supporting the conclusion that the hypothesized model adequately 
fits the data. Figure 3.7 above contains the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for 
the main predictors, significance levels, and R-squares for the hypothesized model with 
positive media coverage as a measure of reputation. Of the three types of symbolic 
activities, only one-way externally oriented symbolic activities are positively and 
significantly related to positive media coverage (γ = .404).  The other two types – 
identity-building and two-way externally oriented symbolic activities – have no 
significant relationship to positive media coverage. Diversity of symbolic activities is 
positively and significantly related to positive media coverage (γ = .158). Together these 
results suggest that although identity-building and two-way externally oriented symbolic 
activities by themselves may not contribute substantively to the favorable evaluations of a 
NV, they increase the diversity of symbolic activities, which in turn has a positive effect 
on the level of positive media coverage. Further, one-way externally oriented symbolic 
activities have significant indirect effects on the amount of the 1st round VC funding 
(.064). 
 
Alternative Models Estimation 
The measured variables path analysis is a statistical technique that allows 
researchers to compare the hypothesized model to other plausible models by comparing 
the fit of the alternative models to that of the hypothesized model. Both Medsker et al. 
(1994) and Hayduk (1987) recommend such comparisons of the hypothesized model to 
plausible alternative models. Two alternative models appear to present logical 
alternatives to the hypothesized system of relationships and should be tested.  
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Alternative model 1 – partial mediation. My theory suggests that reputation fully 
mediates the relationship between the NV resources and the amount of the 1st round VC 
funding. However, it is possible that this mediation is only partial and the resources also 
have direct effect on the early financial performance of NVs. I tested for this alternative 
by adding paths from team members’ industry experience, founders' prior start-up 
experience, number of customers, proportion of Fortune 500 customers, number of 
partners, proportion of Fortune 500 partners, and rate of product completion to the 
amount of 1st round VC funding. All other paths remained unchanged. I used the criteria 
suggested by James, Mulaik and Brett (1982) to compare nested alternative models to the 
hypothesized model. Following this procedure, a significant reduction in chi-square 
suggests an improvement in the fit of the model to the data. For the model with media 
visibility as a measure of reputation, chi-square difference tests revealed that the decrease 
in chi-square from the hypothesized model to alternative model 1 was not significant 
(Δχ2 (6) = 6.218, p > .05). For the model with positive media coverage as a measure of 
reputation, chi-square difference tests revealed that the decrease in chi-square from the 
hypothesized model to alternative model 1 was not significant either (Δχ2 (6) = 5.181, p > 
.05). Thus, the alternative model 1 is less parsimonious because it adds more parameters 
to be estimated and does not fit the data significantly better. 
 
Alternative model 2 – no mediation. Prior research has assumed that the NV 
resources – especially its human capital and relationships – influence directly venture 
capitalists’ funding. I tested for this alternative by adding paths from team members’ 
industry experience, founders' prior startup experience, number of customers, proportion 
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of Fortune 500 customers, number of partners, proportion of Fortune 500 partners, and 
rate of product completion to the amount of 1st round VC funding and removing the paths 
from these variables to reputation. All other paths remained unchanged. Because this 
alternative model both adds new paths and removes paths that existed in the hypothesized 
model, it is not nested in the hypothesized model.  Thus, consistent with the 
recommendations of Kline (1998), to determine whether these alternative models fit the 
data better than the hypothesized model I compared the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC) scores of each alternative model to the AIC score of the hypothesized model. Kline 
(1998) suggests that given two non-nested models, the one with the lowest AIC score 
represents the best fitting model. For media visibility as a measure of reputation, the AIC 
score for the alternative model (402.211) was higher than the AIC of the hypothesized 
model (359.913). For positive media coverage as a measure of reputation, the AIC score 
for the alternative model (372.770) was also higher than the AIC of the hypothesized 
model (358.255).  
 
Alternative model 3 – founders’ experience as an antecedent of symbolic 
activities and signaling resources. Another plausible model to estimate is the one in 
which the founders’ prior startup experience determines the levels of a NV’s symbolic 
activities and signaling resources. This is possible because founders are usually the major 
decision makers of a NV and their experience largely determines their efficiency in 
recruiting resources, such as HC and SC, as well as for using symbolic activities. I tested 
for this alternative model by adding additional paths from founders’ prior startup 
experience to each of the other predictors of media visibility and positive media 
 181
coverage. Although theoretically plausible, this alternative model did not fit adequately 
the data – all fit statistics were lower than .70, which suggests unacceptable fit (the 
recommended levels of fit are above .90). Also, its AIC scores were much higher than 
those for the hypothesized model. For media visibility as a measure of reputation, the 
AIC score for the alternative model was 1676.511 vs. 196.246 for the hypothesized 
model. For positive media coverage as a measure of reputation, the AIC score for the 
alternative model was 1675.29 vs. 195.046 for the hypothesized model. Based on these 
findings, I concluded that the hypothesized model was superior to the plausible 
alternative models I examined. 
 
Tests of differences by founding year. Given the significant effects of founding 
years on media coverage and amount of the 1st round VC funding, I decided to explore 
whether there are some differences in the predictors of reputation by year. For this 
purpose, I split the sample in three sub-samples – 146 NVs started in 1997 (pre-bubble), 
152 NVs started in 1999 (bubble), and 117 NVs started in 2001 (post-bubble) – and I 
tested a reduced form of the hypothesized model in each of these subsamples.18 These 
tests showed the following differences by year: First, for NVs started in 1997 and 2001 
the founders’ entrepreneurial experience was the only significant predictor of NV 
reputation (γ = .115 and γ = .169, respectively), whereas for NVs started in 1999 it was 
not significant (γ = .083). Second, customer prestige was a significant predictor of NV 
reputation for NVs started in 1999 (γ = .309) but not for those started in 1997 and 2001. 
Third, the total number of symbolic activities had positive effect on NV reputation for 
                                                 
18 The reason for testing a reduced form is that splitting the sample in three led to loss of statistical power 
and including all the predictors would not allow for reliable estimation of the model fit to the data. 
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NVs started in 1997 and 2001 (γ = .548 and γ = .493, respectively) but no significant 
effect for those started in 1999. The diversity of symbolic activities is the only predictor 
that was significant in each of the three yearly analyses (γ = .218, γ = .294, and γ = .237, 
respectively). Finally, media visibility predicted significantly amount of 1st round VC 
funding for NVs started in 1999 and 2001 (γ = .136 and γ = .178, respectively) but not in 
1997. Although some of the non-significant results may be due to the lower statistical 
power, these comparisons suggest that the predictors of a NV’s reputation change with 
major shifts in market conditions. Also, it appears that the effect of a NV’s reputation on 
its early financial performance became more important after the Internet bubble. 
 
LISREL Analysis and Results for the Sub-sample with Disclosed Market Valuation 
In order to evaluate the overall fit of my model for predicting NVs’ market 
valuation, I repeated the analysis described above using the sub-sample of 217 NVs that 
disclosed their market valuations. Following the same logic, I re-ran the analysis using 
media visibility, positive media coverage, and media tenor as measures of reputation. I 
also compared the hypothesized model to plausible alternative models. It should be noted 
that the results from this analysis may not generalize to the entire population of NVs, 
because the NVs that did not disclose their market valuations are systematically different 
from those that did in terms of their performance. Specifically, t-tests suggest that the 
NVs that did not disclose their market valuations took longer to get to the 1st round of VC 
funding, received less money on the 1st round of VC funding, and had lower media 
visibility. 
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Media visibility as a measure of reputation. The chi-square for the hypothesized 
model with media visibility as a measure of reputation was χ2 (16, N = 217) = 33.266, p < 
.05. Chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom was 2.079 suggesting an adequate fit 
of the model to the data. The GFI for this model was .992, the NFI was .992, the CFI was 
.996, and the IFI was .996, supporting the conclusion that the hypothesized model 
adequately fits the data. Figure 3.8 contains the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates 
for the main and interaction predictors, significance levels, and R-squares for the 
hypothesized model. As predicted by hypothesis 1, the number of symbolic activities is 
positively and significantly related to media visibility (γ = .319). The diversity of 
symbolic activities is also positively and significantly related to media visibility (γ = 
.174). Thus, hypothesis 1 is supported. The team members’ industry experience is 
positively and significantly related to media visibility (γ = .089). Thus hypothesis 2 is 
also supported. Consistent with hypothesis 3, the founders’ prior entrepreneurial 
experience has a positive significant relationship with media visibility (γ = .271). The 
number of customers has no significant relationship to media visibility and customer 
prestige has a positive and significant effect on media visibility (γ = .092). Thus, 
hypothesis 4 is partially supported. The number of partners has negative significant effect 
on media visibility (γ = -.127), contrary to my predictions, and partner prestige has no 
significant relationship with media visibility. Thus, hypothesis 5 is not supported. The 
rate of product completion is not significantly related to media visibility, thus failing to 






Figure 3.8 – Path Coefficients for the Direct and Interaction Effects with Media 
Visibility as a Measure of Reputation 
 
Rate of product development  .005 Symbolic activities * Rate of product development
          .115*
Team members industry 
experience  .089*
Symbolic activities * Team 
members experience
.116*
Founders' prior startup 
experience  .271*





Total media coverage       
R2 = .702
.159* Market valuation at 1st round    
R2 = .025
Proportion of Fortune 500 
customers  .092*                        .010        -.003
Number of partners
-.127*                    .032
Age at 1st round
Proportion of Fortune 500 
partners -.039
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 
partners
            .727*
Total number of symbolic 
activities  .319*
Symbolic activities * Number 
of partners
               -.266*
Diversity of symbolic 
activities  .174*
Symbolic activities * 
Fortune 500 customers
            -.587*




Consistent with hypothesis 7, symbolic activities have positive significant 
interactions with the rate of product completion (γ = .115), the team members’ industry 
experience (γ = .116), the founders’ prior start-up experience (γ = .528), and the number 
of partners (γ = .727). However, contrary to my predictions, the interactions of symbolic 
activities with the number of customers and customer prestige are negative and 
significant (γ = -.587 and γ = -.266, respectively). It appears that symbolic activities 
increase the positive effect of internal to the NV resources only. Overall, these results 
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provide mixed support to hypothesis 7. Finally, consistent with hypothesis 8, media 
visibility is positively and significantly related to the market valuation of NVs at the 1st 
round of VC funding (β = .159).  
As evident from the R-squares statistics, the predictor variables together explain 
70.2% of the variance in media visibility and media visibility in turn explains 2.5% of the 
variance in the amount of the 1st round VC funding. Further, the following exogenous 
variables have significant indirect effects on the amount of the 1st round VC funding 
(which in this model are the same as the total effects): the number of symbolic activities 
(.051), the diversity of symbolic activities (.028), the team members’ industry experience 
(.014), the founders’ prior experience (.043), and the proportion of Fortune 500 
customers (.015). The other predictors have no significant indirect effects. 
 
Positive media coverage as a measure of reputation. The chi-square for the 
hypothesized model with positive media coverage as a measure of reputation was χ2 (16, 
N = 217) = 32.512, p < .05. Chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom was 2.032 
suggesting adequate fit of the model to the data. The GFI for this model was .992, the 
NFI was .992, the CFI was .996, and the IFI was .996, supporting the conclusion that the 
hypothesized model adequately fits the data. Figure 3.9 contains the maximum-likelihood 
parameter estimates for the main and interaction predictors, significance levels, and R-





Figure 3.9 – Path Coefficients for the Direct and interaction Effects with Positive 
Media Coverage as a Measure of Reputation 
 
Rate of product development  .009 Symbolic activities * Rate of product development
          .104*
Team members industry 
experience .174*
Symbolic activities * Team 
members experience
.209*
Founders' prior startup 
experience .203*





Positive media coverage    
R2 = .586
.172* Market valuation at 1st round    
R2 = .029
Proportion of Fortune 500 
customers -.038                        .032        .000
Number of partners
-.265*                      .016
Age at 1st round
Proportion of Fortune 500 
partners .070
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 
partners
            .857*
Total number of symbolic 
activities .246*
Symbolic activities * Number 
of partners
               .103
Diversity of symbolic 
activities .168*
Symbolic activities * 
Fortune 500 customers
            -.597*




As predicted by hypothesis 1, both the number and diversity of symbolic activities 
have positive and significant effect on positive media coverage (γ = .246 and γ = .168, 
respectively). Consistent with hypothesis 2, the team members’ industry experience is 
positively and significantly related to positive media coverage (γ = .174). The founders’ 
prior entrepreneurial experience also has a positive significant relationship with positive 
media coverage (γ = .203), thus supporting hypothesis 3. Neither the number of 
customers nor customer prestige has a significant effect on positive media coverage. 
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Thus, hypothesis 4 is not supported. Contrary to my prediction, the number of partners 
has negative and significant effect on positive media coverage and partner prestige has no 
significant relationship with positive media coverage. Thus, hypothesis 5 is not 
supported. The rate of product completion is not significantly related to positive media 
coverage, failing to support hypothesis 6.  
Consistent with hypothesis 7, symbolic activities have positive significant 
interactions with the rate of product completion (γ = .104), the team members’ industry 
experience (γ = .209), the founders’ prior startup experience (γ = .362), and the number of 
partners (γ = .857). However, contrary to my predictions, the interactions of symbolic 
activities with the number of customers is negative and significant (γ = -.597). The 
interactions with customer prestige and partner prestige are not significant. Overall, these 
results provide mixed support to hypothesis 7. Finally, consistent with hypothesis 8, 
positive media coverage is positively and significantly related to the market valuation of 
NVs at the 1st round of VC funding (β = .172). 
As evident from the R-squares statistics, the predictor variables together explain 
58.6% of the variance in media visibility and media visibility in turn explains 2.9% of the 
variance in the amount of the 1st round VC funding. Further, the following exogenous 
variables have significant indirect effects on the amount of the 1st round VC funding 
(which in this model are the same as the total effects): the number of symbolic activities 
(.042), the diversity of symbolic activities (.029), the team members’ industry experience 




Figure 3.10 – Path Coefficients for the Direct and interaction Effects with Media 
Tenor as a Measure of Reputation 
 
Rate of product development  .011 Symbolic activities * Rate of product development
            .080
Team members industry 
experience -.003
Symbolic activities * Team 
members experience
.036
Founders' prior startup 
experience  .038





Media tenor              
R2 = .061
.064 Market valuation at 1st round    
R2 = .005
Proportion of Fortune 500 
customers -.060                        .036        .030
Number of partners
-.052                      .052
Age at 1st round
Proportion of Fortune 500 
partners  .050
Symbolic activities * Fortune 500 
partners
            .077
Total number of symbolic 
activities -.250*
Symbolic activities * Number 
of partners
             .160
Diversity of symbolic 
activities  .269*
Symbolic activities * 
Fortune 500 customers
              -.122
Symbolic activities * 
Number of customers
 
 Media tenor as a measure of reputation. The chi-square for the hypothesized 
model was χ2 (16, N = 217) = 42.664, p < .05. Chi-square divided by the degrees of 
freedom was 2.667 suggesting an acceptable fit of the model to the data. The GFI for this 
model was .990, the NFI was .988, the CFI was .992, and the IFI was .992, supporting the 
conclusion that the hypothesized model adequately fits the data. Figure 3.10 contains the 
maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the main predictors, significance levels, and 
R-squares for the hypothesized model with media visibility as a measure of reputation. 
As the figure shows, the number of symbolic activities has negative significant 
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relationship with media tenor (γ = -.250) and the diversity of symbolic activities has a 
positive and significant relationship with media tenor (γ = .269).  None of the other path 
coefficients is statistically significant, suggesting that the predictor variables are not 
related to media tenor and media tenor in turn is not related to the market valuation of 
NVs at the 1st round of VC funding. 
 
Tests of separate effects of symbolic activities by type. As a next step, I tested the 
direct relationships in the hypothesized model including each type of symbolic activities 
as a separate variable in the models to estimate the different contributions to media 
reputation of different symbolic activities. I estimated only two models – those with 
media visibility and positive media coverage as measures of reputation, because media 
tenor is not related to any variables in the hypothesized model.  
I first tested these effects using media visibility as a measure of reputation. The 
chi-square for the hypothesized model was χ2 (11, N = 217) = 62.374, p < .05. Chi-square 
divided by the degrees of freedom was 5.670 suggesting that the model did not 
adequately fit the data. However, the GFI for this model was .980, the NFI was .973, the 
CFI was .977, and the IFI was .977, suggesting that the hypothesized model adequately 
fits the data. Figure 3.11 contains the maximum-likelihood parameter estimates for the 
main predictors, significance levels, and R-squares for the hypothesized model with 
media visibility as a measure of reputation. Of the three types of symbolic activities, 
identity-building and one-way externally oriented symbolic activities are positively and 
significantly related to media visibility (γ = .217 and γ = .551, respectively). Two-way 
externally oriented symbolic activities have no significant relationship to media visibility 
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in this sub-sample. Diversity of symbolic activities is also positively and significantly 
related to media visibility (γ = .095). Further, identity-building and one-way externally 
oriented symbolic activities have significant indirect (or total) effects on market valuation 
at the 1st round of VC funding (.034 and .087, respectively). 
 
Figure 3.11 – Path Coefficients for Each Type of Symbolic Activities with Media 
Visibility as a Measure of Reputation 
  
Rate of product development -.018
Team members industry 
experience  .010




Media visibility           
R2 = .513
.159* Market valuation at 1st round    
R2 = .025
Proportion of Fortune 500 
customers -.075*                        -.084        -.003
Number of partners
 .073
Age at 1st round




Two-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities -.032
            .095*
One-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities  .551*






Figure 3.12 – Path Coefficients for Each Type of Symbolic Activities with Positive 
Media Coverage as a Measure of Reputation 
 
Rate of product development  .007
Team members industry 
experience  .081*




Positive media coverage    
R2 = .399
.172* Market valuation at 1st round    
R2 = .029
Proportion of Fortune 500 
customers  .023                        -.058        .000
Number of partners
 .187*
Age at 1st round




Two-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities -.023
            .132*
One-way externally oriented 
symbolic activities  .439*
Diversity of symbolic 
activities
 
Second, I tested the same model using positive media coverage as a measure of 
reputation. The chi-square for the hypothesized model was χ2 (11, N = 217) = 59.527, p < 
.05. Chi-square divided by the degrees of freedom was 5.412 suggesting that the model 
does not adequately fit the data. The GFI for this model was .981, the NFI was .973, the 
CFI was .977, and the IFI was .978, supporting the conclusion that the hypothesized 
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model adequately fits the data. Figure 3.12 contains the maximum-likelihood parameter 
estimates for the main predictors, significance levels, and R-squares for the hypothesized 
model with positive media coverage as a measure of reputation. Of the three types of 
symbolic activities, only one-way externally oriented symbolic activities are positively 
and significantly related to positive media coverage (γ = .439).  The other two types – 
identity-building and two-way externally oriented symbolic activities – have no 
significant relationship to positive media coverage. Diversity of symbolic activities is 
positively and significantly related to positive media coverage (γ = .132). These results 
suggest that although identity-building and two-way externally oriented symbolic 
activities by themselves may not contribute substantively to the favorable evaluations of a 
NV, they contribute to the diversity of symbolic activities, which in turn has a positive 
effect on the level of positive media coverage that a NV receives. Further, one-way 
externally oriented symbolic activities have significant indirect (or total) effects on 
market valuation at the 1st round of VC funding (.075). 
 
Alternative Models Estimation 
The measured variables path analysis is a statistical technique that allows 
researchers to compare the hypothesized model to other plausible models by comparing 
the fit of the alternative models to that of the hypothesized model. Both Medsker et al. 
(1994) and Hayduk (1987) recommend such comparisons of the hypothesized model to 
plausible alternative models. In the present study, two alternative models appear to 




Alternative model 1 – partial mediation. My theory suggests that reputation fully 
mediates the relationship between NVs’ resources and the market valuation of NVs at the 
1st round of VC funding. However, it is possible that this mediation is only partial and the 
resources also have direct effect on the early financial performance of NVs. I tested for 
this alternative by adding paths from team members’ industry experience, founders' prior 
startup experience, number of customers, proportion of Fortune 500 customers, number 
of partners, proportion of Fortune 500 partners, and rate of product completion to the 
amount of 1st round VC funding. All other paths remained unchanged. I used the criteria 
suggested by James et al. (1982) to compare nested alternative models to the 
hypothesized model. Following this procedure, a significant reduction in chi-square 
suggests an improvement in the fit to the data. For the model with media visibility as a 
measure of reputation, chi-square difference tests revealed that the decrease in chi-square 
from the hypothesized model to alternative model 1 was significant (Δχ2 (9) = 19.894, p 
< .05). For the model with positive media coverage as a measure of reputation, chi-square 
difference tests revealed that the decrease in chi-square from the hypothesized model to 
alternative model 1 was not significant (Δχ2 (9) = 18.890, p > .05). Thus, the alternative 
model 1 is less parsimonious because it adds more parameters to be estimated and does 
not fit the data significantly better. 
 
Alternative model 2 – no mediation. Prior research has assumed that the NV 
resources – especially its human capital and relationships – directly influence venture 
capitalists’ funding. I tested for this alternative by adding paths from team members’ 
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industry experience, founders' prior startup experience, number of customers, proportion 
of Fortune 500 customers, number of partners, proportion of Fortune 500 partners, and 
rate of product completion to the market valuation at 1st round of VC funding and 
removing the paths from these variables to reputation. All other paths remained 
unchanged. Because this alternative model both adds new paths and removes paths that 
existed in the hypothesized model, it is not nested in our hypothesized model.  Thus, 
consistent with the recommendations of Kline (1998), to determine whether these 
alternative models fit the data better than the hypothesized model we compared the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) scores of each alternative model to the AIC score of 
the hypothesized model. Kline (1998) suggests that given two non-nested models, the one 
with the lowest AIC score represents the best fitting model. For media visibility as a 
measure of reputation, the AIC score for the alternative model (451.446) was higher than 
the AIC of the hypothesized model (379.965). For positive media coverage as a measure 
of reputation, the AIC score for the alternative model (434.838) was higher than the AIC 
of the hypothesized model (379.268). Based on these findings I concluded that the 
hypothesized model was superior to the alternative models I examined. 
 
Summary of Results 
 Effects of symbolic activities on NV reputation. Both the number and diversity of 
symbolic activities consistently emerged as the strongest predictors of media reputation 
(both in terms of visibility and favorability). Thus, hypothesis 1 is strongly supported. 
Further, one-way and two-way externally oriented symbolic activities have direct positive 
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effect on NV reputations, whereas identity-building symbolic activities appear to 
contribute only through their input into the overall diversity of symbolic activities.   
 
Effects of human capital on NV reputation. Of the three indicators of team 
quality, only prior industry experience contributed to media reputation, as I predicted in 
hypothesis 2. The founders’ prior entrepreneurial experience also consistently predicted 
the NVs’ media reputation. Together, these two results suggest that experience is 
particularly relevant as a signal of the quality of a NV’s human capital, whereas 
education and diversity appear to be less relevant. 
 
 Effects of relationships with customers and partners on NV reputation. My 
hypotheses about the effect of relationships with customers and partners on a NV’s 
reputation received less than sufficient support. Only the hypothesized positive effect of 
customer prestige on NVs’ reputation received consistent support. The number of 
customers appears to have non-significant and even negative (according to some of the 
regressions) effect on reputation, contrary to hypothesis 4. Therefore, hypothesis 4 was 
only partially supported. The number of partners and partner prestige have no significant 
effect on NV reputation, thus failing to support hypothesis 5.  
 
Effects of product completion on NV reputation. The hypothesized positive 
effect of product completion on NVs’ reputation was not supported in my analysis. 
However, consistent with my predictions product completion had positive and significant 
interaction effects with symbolic activities in all of the analyses that I performed. This 
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suggests that product completion might be an important but less observable signal, and, 
therefore, may influence NVs’ reputations only when it is made more visible to 
stakeholders by using symbolic activities. 
 
Interaction between symbolic activities and resource signals. Consistent with my 
predictions, symbolic activities increased the positive effect of human capital (both team 
quality and founders’ experience) and product completion. However, symbolic activities 
also appear to increase the negative effect of the number of customers and make the 
effects of customer prestige and the number of partners negative. Thus, hypothesis 6 is 
only partially supported. 
 
Effects of NV reputation on financial performance. The hypothesized positive 
effect of NVs’ reputation on early financial performance received consistent support for 
both the visibility and positive media coverage as measures of reputation, as well as for 
both the amount of the 1st round VC funding and the market valuation at the 1st round VC 
funding as a measure of performance. Overall, these results provide strong support to 
hypothesis 8. 
The different types of analysis that I presented above provide general support for 
the hypothesized model of reputation building by NVs that I developed in this essay. In 
the next section I discuss in greater detail the implications of these results and the 






In this essay I tested a set of hypotheses proposing that a NV’s reputation is the 
joint result of its symbolic activities and signaling assets. Specifically, I hypothesize that 
the human capital, relationships with customers and partners, and product completion, 
together with the symbolic activities of a NV, predict its initial reputation, which in turn 
increases its early performance. The empirical analyses of a sample of 415 information 
technology NVs provide general support to the hypothesized model. Consistent with my 
theory, symbolic activities have the strongest direct effect on a NV’s reputation, and tend 
to increase the effects of the key resources possessed by NVs. Also, the NVs’ human 
capital, indicated by their founders’ entrepreneurial experience and team members’ 
industry experience, has a positive effect on NVs’ reputation. Reputation, in turn, is 
positively related to NVs’ early financial performance. The effects on NVs’ reputations 
of their relationships with customers and partners, however, appear to be less 
straightforward, and therefore deserve further attention.  
The non-significant and even negative effect of the number of customers could be 
explained with the lack of consistency among NVs in terms of the customers they claim 
to have and the more general lack of any evidence if a customer has indeed signed to use 
or support a given IT output. Specifically, when exploring the data more qualitatively, I 
found wide variations in what kinds of firms NVs list as their customers: for example, 
one NV had only one big customer – the state of North Carolina, the contract with which 
was announced in press-releases from both parties to the contract, posted on the NV’s 
web-site, and subsequently covered by the media; another NV had listed on its web-site 
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the names of more than 40 customers, most of which I was unable to find on the Internet 
(probably very small firms that have no web-site or individuals). These variations suggest 
that the number of customers a NV claims to have cannot serve as a reliable indicator that 
the NV indeed has strong (or even any) relationships with those customers. On the other 
hand, having a prominent firm, such as IBM or Microsoft, as a customer may serve as a 
more reliable signal, because such firms are unlikely to allow every NV to post their logo 
on its web-site. Thus, the NVs that have highest proportions of Fortune 500 customers are 
those that have few strong relationships with prominent industry players, which explains 
why the prestige and not the size of customer networks had a significant effect on NVs’ 
reputation. 
The lack of significant effects of a NV’s partnerships on its reputation appears to 
somehow contradict prior studies, which have established that partners have a positive 
effect on NVs’ performance and have attributed these effects to the reputational 
mechanisms through which affiliation influences stakeholders’ perceptions of a focal NV 
(Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999). However, these studies assumed rather than tested for 
the effects of relationships on reputation, which makes it difficult to compare the results. 
One possible explanation for the lack of a strong signaling effect on the part of 
partnerships is that in the IT industry partnerships are so ubiquitous (Kotha, Rindova & 
Rothaermel, 2001; Rindova, Wiltbank & Kotha, 2001; Stuart, 2000; Stuart et al., 1999) 
that they may appear to be the norm rather than a distinctive signal of the quality of a 
NV.  
An alternative explanation for the weak effect of relationships with customers and 
partners is that there might be a substitutive effect between symbolic activities and the 
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signaling role of third parties. In fact, all prior studies that found the positive effect of 
affiliation did not take into account symbolic activities. Therefore, it is possible that once 
symbolic activities are used to draw stakeholders’ attention to the NV’s human capital 
and product development activities, the third party affiliations do not add that much 
value. Indeed, if I exclude symbolic activities from the analysis the coefficients for the 
number of partners become positive and significant. Therefore, future research should 
account for the role of symbolic activities when studying reputational effects of 
affiliations with third parties on NVs’ performance.   
I found that the founders’ past entrepreneurial experience appears to increase a 
NV’s reputation. These results suggest that related experience matters by itself, 
regardless of past performance (i.e., whether prior start-ups were successful or not or 
whether the team members were doing a good job in their prior positions). This strong 
effect of founders on a NV’s reputation is consistent with past research on the role of 
founders for the formation and performance of new organizations (Boeker, 1989; Dobrev 
& Barnett, 2005). However, there might be variations in how much founders learn from 
successful versus failed experiences. Thus, one productive line for future research could 
be to explore the differential effects of founders’ prior successful, failed, and mixed 
experiences on the reputation and performance of their subsequent ventures.  
Further, the team members’ industry experience had both direct and interaction 
effects on a NV’s reputation. However, the other two indicator of the quality of a NV’s 
human capital suggested by prior research – education and team diversity – did not 
appear to be significant predictors of the NVs’ reputation.19 It should be noted, however, 
                                                 
19 In fact, education appears to have even a slightly negative effect on reputation, which could be explained 
with the fact that the “all Ph.D. in engineering” teams tend to believe that the product will speak for itself 
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that prior studies were conducted in relatively older high technology firms than the ones 
in my sample (Honig, 1998; Schoonhoven & Eisenhardt, 1996; Schoonhoven, Eisenhardt 
& Lyman, 1990). One explanation for the relatively weak signaling value of team 
diversity may be that finance, accounting, marketing and other types of expertise that 
adds to a team’s diversity, may appear less relevant so early in the NV’s life. Whereas 
such experience would be valuable once the NV takes off, at the very early days of its life 
it may have unclear relevance in the eyes of the stakeholders, because this is the time 
when the NVs are still struggling to produce a first prototype or to develop a new 
technology that will not be ready to market in the next few years. Therefore, it is 
plausible that very early in a NV’s life stakeholders look for indications that the NV is in 
good hands and likely to take off and survive, whereas later they may become more 
concerned with the availability of complementary expertise (i.e., team diversity) or highly 
specialized technical competences (e.g., a Ph.D. in computer engineering). Future 
research should explore the potential variation in the effect of human capital 
characteristics as a NV progresses from the start-up stage to later stages in its life.  
The rate of product advancement had no direct effects on NVs’ reputation but had 
significant interaction effects with symbolic activities. These findings suggest that such 
internal activities might be relatively weaker as signals but become more visible to 
publics when they are promoted or emphasized by using symbolic activities. For 
example, if a NV is committed to new product development and makes fast progress but 
nobody knows about this, it is unlikely that the high rate of product advancement will 
contribute to its reputation. Therefore, one practical conclusion that can be derived from 
                                                                                                                                                 
and to invest only in new product development activities, ignoring completely the need to build reputation 
for the NV. 
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these observations is that NVs should use symbolic activities as much as possible, 
especially if they have something substantive to show, because symbolic activities 
magnify the effect of otherwise unobservable new product development activities and 
make them important reputation signals.  
The strongest predictor of reputation in my study is the number of symbolic 
activities, which appears somewhat surprising given all the reputation research that has 
focused on product quality and past financial performance (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; 
Milgrom & Roberts, 1986; Roberts & Dowling, 2002; Shapiro, 1983). The strong effects 
of symbolic activities could be explained with the fact that at the beginning NVs have 
very few substantive resources and relationships with stakeholders, because building 
substantive relationships with large stakeholder audiences requires long-term consistent 
behaviors and performance on part of the organization (Grunig, 1993; Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1982, 1986; Shapiro, 1983). Thus, early in a NV’s life when these relationships 
are not developed yet, stakeholders need to rely more extensively on the communications 
that come from the NV than they would later on.  
Two-way communications have been advocated as the most effective PR 
practices, especially when firms operate under high environmental uncertainty (Grunig, 
1984; Grunig et al., 2002). My results suggest that indeed two-way communications 
contribute significantly to a NV’s reputation, both independently and by adding more 
diversity to the repertoire of symbolic activities that the NV uses. Further, one-way 
externally oriented symbolic activities (e.g., press releases) had the strongest independent 
effect, consistent with observations in media research that journalists tend to be quite 
passive when searching for new events to cover. Specifically, prior research has found 
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that most media stories come form press releases and other passive information 
gathering, rather than from active search of new events on part of the journalists (Hunt & 
Grunig, 1994). This might be even more so in the case of NVs, for which journalists may 
not have any information unless they encounter announcements of what NVs are doing or 
learn about their products during a specialized industry event. 
It is somewhat surprising that the identity-building symbolic activities, such as 
web-site upgrades, logo, motto, and mission statements, did not appear to have significant 
effect as a standalone type of symbolic communications in most analyses. They appear to 
add value only by contributing to the overall diversity of symbolic activities. It is possible 
that because such symbolic activities do not target specific stakeholder groups, they 
receive accordingly less attention from the more general and distant stakeholders, 
represented by the media. Overall, my results suggest that using a large number and 
diverse types of symbolic activities is the best strategy to build an early reputation for a 
NV. However, these activities have to be backed up by some substantive resources or 
advancement toward completion of the product that the NV is going to offer. 
Whereas my model holds for media visibility and positive media coverage, both 
in terms of factors that predict a NV’s reputation and the effects of reputation on a NV’s 
performance, the overall media tenor had no significant relationships with other variables 
in my model. This observation can be explained with the fact that early in their lives NVs 
receive primarily neutral media coverage (86.3% of my sample) and relatively few NVs 
(13.1% of the sample) received positive evaluations, which makes the tenor scores very 
low. This observation is not surprising, though, because prior research suggests that even 
for established firms, reputation may not always include an evaluative component 
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(Grunig & Hung, 2002). For example, Grunig and Hung (2002) found that the lack of 
familiarity leads to neutral description by stakeholders of the products of world-wide 
known firms such as Microsoft.  
Further, it might be the case that a NV first has to accumulate a certain threshold 
level of visibility before it can start developing the evaluative dimension of its reputation. 
The more coverage a NV receives, the more familiar it becomes and the more likely the 
journalists to feel comfortable making evaluative statements about it. This idea is 
consistent with the fact that in order for people to form evaluative opinions of an issue, 
they first have to devote their attention to that issue (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Similarly, for 
stakeholders to begin to form evaluative opinions about a NV, it might be necessary for 
the NV to become sufficiently salient in its organizational field, and to gain a minimum 
amount of attention. Therefore, at the beginning of a NV’s life visibility might be a more 
meaningful measure of its reputation than the formation of favorable interpretations. 
Given the relatively short period of observation of my study (average of one and a half 
year per NV) and the small number of NVs that received positive coverage, it is difficult 
to make specific conclusions along those lines. Future research should explore more 
systematically the potential threshold effect of media visibility – e.g., at what point in 
time NVs begin to accumulate positive evaluations in addition to visibility. Also, future 
research can explore how the patterns of accumulation of visibility and favorability 
evolve over time, as the NVs progress through subsequent stages of their lives. 
It is also important to note that the visibility (or awareness) component of 
reputation accrues at the level of the NV and is more general (i.e., the stakeholders’ focus 
of attention is shifted towards the focal NV), whereas evaluations for quality are at the 
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product  level and are based on more detailed assessment of product quality (Rindova et 
al., 2005). Given that most NV in my sample had no available outputs, it is not surprising 
that only a few of them accumulated positive reputations. This finding is important from 
a theoretical point of view, because it suggests that the reputational perceptions begin to 
accumulate from more general awareness and progress toward more specific evaluations 
of the output quality. Therefore, this dissertation extends prior research, which has 
focused extensively on quality and past performance as the main drivers of reputation, by 
drawing attention to the initial factors that trigger the reputation-building process – 
namely, to the activities that attract stakeholders’ attention to a NV. My study also 
extends the sociological view of reputation as a position in a network of relationships by 
pointing to the fact that before relevant stakeholders begin to form relationships with a 
NV they need to notice it and form some initial reputational perceptions about it. Finally, 
my study also alerts entrepreneurs, who often believe that the product will “speak for 
itself”, that this is not necessarily the case. In fact, my results suggest that there might be 
some threshold level of attention that needs to focus on the NV before stakeholders even 
begin to evaluate the NV or its products.  
 
Research Contributions  
This study makes several important contributions to management and 
organization theory and practice. First, the paper contributes to reputation research by 
uncovering the process of reputation building from its very beginning. It addresses an 
important gap in current research on organizational reputations, which has focused 
primarily on established firms (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Wartick, 
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2002) and has overlooked the uniqueness of the process of reputation building by NVs. 
As my results suggest, certain venture-specific assets, such as the founders’ 
entrepreneurial experience and the relationships with prominent customers, serve as 
reputation building investments by NVs, although they have not been considered relevant 
variables by reputation research to date.  
Further, I show that symbolic activities play a much more critical role for building 
the initial reputation of NVs than for established firms. Past reputation research suggests 
that investing heavily in one particular type of symbolic activities – advertising – can 
help an established industry player improve its reputation (Milgrom & Roberts, 1986). 
However, none of the firms in my study engaged in advertising in the early period of its 
life. My results show that using a large number of discrete and relatively inexpensive 
symbolic activities, as well as using a wide variety of symbolic activities can help NVs 
build their initial reputations. These findings are important because they draw 
researchers’ attention to the fact that the process of developing initial reputation might be 
quite different from the process of sustaining or increasing an already existing reputation. 
Second, I refine the scholarly understanding of reputation as a valuable intangible 
asset by examining the processes through which this asset can be developed and by 
demonstrating that early in a firm’s life, its accumulation is much less ambiguous than 
the resource-based view of the firm suggests (Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
Specifically, my analyses suggest that the resource signals I identify (i.e., human capital, 
social capital and new product development) together with symbolic activities explain a 
sizable portion of the variance in NV reputation. According to the results of the 2SLS 
regressions the NVs’ symbolic activities and signaling resources explain 52.5% of the 
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variance in the visibility component of a NV’s reputation (R-square change is .320 for 
direct effects and .205 for interaction effects) and 46.4% of the variance in the evaluative 
(positive) component of a NV’s reputation (R-square change is .271 for direct effects and 
.193 for interaction effects). Similarly, the results of the LISREL suggest that the 
predictions of my model explain 55.7% of the variance in the visibility component of a 
NV’s reputation and 48.6% of the variance in the evaluative (positive) component of a 
NV’s reputation. Therefore, it might be useful to investigate more carefully when and 
how reputation and other critical intangible resources emerge, and what factors contribute 
to their initial accumulation.  
Third, with this study I extend the current understanding of firm resources by 
offering useful insights about the interrelationships among critical intangible assets, such 
as reputation, social capital and human capital. Past research has found that once 
reputation is accumulated, it can help young and small firms attract better employees, 
thus increasing their human capital (Williamson, 2000; Williamson, Cable & Aldrich, 
2002). Also, reputation has been found to help NVs attract more venture capital (Shane & 
Cable, 2002; Stuart et al., 1999) – a finding confirmed by my analysis – which capital in 
turn allows for the acquisition of various resources. Therefore, by explaining how NVs 
can build their initial reputations, I provide more detailed understanding of the early asset 
acquisition processes by new firms, especially with regard to the interactions between 
symbolic activities and substantive NV attributes. My model suggests that the initial 
human capital (especially the founders’ experience) and the first relationships with 
customers and partners can contribute to the accumulation of early reputation by NVs. 
Thus, it appears that some resources might be a prerequisite for other resources to be 
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developed. Specifically, reputation is a resource whose accumulation might be largely 
dependent on the existence or early acquisition of other, more internal to the firm 
resources. These initial observations suggest that future research should explore the co-
development of multiple intangible assets instead of focusing on one asset at a time.  
Fourth, this dissertation extends prior research on NVs, which has assumed that 
NVs do not have their own reputations and therefore borrow the reputations of their 
partners or investors (Beatty & Ritter, 1986; Hsu, 2004; Stuart et al., 1999). Specifically, 
recent studies have demonstrated that NVs pay for their affiliation with prestigious 
venture capitalists by agreeing on a lower market valuation than they would get otherwise 
(Hsu, 2004). My results suggest that in fact these assumptions of past research are only 
partially true – indeed, NVs that have no reputation may seek affiliation with prestigious 
VCs. However, there are also NVs that are pretty alert and manage to build reputation 
very early in their lives. Those NVs do not necessarily strive to attract the most 
prestigious VCs but still manage to receive more money and higher market valuations. I 
split the sample in two – NVs with no reputation (no articles) and some reputation (at 
least one article) – and found that on average the VCs that invested in the ‘no-reputation’ 
group of NVs were 33% bigger and had 52% more IPOs in the preceding year than those 
that invested in the ‘reputation’ group. These differences suggest that the NVs with no 
reputation are the ones that tend to affiliate with more prestigious VCs, but they also 
receive less money and lower market valuations than the ventures that build their own 
reputation and can afford to raise VC money regardless of the VCs prestige. Therefore, 
my study points to the different consequences for NVs between developing their own 
reputations versus borrowing the reputations of others.  
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Last but not least, my study speaks directly to entrepreneurship research and 
practice by providing specific suggestions how new ventures can build reputation early in 
their lives. As I already discussed above, building reputation early in a NV’s life is 
critically important for the NV’s ability to attract stakeholders and to engage in exchange 
relationships with them. Thus, building reputation early on can improve NVs’ chances for 
survival and success. Moreover, most of the activities necessary to accumulate resources 
that serve as reputation signals are a natural part of the development of a new firm. 
Therefore, building these resources strategically and with an eye towards their potential 
reputation effects would help NVs grow faster and overcome the initial hurdles at start-
up. Also, using symbolic activities to promote the substantive resources possessed by a 
NV is something overlooked by both researchers and entrepreneurs. However, symbolic 
activities can be used not only to attract stakeholders’ attention to a NV, but also to 
increase stakeholders’ knowledge of the positive aspects of the NV, which may convince 
them to invest in it, attempt employment with it, or otherwise support its development. 
All these benefits, added to the fact that most of the symbolic activities I identified are 
relatively easy to initiate and do not require substantive resources, make them both 
attractive and affordable for NVs.  
 
Limitations and Future Research Directions 
As every study, this dissertation is not without limitations. Several points deserve 
particular attention and further exploration in future research. First, I examined the 
factors that influence NV reputation in a sample of venture capital backed NVs. 
Arguably, these NVs may differ from the population of NVs that never receive VC 
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finding. For example, it is possible that NVs interested in VC finding focus more on early 
reputation building activities than those that have enough start-up capital from non-VC 
sources. Alternatively, it is likely that the majority of the NVs that never receive VC 
funding have lower potential or otherwise perform worse than those that receive VC 
funding. Also, it is possible that reputation influences which ventures will receive finding 
from VCs. If so, there might be systematic differences between VC-backed and non-VC 
backed NVs in terms of their reputation building activities and outcomes. Given that the 
majority of high technology NVs never receive VC funding (Goldfarb, Kirsch & Pfarrer, 
2006), it is important for future research to explore the reputation building processes in 
non-VC backed NVs and to compare with those identified in this dissertation research.  
Second, this study explores how NVs can build reputations with large and distant 
stakeholder audiences through media coverage. However, some NVs may also invest in 
building direct reputation with a small set of stakeholders by relying on developing high 
quality relationships with these stakeholders through direct interactions with them 
(Grunig et al., 2002). Arguably, these two distinct strategies in approaching the 
reputation-building process – reputation building with a small set of stakeholders that 
have direct experience with NVs versus a large number of distant stakeholders – require 
different resources and may have different consequences for NVs’ early and long-term 
performance. Future research should explore the pros and cons of each strategy and the 
role of some contingent factors, such as industry and product type (e.g., hard products, 
services, or new technologies) on the effectiveness of each strategy. It is also likely that 
media visibility can create interest in various publics towards the focal NV and thus can 
contribute to converting such relatively distant (and thus less involved) stakeholders into 
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more proximate ones, who are more directly involved with the NV. This is an important 
issue for future research to explore, because according to some scholars, only the 
stakeholders that are actively involved with a given firm deserve investments in 
sustaining and improving the firm’s relationships with them (Grunig et al., 2002). 
Although conventionally direct relationships with stakeholders have been seen as more 
important than reputation building with larger publics, in the context of my study media 
appears to be a pretty important factor, too. This observation is likely to generalize to 
other high-technology context, where the uncertainty about the quality of NVs is 
substantial. Therefore, a more fruitful direction for future research might be to look for 
relationships between the more direct and more distant types of reputation and to explore 
them together as opposed to mutually exclusive alternatives. 
Third, in this study I use media coverage to measure NVs’ reputation with large 
and diverse stakeholder groups. Arguably, my measures capture only part of the 
reputation of NVs – the most broadly shared one. Ideally, one would collect data on each 
stakeholder’s opinion about a focal NV to draw more correct conclusions. Also, the 
reputation of any given NV with the few stakeholders with which it has direct 
relationships may differ qualitatively from its reputation with distant anonymous 
stakeholders. Although it has been notoriously difficult to measure stakeholders’ opinions 
about a NV (primarily due to the difficulty to find relevant stakehdoelrs who have any 
opinion about a given NV), it might be useful to explore even small samples of 
stakeholders in greater detail in order to see whether their opinions differ from the 
representation in the media. Such comparison would be particularly useful given that 
contrary to the common belief that media follows it own agenda, some scholars have 
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argued that in fact media correctly represents publicly shared views about organizations 
(Deephouse, 2000). More generally, future research should strive to come up with new 
and improved measures of NV reputation, which may reflect more completely whether 
stakeholders are aware of and what they think about a given NV. 
Fourth, I focused on identifying the predictors of early NV reputation – symbolic 
activities and signaling resources – and on establishing that they matter both 
independently and jointly. My results suggest that different activities have different 
effects and that symbolic activities in particular are critical for increasing the effects of 
some resource signals, such as product advancement and human capital. However, my 
study does not address the issue of what determines the variation among NVs in their use 
of symbolic activities and investment in signaling resources, because these predictors are 
exogenous to my model. Therefore, one productive avenue for future research might be 
to further investigate what factors determine whether and how much a NV would use 
symbolic activities and to what extent it would invest in different resources. Some 
potential predictors to explore could be founders’ prior startup and industry experience, 
market or industry differences, and other factors from the external environment. 
Fifth, my findings suggest that other things being equal a NV’s reputation 
increases its early performance, as measured by the amount of money that VCs invest in 
it. One plausible alternative explanation of these findings might be that sunk cost 
investments (such as new product development, as well as building human capital and 
social relationships for the NV) are higher in industry sectors with increasing returns 
(Sutton, 1991). If VCs are most likely to invest in these same sectors, the relationship 
between reputation and VC finding might reflect simply the coocurrence of resource 
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signals, more media attention, and higher VC investments in the fastest growing industry 
sectors. In my models I did my best in accounting for these factors by including industry 
sector controls. Also, in additional analyses not reported in the main body of this 
dissertation I added controls for the type of product that the NV is going to offer – hard 
product, software, hardware, or new technology, to account for potential differences in 
the sunk cost investments required for each type of product. However, these controls are 
only proxies for the actual differences in the sunk cost investments and the increase in 
returns in each industry sector. Therefore, one recommendation for future research is to 
try to come up with better ways to account more directly for these potential differences. 
My study focuses on if and how NVs manage to build their own reputations very 
early in their lives. However, prior research has demonstrated that many NVs do not 
build their own reputation but instead borrow the reputations of their affiliates. Indeed, in 
the discussion above I pointed to the different financial consequences of developing own 
reputations versus borrowing the reputations of venture capitalists. Further, it is plausible 
that each of these two options has both pros and cons, or different pay-offs from a short-
term versus a long-term perspective. Future research should explore what factors 
determine whether a given NV would choose to build or to borrow reputation early in its 
life and what the consequences of building its own reputation versus borrowing the 
reputation of affiliates for the NV’s long-term performance are. It might be the case that 
building its own reputation initially brings more money to the NV but later on having 
prestigious VC affiliations becomes more important. Also, there might be some trade-offs 
between investing in reputation-building earlier versus later for the long-term survival 
and success of NVs. All these possibilities provide fertile grounds for future research. 
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In order to understand the first attempts at reputation-building that NVs make, I 
focused on the very early stage in the life of NVs – from founding to the first round of 
VC funding – a period during which NVs have no prior financial performance to guide 
stakeholders’ perceptions and opinion formation. Based on the consistent evidence from 
prior research on the reputation of established organizations that financial performance is 
the strongest predictor of reputation (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990; Roberts & Dowling, 
2002), one could expect that the first round of VC funding would influence the 
subsequent reputation of NVs, because it serves as the first formal and comparable across 
NVs evaluation of their financial performance. Moreover, the NV’s performance at this 
important milestone event in their lives may influence how much they will be able to 
invest in various resources later and how efficient their investments will be, which will 
influence further their subsequent reputations. Therefore, it is important for future 
research to explore the reputation-building dynamics after the first round of VC funding 
and to compare them with the dynamics identified in this study. 
Further, my study suggests that the accumulation of reputation as a resource is 
largely dependent on the existence or early acquisition of other, more internal to the firm 
resources, such as human capital and product advancement. However, it is also possible 
that there is a feedback effect and the initial reputation influences the subsequent 
accumulation of human capital and other resources by NVs. For example, prior studies 
have documented that young and small firms with better reputation are more capable of 
attracting highly qualified personnel (Williamson, 2000; Williamson, Cable & Aldrich, 
2002). It is also very likely that NVs with better initial reputation would become more 
successful in attracting customers, partners and VCs. Therefore, the interdependencies 
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between reputation, human capital, and social capital might be quite complex and 
intertwined. Given that these are the most important intangible resources for the firm 
(Hall, 1992; McMillan & Joshi, 1998), it is important to understand their co-evolution 
and co-development both in young and more mature firms. Overall, these ideas suggest 
that future research should explore the co-development of multiple intangible assets 
instead of focusing on one asset at a time and should try to understand how these critical 






Interview Questions for Entrepreneurs 
Preliminary Information 
 Name 
 Age now 
 Highest education at start-up (degree and major – tech/business)  
 Where received degree (university/college name) 
 Work experience before 1st venture – type and highest position held 
 Business or entrepreneurship courses taken before 1st NV – how many & what 
level (UG/MBA)  
 Been a non-founding member of a NV – successful/unsuccessful 
 Membership in associations, clubs, professional organizations 
 
1st NV 
 Exact name  
 Year started 
 How old were then 
 Alone or with partners  
 Partners’ names, age, education, majors, university names, firms they last worked 
for 
Knowledge & experience 
 Similarity of the NV to prior work or start-ups 
 Areas of activities you felt confident/knew well 
 What you found you didn’t know when started 
 What did you do about that (ex, hiring TMT/other, consult experts, acquisitions, 
alliances) 
Social relationships 
 How did you find customers for your products/services 
 Did you rely on some third-party referrals or other relations with people you new 
well 
Reputation 
 Did you do anything special to make others notice your business 
 Have you hired a “star” person (ex, s.b. from IBM or Microsoft) 
 Any public recognition – press releases, media article 
Recapitulation 
 For how long run the NV – years  
 What happened – sold, IPO, still active, closed down 
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 What plans or expectations had when started  
 How was relative to these expectations in 6 ms, 1 yr, 2 yrs 
 Growth rate (# of people at founding, 3 mths, 6 mths, 1 year, 2 year) 
 Revenue/sales – when 1st sale and how much 
 Did they get any VC/angel funding 
 Time to external funding 
 Did they go public 
 Time to IPO 
 Market valuation 
Evaluation 
 How useful was your background for this NV 
 What did you learn from the NV experience 
 If you are to start over, what would you do differently 
 Special role of mistakes during the NV or from previous work and old NVs 
 
Expert opinion 
 What determines the potential of a NV to create valuable products/services 
 If you are to judge a NV, how would you decide if it is promising or not 
 





Variables Extracted from the Interviews with Experienced Entrepreneurs 
 
Variable Indicators 
suggested by the 
informants 
Examples of Why the Informants Consider It Important  
Symbolic 





Make people notice 
the NV by high 
level of activity 
“You have to be very active, you know … if you’re great and nobody knows that, you’re not great” (E4: 27) 





“See we go to very targeted shows.  You know, we generally have a booth, a demonstration booth. So we do some 
creative things there, so people come to our booth, and we share some information.” (E8: 15) 
“I also spent a lot of my time going to trade shows.  So I was at almost every major event that was in the business, I 
would go to that all the time.  And essentially, most of my job was public facing.  ...  And the company as a whole 
generally transformed itself from being in stealth mode to really being outward facing.  And that was critical.” (E6: 6) 






“I went and I gave speeches at every major meeting but the speeches were always about the networks of the future, 
how to build them and how to plan for them and network strategy and I would give twenty, thirty, forty speeches a 
year and I may be talking to maybe 25 people or 125 people or 500 people and they were all these major conventions 
of major meetings, you know, major business meetings, major communications networks, symposiums and so in the 
audience you would see literally hundreds of people internationals as well as domestic, who were interested in 
building these networks representing companies so within a period of 2 or 3 years of doing this and I continuously 
did it, we were known world wide to the point where people would call us.” (E4: 7) 
 Hired VP of public 
relations 
“We hired a head of public relations. Her idea was we’re going to build this large company and get promotions, so 
there would be articles in magazines, again from same context as that pile there ... so again the company became 
very well known very quickly because of the high visibility.” (E4: 17) 
 Published tech 
papers, books, 
industry newsletters 
“It’s small company, no way a company like that can actually really purchase enough promotion and advertising to 





Act as a “real” 
company:  
• hired a 
professional 
PR-agency  
• hired a 
“We use an internal [to the industry] PR firm.  It’s a very technology focused PR firm.  They are some really smart 
people. So they call down industry analysts, press people, Washington Post, Washington Business Journal, a whole 
bunch of people.  So we have a PR firm that’s actively looking out for us, and really helping build momentum for 
the company.” (E8: 15) 
“You build credibility in every possible way that you can.  We built these capability brochures, we built very, very 




sudden in the big time.  We’re hiring professional advertising agencies to help develop these brochures whereas 
before that, I was designing the brochures.” (E4: 7) 
 Efforts to educate 
customers about 





the new technology 
 “And so it was the promotional campaigns that had to do with share your knowledge with them.  I was supposed to 
talk about the field that should give them interest, and give them insight to what’s going on and every sort of six or 
eight months I would develop what I would call a really significant strategic sort of speech that I would give at a 
major conference and by that time I was the keynoter of the major conferences and that significant speech would 
really weigh out where the future was going and where another future in terms of networking and 
telecommunications and computing would be going and I’d be interviewed as I said 5 times a month, 6 times, 7 times 
by the trade newspapers and magazines and there would be profiles of me and there would be profiles of the company 
and so this is the way of building tremendous recognition and that built the business.” (E4: 8) 
“Well, it’s a very successful strategy because what happens is that what you have to be able to do is impart 
knowledge and wisdom about whatever it is that you’re doing and in the imparting of that knowledge and wisdom 
you build a reputation.  You know, if you just say, ‘here’s the products that we offer.  Buy our products’ you lose 
credibility.  You talk about the actual field itself with how products are used and then how services are used and then 
you show what the available services are and you build credibility. … You sell education and by giving away good 
insights for free, cause that’s what you are doing, they come back and they figure there must be more there, alright, 





the NV and its 
activities 
Communicating 
clear vision to 
external parties – 
how the NV creates 
unique value for 
customers  
 
“I think it’s important for a business owner to be able to articulate why it’s better to use their products or services 
over the competition’s … and then also to be able to back that up with support for the customer, and answering 
questions, and just being there.” (E7: 8) 
“You need to set a vision of where you’re going to be and that vision just can’t be painted in words by the senior 
executive.  It has to be embodied in sort of like the literature of and the images of the place and the vision itself of 
where you’re going to be helps people get there.  This is as important for the internal people as for external people.” 
(E4: 27) 
“Let’s see if we can do something new and unique.  And so what was unique for them was that they got to influence 
the design, because they would come to customer meetings, and we’d do joint application developments, JAD 
sessions together.” (E6: 5) 
 Brochures and 
handouts that 
illustrate the NV 
team’s skills and 
capabilities 
 
“What we did was, for example, we built what we called ‘a capabilities brochure’ and we took the resumes of all of 
the individuals who were associated with us and we were academics ok, so we had written many, many papers and 
some of those papers had very interesting titles and so we built a brochure that was by subject matter, Design and 
Computer Communications Network, for example, and we took the papers and we wrote down the names of the 
papers that we’d written on that, so we built this brochure out of capabilities including us as individuals, our 
resumes, a description of the business, challenges, up front big world of networking, then the backword 
applications.“ (E4: 4) 
Investments in 
HC as a path to 
Reputation 
Building a TMT 
early in the life of a 
NV (HC quantity) 
“So when those management teams are assembled early, it alleviates a lot of pressure from the CEO to do what the 
founders should be doing, which is looking to the future, being out as an advocate of their technology, their product 
to the marketplace. Not trying to deal with lots of other issues.” (E5: 15) 
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 Recruit a TMT 
member or other 




“I felt confident in my own consulting abilities, but I didn’t have a blue chip management consulting resume.  You 
know, having worked for Diamond Technology Partners, or Cambridge …  So the two places I hired in, it wasn’t so 
much I felt weak in the consulting, as I knew how I needed the right reputation.” (E5: 7-8) 
“I think it gave some credibility, but the reality was what was valuable was that in his role at Microsoft, he had 
established a bunch of industry contacts in the retail and supply chain industry, which was where this product was 
tending to focus in small business.  And so he was able to reach out to people at Dell and Paychecks, and so forth, 
and say hey we’ve got this new product coming.   Don’t you remember me from Microsoft?  We’d like to pitch the 
product to you.  And they would take those phone calls.” (E6: 9) 
“From a learning standpoint, Microsoft is a great place, you know, when you get out of school to go into learn what 
it takes to go create a new software product company.  It’s a great place to go learn.  So all of our development 
processes, all of our product methodology, product marketing, methodology, how we collect market needs, and 
definition.  How we organize ourselves, titles, levels, everything is Microsoftish, Microsoft like.  Everything is 
adapted, you know, anywhere from HR review forms to how we build a desk code, it’s all, it’s all very Microsoft 
like.” (E8: 11) 
 Recruit an expert 
with degree from a 
top university (HC 
quality) 
“our chief marketing officer has got a Harvard MBA” (E8: 13) 
 
 Recruit a TMT 
member or other 
expert with proven 
track record (HC 
quality) 
“You know that A+ players always hire A+ players, right, or usually even better than them.  So if you look at my 
management team, my VP of products has been a product manager guy for twenty-two years, our chief marketing 
officer has been a CEO for about fifteen years.  He moved from Silicon Valley here. …  He shut down a company.  
He spun off a company.  He’s done multiple things.  Same thing with the VP of sales.  You know, each one of the 
key management team members have tasted success.  And if you haven’t tasted success, you don’t know what it is.  
Then you don’t know what it takes to get there.” (E8: 13) 
“I would generally argue that the quality of the people and the management team is almost more important than the 
product.  Because I’m convinced that you can hire a management team to deliver any kind of product.  The product 
idea flow is relatively easy and systematized system, or process.  And the management capability is really what 
brings these things home.” (E6: 10) 
 Recruit a TMT 
member with prior 
start-up experience 
(HC quality) 
“I think a lot of what one learns in the field running a company is very difficult to teach ...  I think that internships 
and apprenticeships are very good models for this type of experience simply because the number of variables are so 
great and the number of different situations that evolve over time so unpredictable that it’s very difficult to lay it 
down as if it were a set of principles.” (E9: 8) 
 Recruiting TMT to 
fill-in missing skills 
(HC diversity) 
 
“… the management team becomes so important, because even if I could do ten start-ups in a row, I’m not going to 
learn everything about running a start-up” (E5: 17) 
“Good engineers, you know, bright ideas, but no clue whatsoever when it’s coming to what do you need to do, to 
take a new product and market it successfully, and fund successfully, the creation of an operation line, and all that 






(SC) as a path 
to Reputation 
Investment in 






“… we were so far behind in terms of branding, that it was useless to try to brand in this region.  So instead we went 
on the path of having a better network.” (E5: 10) 
“It’s small company, no way a company like that can actually really purchase enough promotion and advertising to 
become famous.” (E4: 7) 
“It’s all about brand, and it’s all about a compelling network of both connections, and in the absence of connections, 
a powerful branding.  So in the case of [a NV], for example, the brand is non-existent, but the connections we 
developed are very, very strong.” (E6: 10) 
“All the advertisements and things like that, they are only good for brand building for Microsoft and IBM.  It doesn’t 
work for companies like us, small companies, because it’s meaningless.  So we have a very shotgun, rifle approach 
where we figure how we do market segmentation, you know, to figure out exactly which company, you know, where, 
what level, and target those companies.  And we’ll talk to them, you know, by cold calling them, or sending them 
email.  Find out who knows them, personal relationships, that social capital.  You figure how to use your social 
network to go out and capture your first three customers.” (E8: 14) 
  “That’s a big distinction—relationships in large companies are important, but there are often redundancies. Start-ups 
don’t have a lot of redundancies. So if you blow a relationship, you’ve blown it for your firm, right. If you go into a 
situation, and you just totally mishandle it, you don’t have back up to go in through another door and sort of smooth 
things over and fix the problem. Where larger firms in many cases have that sort of slack or that buffer to do that.” 
(E5: 17) 
 Building a 
customer network 
 
“My whole management team spent a lot of time networking, spent a lot of time out, going to conferences, meeting 
people, really developing a personal connection to different people.  And that helped develop the reputation more 
than any branding or marketing ever did.” (E5: 10) 
“The relationship with the customer is what keeps the venture going, because all the greatest ideas in the world just 
die on the vine if somebody didn’t buy them.” (E7: 14) 
“You don’t need to have the fancy new gadget in order to start a business.  You can sell the same widget everybody 
else is selling, but just do a better job interacting with the customer to get them to buy it from you.” (E7: 14) 
“This business is all about relationships.  It’s beyond the price, beyond everything.  You know, because next time 
someone will come and try to bid, and if their bid is going to be close to us, the only reason the customer will stay 
with us is the relationship.” (E1: 7) 
“When we started focusing more on printing, we still got referrals from existing clients who had started with 
design.” (E1: 6) 
 Secure a few 
prominent 
customers and use 
them for credential 
purposes 
 
“We wrote a business plan that talked about the future of networking and we had this project that we did in the 
government that showed that we were able to work with a great deal of money and we convinced them that we 
could make a big company out it.” (E4: 3) 
“It is not important, you know, how many of them [customers] sign up.  What’s important is what is the number of 
customers that you can use to go out and get ten more. Right?  Because what you are trying to do is to build an 
influence channel.” (E8: 9) 
“So you leverage your wins to say … We would let the prospective customers know about the first thing that we did 
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with Compaq, because we knew that the first time they went to Merrill Lynch, Merrill Lynch would ask Microsoft, 
and Compaq would typically be on the customer call with us, or we would hook them up there on.  …  So what we 
did was, we basically used that as a teaser.” (E8: 7) 




“Relationship is really what matters, because you know that a partner is going to help create a business.  So you got 
to make commitment to them first to make them successful. So once they’re convinced that for every dollar that you 
make, they can make twelve dollars and you show to them how they can make twelve dollars, they will help you go 
get the customers.  They will help you go out, get more revenue.” (E8: 19) 






“the notion was that because Microsoft was entering the high-end enterprise networking market that they were 
going to go after the Novell and the Banyan customers.  Because that was, that was the hunting ground for them. 
And the Microsoft was going to be the driver of our business. … And there’s usually an eco system for large 
software companies that exist with or without their knowing.  They’re large number of companies that are offshoots 
of Oracle or SAP, a very large technology company.  Doesn’t matter which one it is.  So we picked Microsoft.  We 
knew that as they come up with products, enterprise space, there was going to be a tremendous opportunity to help 
ride that wave, you know.  And that’s what we did.” (E8: 2) 
 Relationships with 
VCs 
“And the real learning was that the VC’s are significantly more than just cash.  They are a network of relationships 
that allow you to succeed in the marketplace, much more than just the money that they provide.  And sure, it would 
have been great to have a hundred million dollars in cash in the bank from which to run the business, but the real 
issue was because we didn’t have those relationships, we couldn’t move forward.” (E6: 12) 
“I think I had become a lot more business savvy, because now I had venture capitalists on the board advising me, I 
had had a guy who had been on Commodore’s board that had come from the Yankee group to Commodore and then 
he ultimately left Commodore but stayed on our board who was really a terrific asset on the strategic advice side” 
(E3: 12) 
 Relationships with 
prominent VCs 
“I think you can’t underestimate the power of the VC relationship in making these deals work.  I would say greater 
than 50% of the success of a small entrepreneurial company is the quality of the people that are doing the work, and 
the quality of their network of potential investors and influencers. … It’s one of these things, the more VC’s you 
know, and the more high quality VC’s you know, the better ability it is for you to navigate the business.” (E6: 9) 
“So it’s key to me that the board be high quality brand.  It’s got to be brand- name VC.” (E6: 13) 
“I think having [prominent VC1]’s input on the business and his sort of cache’ would have helped us back when we 
were trying to forge those strategic relationships in the PC industry. … So if I look at it and say would I have agreed 
to whatever the little mingling terms were that the lawyer and [VC1] had pissed me off, today I would probably 
have said you know this isn’t right but in the long run I’m going to get more strategic value out of having [VC2] 
and [VC1] be on my board as opposed to [VC2] and the guy I had on the board from Bay Partners, who wasn’t a 
bad guy but he just didn’t have the marquee name.” (E3: 14-15) 
 NO evidence that 
the more VCs the 
better 
“I realized that while I had raised this significant amount of money to start the companies, I had the wrong financial 
structure.  I had nine venture capital companies that could never agree on anything.” (E4: 18) 
Technology Quality of the NV’s “But they [PR agents] can only be effective if you give them real bullets to shoot with.  You know?  So you can’t 
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Development potential products/ 
services/ 
technology 
give them blank bullets.  You have to have some meat.  You have to have some real contacts.  So you have to go to 
them with specific customer stories.” (E8: 15) 
“The thing is, public relations is good to get a quick start.  It’s essential to deliver an impression of what you have but 
it can’t requite. The best quality of public relations with a lousy quality product is like the advertising that goes on for 
a movie before the movie comes out.  But when the movie comes out, all of a sudden people know if it’s any good or 
not.  You can get people into the movie the first weekend based on public relations but you can’t get them to come 
back and you can’t get the next weekend so you have to have the quality.  If you don’t have the quality, then the 
public relations is sort of a sham and people figure it out.  People aren’t dumb.” (E4: 33) 
“So when investors do decisions of putting money into companies, because you don’t have products, they talk to 
customers and really, and they’re pretty good at it.  They dig down to what is the value proposition that [the NV] 
brings to the table that if technology were used to solve the problem, how much time it would save, how much money 
it would save, how much effort it would save.  They put hard quantifying.” (E8: 17) 
 Have a pipeline (2nd 
product/ upgrade of 
technology)   
 “The question is, can you actually have a second product to follow along with the first even before you do the first 
because if you don’t have a second product, you are not going to stay. Most one product businesses don’t become 
very interesting.” (E4: 13) 
 Mergers with 
existing firms 
“… we had technical expertise by putting together the two kinds of companies that we did, we created a set of 
expertise that was very different and very special.  That was the whole strategy behind our building the companies 
that we created a set of expertise that it was difficult for even the very large multi-division companies to compete 
with and we able to do it on technical proficiency and we were actually able to deliver.” (E4: 7) 
“There was very little overlap between the six companies. … I mean really, it’s a merger.  In a way, it was a merger 
of equals.  And for the purposes of for a market, you know, to satisfy market need.” (E7: 10) 
  Acquisition of 
technology 
“So I got the idea, why don’t we assemble the pieces of a much bigger company by buying little pieces and putting 
them together and create a whole new capability that way and that was the beginning of the idea. Ultimately in an 
18-month period I bought 6 companies.” (E4: 15) 
Reputation • Media coverage 
in the general 
business press  




• Covered in TV 
news or other 
reports 
“We got write-ups and a lot of business press, and train rides, and things like that.” (E8: 10) 
“the company became very well known very quickly because of the high media visibility” (E4: 17) 
 
 • Industry/ market 
awards for 
innovation, 
“So we and Oracle actually shared a marketing award for creating a brand new category called Enterprise Directory 






sold the NV to a 
big firm 
• Market valuation 
when sold the 
NV 
• Number of 
employees 
“We almost doubled again.  So we went up to about 430 odd people.  A pretty explosive growth.”  (E6: 6) 
“The total investment in [the NV] was about 4 Million dollars, both angel and institutional and the price of the 
company when it was sold was about 22 Million and that acquisition took place in less than a year following the 








Definitions of Reputation Type of Perceptions  Example Studies 
Management Economics/ Game-theory perspective 
 An attribute or a set of attributes 
ascribed to a firm, inferred from 
the firm’s past actions 
Assessments of a relevant 
attribute(s) 
Weigelt & Camerer 
(1988); Hayward & 
Boeker (1998); Stuart 
(2000) 
 An observer’s impression of the 
actor’s disposition to behave in a 
certain manner 
Assessments of a relevant 
attribute(s) 
Clark & Montgomery 
(1998) 
 Sociological/ Institutional perspective 
 Publics’ cumulative judgments 
of firms over time; global 
perception 
 
Accumulation of knowledge 
and esteem in the collective, 
a global perception 
Fombrun & Shanley 
(1990); Roberts & 
Dowling (2002) 
 Stakeholders’ knowledge and 
emotional reactions – affect, 
esteem – towards the firm 
Accumulation of knowledge 
and esteem in the collective, 




 Marketing perspective 
 The level of awareness that the 
firm has been able to develop for 
itself and for its brands; fame 
Accumulation of knowledge 
and esteem in the collective, 
a global perception 
Hall (1992); Shamsie 
(2003) 
 
Economics Consumers’ expectations and 
beliefs about a firm’s products 
quality 
Assessments of a relevant 
attribute(s) 
Shapiro (1982, 1983); 
Allen (1984) 
 A rival’s perceptions about the 
likelihood of an incumbent to 
behave in certain way 
Assessments of a relevant 
attribute(s) 
Kreps & Wilson 
(1982); Milgrom & 
Roberts (1982) 
Sociology A prevailing collective 
agreement about an actors’ 
attributes or achievement based 
on what the relevant public 
“knows” about the actor.  
Accumulation of knowledge 
and esteem in the collective, 
a global perception 
Lang & Lang (1988); 
Camic (1992) 
 
 A characteristic or an attribute 
ascribed to an actor, based on his 
past actions 
Assessments of a relevant 
attribute(s) 
Raub & Weesie 
(1990); Kollock 
(1994) 
Marketing The estimation of the 
consistency over time of an 
attribute of an entity 
Assessments of a relevant 
attribute(s) 
Herbig & Milewicz 
(1995);  
 Perceptions and beliefs about the 
firm based on previous 
interactions 
Assessments of a relevant 
attribute(s) 
Campbell (1999); 
Prabhu & Stewart 
(2001) 
 Consumers’ impression of the 
company that is producing and 
selling a given product or brand 
Accumulation of knowledge 
and esteem in the collective, 
a global perception 
Goldberg & Hartwick 
(1990) 
 Public esteem or high regard 
judged by others 
Accumulation of knowledge 
and esteem in the collective, 
a global perception 
Weiss et al. (1999) 
 
 
Note: This table was adapted from Rindova, Williamson, Petkova and Sever (2005).  
 
Appendix 2.B 
Major Studies on the Role of Human Capital for New Ventures 
 





RQ: investigate analytically what factors determine the 
decision of Es to develop their NV independently or w/ VCs 
*Principal-agent framework of the relationship b/n Es and 
VCs: E’s ability as predictor of involving VC-cap 
*E’s ability = talent, skills, experience, ingenuity, 
leadership, etc. to combine tangible and intangible assets in 
new ways and to deploy them to meet customer needs in 
manner that could not be easily imitated 
Formal econometric modeling to solve for 
maximum conditions 
*If Es skill levels are common Kn, 
all will choose to involve VCs for 
risk-sharing purposes;  
*Less able Es choose > VCs than 
more able ones;  
*Some Es invest in costly signals to 
convey ability (not necessarily the 
most able ones) 
Bates (1995 
– JBV) 
RQ: the role of education and work experience in identifying 
self-employment entry 
*Role of education and work experience differs across 
industries (skill-intensive, construction or large-scale) 
*NV creation (0/1) 
*Education – dummies for high-school, 
etc. 
*Experience – # of years of work 
experience 
*Higher education  (+) skilled-
service NVs, but (-) construction 
*Experience  (+) skilled-service 
NVs, but N.S. for construction  
Bird (1993 – 
book 
chapter) 
RQ: What factors predict propensity to start a NV? 
*Summary of prior work on the role of entrepreneurial 
background and behaviors  
*demographic approaches – life experience channels and 
shapes behavior: hard to change char-s (motivation and 
personality) and changeable qualities (abilities, 
competences, relationships) together influence entr-l 
behavioral potential to start, persist and succeed 
*education and work experience (industrial, managerial, 
entrepreneurial) are the major experience var-s studied 
*Entrepreneurial experience = direct 
(founders) or vicarious (employees or in 
other way observed/ involved in the start-
up process) 
*also people have looked at effects of 
age, gender, race, ethnicity, and religious 
background  
*across various studies and countries, 
27-40% of Ers have previous start-up 
experience (having started once  
increases potential for new start-up) 
*in certain industries having tech 
degree (engineering, medicine, 





RQ: The role of founder Er’s experience and environmental 
conditions at time of founding on initial NV strategy 
“Because organizations are primarily begun by individuals, 
these individuals (the founders) play a central role in guiding 
the organization’s creation process.” (p. 37) 
*expect that founder’s characteristics and incubator firm 
worked for will shape NV strategy (close to familiar 
organizational strategy) 
*environmental effects also will impact likelihood of initial 
Semiconductor industry – 62 firms, 
responses by Mngrs 
DV: NV strategy = 1st mover, 2nd mover, 
low-cost, niche  
IVs: Es’ functional background = R&D, 
manufacturing, mktg/sales; Er’s incubator 
firm; formal education, age; 
environmental characteristics by time 
periods – military market, symbolic 
*Es’ functional background  (+) 
NV strategy (R&D 1st mover, 
manuf  low-cost, mktg/sales  
niche) 
*Small effect of incubator-firm 
strategy on the NV strategy 
*Highest education  1st mover 
*Es’ age  (-) 1st mover 
*environment  predictive of 1st 
 
strategy competition, expansion of the consumer 
market, advent of the consumer market 
mover, low-cost & niche 





RQ: the extent to which org strategies exhibit patterns of 
stability or change – what specific conditions influence 
change in strategy 
*Brings together a strategic choice and inertia perspectives 
*characteristics of organization’s founding imprint its initial 
strategy by contributing to a consensus around a given 
strategic approach 
*conditions subsequent to founding influence the degree to 
which initial strategy is preserved 
*younger firms are more likely to have retained their initial 
strategy and thus to exhibit less change in organizational 
strategy than older organizations which have had more time 
to deviate from original strategy  
Semiconductor industry, 51 firms in 1984 
Interviews, market research firms in the 
Silicon Valley, articles in the electronic 
and business press 
DV: change in strategy 
IVs: Conditions at founding: dominant 
initial strategy, distribution of influence, 
management ownership at founding; 
Conditions subsequent to founding: org 
performance, environmental variation and 
org age, Er’s tenure with the firm 
*Org age  (+) change 
*Dominant founding strategy  (-) 
change 
*no effect of functional background 
on strategy change 




RQ: Why are new firms founded under different conceptual 
models? What are the factors that lead a founding team to 
espouse a particular employment model? 
*differences in founders’ educational and employment 
experiences produce diversity in their understanding of what 
the normative employment models are 
*five major employment models (star, engineering, 
commitment, bureaucracy, autocracy) emerged based on 
three recruiting dimensions (nature of the employees’ 
attachment to the firm, basis for selecting new employees, & 
mode of coordination) 
*strategies – tech-driven (innovator or enhancer) and org-
development (marketer or low-cost producer) 
*173 Silicon high-tech firms (SPEC 
project) 
*open-ended interview and secondary 
sources 
DV: likelihood of the NV to deviate from 
the dominant industry model 
IVs: prior founding experience and/or 
senior mngt experience = # of founders 
holding a title of VP or higher prior to 
founding the focal firm; nontechnical 
background = # of founders w/ sales, 
mktg, finance, or administration 
experience; team size = # of founders 
*senior mngt experience  (+) 
deviation from dominant ind. Model 
*nontechnical experience  (+) 
deviation from dominant ind. Model 
*team size  (-) deviation from 
dominant ind. Model 






RQ: where do innovative NVs come from? 
*Entr. Prominence – visibility of established firms in the 
entr. community 
* Information advantages allow individuals from 
entrepreneurially prominent firms to identify new 
opportunities 
* Reputational benefits accrue to employees of prominent 
firms: Entr. prominence reduces perceived uncertainty of the 
*A stratified random sample of Silicon 
Valley NVs <10 years and w/ >10 
employees 
*Pursue innovation strategy – semi-
structured interviews to see how founders 
describe core competence of the firm at 
founding (dummy-coded as 0/1) 
*Financing at time of founding – any 
*Entr. Prominence  (+) innovation 
strategy and likelihood of external 
financing at start-up 
*Graduate degree  (+)innovation 
strategy 
*Experience in sales or finance  (-) 
innovation strategy 
*Senior mngt experience  (+) 
 
NV 
* Entr-s’ work history (being employed at entr-prominent 
firm) is a social capital that carry to the NV and helps Er 
attract more resources and increase their innovativeness 
* “There are three ways in which a brand NV can have 
higher perceived quality: (1) its founders have high level of 
human capital; (2) it has a product which can be 
independently evaluated; and (3) it has ties to prominent 
firms that serve as endorsements” [p. 239] 
money from any third party (incl. VC, 
angel, family, banks, corp. investments, 
government) 
*Founders’ careers – for each team 
member # of prior jobs and employer 
name; # of founders w/ prior entr 
experience; # of founders w/ prior senior 
mngt experience 
*Prominence of past employment – the 
extent to which a firm has been a source 
of NVs (how many founders in the 
sample come from the same firm) – see p. 
245 list 
probability of external financing at 
start-up 
*N.S. effect of prior entrepr. 
Experience on innovation strategy 
and likelihood of financing at start-
up 
Chandler 
(1996 – ETP) 
RQ: focus on the degree of similarity b/n pre-ownership 
experience and the work requirements of the present NV as a 
moderator of the relationship b/n pre-ownership experience 
of founders and the NV performance 
*Two dimensions of business similarity – task environment 
(similarity in customers, suppliers, and competitors) and 
skill/ability (specific managerial and technical skills) 
*Managerial experience – competence in organizing, 
planning, coordinating, and motivating people 
*Technical competence – R&D, production 
*Conclusions [based on results contrary to prediction] it 
may not be necessary to have experience in a highly similar 
business to gain familiarity with the task environment  
*Performance – self-reported business 
growth (market share and sales growth) 
and volume (earnings and sales) [p. 58] 
*Task environment similarity – 5-point 
scale to what extent previous job is 
similar to NV in customers, suppliers, 
competitors, product/service, and 
technology 
*Skill/ability similarity – 5-point scale on 
task performed, skill/abilities used, 
managerial duties, technical/functional 
duties 
*Past experience – # of years spent as 
general manager, managing their own 
business, in technical/specialist positions: 
breadth= how many of this, depth=years 
in each 
*Similarity b/n task environment of 
the NV and task envir. Faced in 
previous job  (+) NV growth, N.S. 
effect on volume 
*Skill/ability similarity  (-) on 
volume [contrary to prediction], N.S. 
effect on growth 
*N.S. interaction b/n task envir 
similarity and experience 
* Skill/ability similarity  (-) 
moderation of experience on all perf. 




RQ: present a parsimonious model of NV performance that 
incorporates individual founder, firm, and environmental 
characteristics 
*Individual founder, firm, and environmental characteristics 
jointly influence NV performance 
*Er plays a very central role in the NV’s goal, strategy, 
vision, and culture 
*Self-reported data on everything, scales 
for each variable [p. 81-84] 
*Perf measured both in growth and 
volume [same as Chandler, 1996] 
*Entr competence – moderates 
quality of opportunity  NV perf 
*Mngrl competence – moderates 
resources and capabilities  perf 
*Entr comp and Mngrl comp – no 
direct effect on perf. 
 
*Two roles of Er: (1) entrepreneurial role – scan the envir 
for opportunities; (2) managerial role – interact w/ the envir 




RQ: the relationship b/n founder characteristics and NV 
performance 
*Three role of Es: entrepreneurial, managerial, and 
technical-functional. Entr. role – the ability to take 
advantage of an opportunity; Mngrl role – competence to 
coordinate all org activities, human competence to motivate 
people, political competence to build power, establish the 
right connections, enhance own position; Tech role – ability 
to use tools, techniques and procedures of a specialized field 
*prior business similarity to NV – 
customers, suppliers, competitors, 
products, technology 
*task similarity – knowledge, skills, 
abilities, managerial duties, tech-
functional duties, task 
*21 items for competencies  
*performance = profitability (sales, 
earnings) and growth 
*# prior start-up and years as owner 
mngr – NS related to performance 
*High on all roles  best perform 
*years of education – NS but type of 
education (buss & mngt)  perf 
Cooper et al. 
(1994 – JBV) 
RQ: seek to predict NV performance based on factors that 
can be observed at the time of start-up (HC & FC) 
*Three possible outcomes – failure, marginal survival, 
growth 
*initial HC (general HC, mngrl know-how and industry-
specific KH) and financial capital  outcome 
*NV involves extensive experimentation and learning 
*longitudinal, 1053 NVs 
general HC = education, gender, race 
mngrl KH = parents owned buss, non-
profit org, level of mngrl experience, use 
of professional advisor, partners 
*Ind KH = business similarity 
*Industry-specific know-how  (+) 
survival and growth 
*general HC (education)  (+) 
survival and growth 
*mngrl know-how – NS effect 




RQ: Do individuals who attempt to start busineses begin w/ 
different levels of HC & SC? Do these endowments affect 
their rate of success? 
*HC – not defined but ~ previously accumulated Kn and 
experience 
*SC – defined as social exchange of resources or 
information  
*Both formal and informal HC-activities lead to Kn 
promotion: Formal HC = education; informal HC= labor 
market experience, mngt experience, and previous tart-up 
experience 
*start a NV (0/1) 
*exploitation – frequency of gestation 
activities  
*success – succeed w/ a first sale, 
profitability 
*Bonding social capital (=strong ties) – 
parents or friends who own a business  
*Bridging SC (=weak ties) – being a 
member of association or organization 
 
*Formal education and previous 
start-up experience  (+) likelihood 
to start NV 
*Formal education  N.S. effect on 
NV success and exploitation 
*Start-up experience  (+) 
exploitation but N.S. on success 
*STs  (+) likelihood to start NV 





RQ: How does NV growth relate to founding conditions – 
TMT, tech strategy, competitive environment? 
*Examine direct and interaction effects of founding 
conditions on organizational growth 
*interviews w/ TMTs, secondary data 
*98 semiconductor firms founded 1978-
1985 – annually through death/ 1988 
DV: firm growth (sales) 
IVs: founding team – size, prior joint 
exper, heterogeneity of industry exper; 
tech innovation; founding environment – 
*TMT size, joint exper, 
heterogeneity of industry exper  
(+) growth 
*tech innov  N.S. effect on growth 
*no relationship b/n TMT 
characteristics and founding 
environment 
 
market stage (new, growth, mature), 
competitive concentration (4-firm ratio) 
*effects of environment and TMT 
grew over time 
Gimeno et al. 
(1997 – 
ASQ) 
RQ: what are the determinants of NV performance and 
survival? Why some underperforming firms persist? 
*“HC  theory (Becker, 1975) uses econ logic to study 
individual decisions dealing w/ investments in productivity-
enhancing skills and Kn (schooling, training, firm-specific 
Kn investments), career choices (decision to work, switching 
employment, labor mobility), and other work characteristics 
(wages, reservation wages, hours of work)” [p. 754] 
*General HC leads to skills useful across a wide range of 
occupational alternatives 
*Specific HC results from education, training, and 
experience w/ a limited scope of applicability; related to 
degree of similarity b/n NV and prior work [p. 757] 
*Similarity b/n NV and prior experience also allow Ers to 
rely on previously established relationships 
*NV survival is not strictly a function of econ perf. But 
depends on a firm’s own threshold of perf. 
*Threshold of a NV differs across Ers – it depends on EHC 
characteristics: alternative employment opportunities, 
psychic income from entr-ship, and cost of switching to 
other occupation 
*Survey mailed to 13,000 NFIB members 
in business for less than 18 mths; 3 waves 
*General HC – formal education (% of 
people in the sample with lower level of 
education), achievement level (supervised 
managers – 0/1, supervised others – 0/1, 
managed own business – 0/1, all vs. 
supervised no one) and prior work 
experience (# of prior jobs) 
*Specific HC – knowledge of customers, 
suppliers, products, an services w/in the 
context of the NV (5-point Likert scale) 
*Parents owned a business – 0/1 dummy 
*Intrinsic motivation – goal in starting 
NV: 1=avoid working for other, -1=make 
more money than otherwise, 0=other 
reasons 
*Status of NV in 2nd and 3rd year – 
surviving, sold, discontinued: 0/1 exit 
dummy 
Performance – money taken out 
 
*Education, mngt experience, and 
supervisory experience  (+) econ 
perf of the NV 
*Only mngt exper  (+) threshold 
*Education and supervisory exper  
(-) exit 
*Similar business  (+) econ perfor, 
(-) exit 
*Entr experience – marginally sig. on 
econ perf, N.S. on exit, (+) threshold 
of NV perf 
Honig (1998 
– JBV) 
RQ: study the influence of HC, SC, and FC of the owners on 
their business profitability 
*SC – individual affiliation within the community  
*SC moderates the return to HC  
*SC provides access to financial capital 
 
 
*HC = education (five dummies for 
primary, secondary, high school, 
vocational, and post-secondary 
education); years of experience in the 
business – separate from HC (???) 
*SC = frequent church attendance, 
marital status of the owner 
*HC (vocational training, mother’s 
high occupational status, experience) 
 (+) econ. Performance 
*Business loan – N.S. effect on 
technological tier NVs 
*SC  (+) performance 
Honig (2001 
– ETP) 
RQ: differences in learning strategies b/n entrepreneurs and 
intrapreneurs 
*HC refers to wage and compensation in return to individual 
variation in skills, training, and expertise (Schultz, 1959; 
Becker, 1964; Mincer, 1974) 
*Social networks provided by extended family, community-
HC=years education, years of full-time 
paid work experience, ever taken business 
class (0/1), and ever started a NV before 
(0/1) 
SC=contact w/ agency 
*HC (years education, years work 
experience, ever took business class, 
and previous start-up) – N.S. on 
likelihood of being Er (vs. Intrapr.) 
*SC  (+) probability of being Er 
 
based, or organizational relationships enhance the effect of 




RQ: the effect of previous experience on the management of 
a NV 
*Occupational background of technological Ers affect the 
skills they bring to the NV  
*Technological background of Ers is more important for 
technology-based NVs 
*Four types of technical Ers: (1) research TEs – academic 
Kn-oriented background; (2) producer TEs – IO 
background, involved w/ production & development of 
technology; (3) user TEs – OI background, peripheral tech 
experience in tech sales or support, or user of tech; (4) 
opportunist TEs – no IO background 
*Exploratory case-study – interviewed 38 
TEs  
*Structured interviews, coding and text-
reduction techniques 
*Grouped in the four types and compared 
in terms of technological and managerial 
experience 
*Most of the TEs – high to moderate 
tech experience, many w/ managerial 
experience in R&D but few in 
functional areas (finance, marketing, 
manufacturing, sales) 
*Ers from academic research settings 
have very strong technical skills but 
low level of managerial competence 
*Producer TEs – high tech skill and 
high managerial competences 
*User TEs – relevant mngt skills but 
predominantly user-level tech skills 
*opportunist TEs – strong prevalence 
of any skills, random examples of 
high on tech or mngt skills 
McGee et al. 
(1995 – 
SMJ) 
RQ: should inexperienced managers cooperate simply to 
gain new knowledge and experience, or should they not 
cooperate unless they are experienced enough to know what 
they don’t know? 
*Examine the relationship b/n the experience of a NV’s 
TMT, its choice of competitive strategy, and its use of 
cooperative arrangements 
*Experienced TMTs can benefit more from cooperative 
arrangements, especially when their areas of expertise 
overlap w/ competitive strategy of the NV: 
mktg different – mktg exper, tech differ – R&D exper, low-
cost – manuf exper. 
*IPO statements of high-tech NVs 
*Perf = average sales growth over 3 years 
*functional experience of TMT members 
in mktg, R&D, and manuf = adjusted sum 
of years of experience in each area 
*average experience = divided the 
adjusted mean to the # of TMT members 
*cooperative arrangements – all SAs & 
JVs  
*comp strategy – coded from SEC 
statement 
*coop mktg  (+) perf 
*coop mktg * mktg exper  (+) perf 
*coop R&D  (-) perf 
*coop R&D * R&D exper  (+) per 
*coop manuf  (+) perf 
*coop manuf * manuf exper  (+) 
perf 
Mosakowski 
(1998 – OS) 
RQ: which entrepreneurial resources might generate novel 
competitive outcomes? 
*Entr resources – the propensity of an individual to behave 
creatively, act with foresight, use intuition, and be alert to 
new opportunities: (1) creativity – an individual’s propensity 
to engage in generating novel variations on existing themes; 
(2) foresight – tendency to spend significant amount of time 
engaged in thought or care for the future; (3) intuition – 
Propositions – focus on ER. And entr. 
outcomes (nothing specific or testable) 
 
 
tendency to solve problems without explicit reasoning or 
analysis; (4) alertness – tendency to spend significant 
amount of time engaging the environment with a search for 
profitable opportunities 
*ER are based on past perf & determine future perf 
*Entr. res-s can be held by one individual or distributed 
across a team of Ers 
Pennings et 
al. (1998 – 
AMJ) 
RQ: effect of human capital and social capital on firm 
dissolution 
“HC of a firm is defined as the knowledge and skills of its 
professionals that can be used to produce professional 
services” (p. 426) 
SC is “the aggregate of firm members’ connectedness with 
potential clients” (p. 427) 
“SC plays a more important role in economic transaction 
when information with respect to qualities of professionals 
is imperfect, as is the case in professional service industries 
(Burt, 1992; Pennings & Lee, 1998)” (p. 427) 
All Dutch accounting firms, 1880-1990; 
DV – firm dissolution; 
HC: firm-specific HC =firm tenure; 
industry-specific HC=professional degree 
(Masters, Ph.D.) & industry experience in 
Ln(years) [assume diminishing effect of 
time] 
SC=previously employed in client firm, 
departed to work for client firm – see p. 
430-431 for calculation of heterogeneity 
variables 
*Professional education  (-) 
dissolute 
*Ind. Exper & Firm exper  U-
shape relationship to dissolution 
*SC  (-) dissolution 
*Firm-specific HC & SC > effect 
than industry-specific HC 
*Partners (owners’) HC & SC > 
effect than associates (employees) 
Porter (2004 
dissertation) 
RQ: transfer of individual level characteristics to the firm 
level; the power of 1st impressions; the role of regional 
culture in shaping the growth of an industry at the level of 
who becomes involved 
*considers the interaction b/n three main facets of founders’ 
background: HC, SC, and status 
*argues that one characteristic is valued most (in the case of 
biotech – status) and if the NV is high on it, it doesn’t matter 
whether it has other desirable char-s; *for middle status NVs 
the presence of other char-s matters most (middle-level 
conformity theory) 
*Founders’ individual status transfers to the NV 
*125 biotech firms in SanFrancisco & 
Boston areas – from Bioscan database 
*founders’ career histories from company 
web-sites, SEC filings, & press-releases 
DVs: 1st investment (0/1 received; age at 
time of inv, value of initial inv, value of 
inv for 2 years after founding), IPO (0/1; 
age at time of IPO, size of IPO), and exit 
(0/1; age at time of exit, 
acquisition/Bankruptcy) 
IVs: status – three categories based on 
founders research affiliation and degree; 
desirable team char-s (0-6) – larger than 
median founding team, multiple 
functional backgrounds, two or more 
members have worked together, at least 
one member w/ prior founding, industry, 
mngt experience; SC = diversity of prior 
affiliation (Blau index) 
*founding team status  (+) value of 
1st inv, IPO, (-) exit 
founding team demographics - 
middle status  (+) IPO 
*status  (-) dependence on past 
relationships for obtaining resources 
(earlier and larger 1st investment) 
*status & founding team 
demographics  (+) acquisition 
(contrary to predictions) [expl: others 
have to be aware of the firm to 
acquire it – low status firms are not a 





RQ: the impact of agency risk and task uncertainty on VC-
CEO interactions 
*the major argument is that VCs interact more with the NV 
CEO when the uncertainty regarding the NV is greater and 
look at CEO experience, degree of tech. Innovation, NV 
stage of development, and goal congruence as uncertainty-
reduction factors. 
51 VC-CEO dyads (contacted 32 VCs) 
DV: VC-CEO interaction – 1-7 scale 
IVs: mngt ownership = sum of % owned 
by all mngrs; goal congruence = 
instrument asking CEOs and VCs about 
their objectives; CEO’s NV experience = 
no, worked at a NV, founded a NV; 
financing stage of the NV = seed, start-
up, first-stage, restart-up, expansion, 
bridge-acquisition (from Pratt’s Guide to 
Venture Capital Sources) 
*CEO NV experience  (-) VC-
CEO interaction 
*NV’s stage of development  (-) 
VC-CEO interaction 
*Degree of innovation  (+) VC-
CEO interaction 




(1996 – book 
chapter) 
RQ: What determines the formation rate of SAs in new 
firms? How do environmental, organizational, and 
institutional conditions play a role? 
 
*Interviews w/ TMTs of 98 
semiconductor firms founded 1978-85 
DV: formation of SA-manufacturing 
IVs: TMT-char-s – founders’ networks, # 
of past industry employers, previous 
highest position; envir – competition, 
market stage, envir variability; tech 
innovation; org attrib-s 
*tech innov  (+) SA formation 






RQ: What factors influence the time to shipping 1st product 
by a NV? 
*time to market the 1st product is important to gain early 
cash-flow, external visibility and legitimacy, early market 
share, and increase likelihood of survival 
*greater experience in parent industry (esp. research 
intensive) provide founders w/ tacit Kn of the innovation 
process 
*prior start-up exper – provides skills in balancing multiple 
functions (funding, hiring, tech equipment) 
*joint work experience improves and speeds up the decision 
making in the NV team 
*Interviews w/ TMTs of 98 
semiconductor firms founded 1978-85 
DV: time to market the 1st product = 
months 
IVs: entrepren. exper – % founders w/ 
start-up exper, % founders w/ joint work 
exper, mean years industry exper, tech 
innovation (Kn created and synthesized), 
% VC owned, outside investors on 
founding board, # competitors; org 
structure – marketing and manuf positions 
*Entrepreneurial exper  NS speed 
*tech innov  (+) time to market 
*manuf & marketing position  (-) 
time to market 
*competition  (-) time to market 
*fin resources  (-) time to market 
* Silicon Valley  (-) time to mrkt 
Shane & 
Khurana 
(2003 – ICC) 
RQ: what is the effect of inventor teams’ prior experience on 
the probability that an innovation will be commercialized 
through founding of NV? 
*Prior experience influences individuals’ expectations about 
the liability of newness their NV would face and the external 
expectations of the capability of the NV to overcome this 
*1387 MIT inventions (patents) 1980-
1996 
DV: firm founding (0/1) for each patent 
IVs:  
*firm founding experience = aver # of 
prior MIT inventions that led to founding 
*founding exper  (+) NV founding 
*financing exper  (+) founding 
*social status  (+) founding  
 
liability, and thus impact the likelihood of founding a NV, 
given opportunity of certain quality 
*financial experience  access to resources 
*founding experience  familiarity w/ entrepreneurial roles 
and skills 
*status  legitimacy 
of NV across all the inventors of the 
patent, *financing exper. = aver # of prior 
inventions that led to external financing 
of NVs across all the inventors of the 
patent,  
*social status = max university rank 
across the set of inventors who filed the 
patent 
Controls: radicalness, prior patents, tech 
field, # of firms in the industry, year 




Plots of the Significant Interaction Effects of Symbolic Activities and Resource 
Signals on Media Visibility 
 






































































































































































Plots of the Reverced Interaction Effects of Symbolic Activities and Relationships 
with Customers and Partners on Media Visibility 
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